Billeder på siden
PDF
ePub

ingly acute remarks have been made by Brooke Taylor* and other writers; but without going into these subtleties, we imagine there is not one in a million who would for a moment be willing to suspend this cardinal truth on any such notion as that of the necessary objective existence of God, merely because the mind has such an idea.

Another modification of Descartes' favourite argument is founded on the assertion that the idea of God in the mind cannot have been made in the mind, because the mind cannot unmake it. Ergò, God exists. To this it has been justly replied, that it would be difficult to prove the objective reality of every notion, which the mind in accordance with its laws has clearly fabricated, but which it cannot afterwards by any act of the will destroy; and by those who flatter themselves that the notion of God could and would be naturally fabricated out of the combination and aggregation of all known perfections seen in man, the force of this argument would be denied.

[ocr errors]
[ocr errors]

Another modification of the argument from the idea of God, though in strictness a deduction à posteriori-is this, I have the 'idea of a being infinite and eternal: How came I by this idea? I am a finite and imperfect being, and I cannot have given it to myself; there must be at least as much reality in the cause as in the effect.' As one of his critics remarks, there does not seem much difference between this, and saying, 'I am, and am 'conscious I did not bestow existence on myself: therefore I ' owe it ultimately to another.' But Descartes also avails himself of this form of the argument, though he seems to prefer the former. Either is in the ordinary form of the deduction à posteriori - from effect to cause only the premises are exclusive of external phenomena and are derived simply from the facts of our consciousness. And to most men, this argument will be cogent enough for the proof, in the last resort, of some cause of our existence, not itself derived; though they may reject the superfluous clause Descartes has added, for if I had bestowed existence on myself, I should, doubtless, have conferred all ' other perfections;' since, if there be any one who has the front to say that he has bestowed existence on himself, he would, we apprehend, be little likely to flinch from saying that he has also bestowed all possible perfections on himself— at least, for aught he knows!

[ocr errors]
[ocr errors]

We are far from denying that there is great force in the argument for the divine existence derived from the constitution of

* Cited in Hallam's Literature of Europe. Criticism on Descartes, vol. iii. pp. 237, 238.

1852. The Cartesian Proof of the Existence of God.

39

the human mind, when properly stated. It requires to be presented, however, in a different form, and must also occupy a totally different place to what it does in Descartes' philosophy. That the human mind, as it gradually unfolds, under an external stimulus indeed, but in harmony with its own original laws of thought, which impose upon it a certain course of development, does very generally (we may say, almost universally) arrive at some notions of a deity, is a matter of undeniable experience. This general fact requires to be accounted for as much as any other; and how can it be accounted for so naturally as by the supposition that man is thus constituted, because that being to whom it thus apparently bears uniform testimony, has thus constituted him? But then this argument is quite different from that of Descartes. This last presupposes, not simply a constitution of mind which, developing pari passu with the intuition of an external world, and by contact with it, will necessarily evolve the idea of God; but such an idea as, even if dependent in fact for its development on external influences, enables us, and alone enables us by its internal light, to infer the actual existence of an external world. So far again as the argument depends for its cogency on the uniformity of the phenomenon, as it is manifested in the mind of man generally, it must, as we have said, occupy a totally different place to what it does in Descartes' philosophy. For it must be recollected, that Descartes, at this stage of his self-constructed universe, knows nothing of an external world-nothing, therefore, as to whether there be any other minds or not-and nothing, therefore, as to whether the uniformity which supports the above argument exist or not. He believes in an external world, and that its phenomena are not illusions, only because he has demonstrated previously the existence of God from the idea of him. The idea itself, therefore, must be supposed irresistibly distinct and powerful to each individual mind.

The Apostle John, (it may be humbly presumed, as sound a divine as, and certainly in this case a sounder philosopher than Descartes) makes the love of our brother easier than the love of God, our brother being more familiarly known than God: 'He who loveth not his brother whom he hath seen, how shall 'he love God whom he hath not seen?' Descartes goes

another way to work, and asks, how shall man believe even the existence of his brother whom he hath seen, if he first of all believe not in the existence of God whom he hath not seen ?

Whatever force has been supposed to attach to these mentally deduced proofs of the Deity, from the idea of God in the human mind, we see not anything in them, even when exhibited in the

best form, and still less in relation to the unhappy position they occupy in Descartes' philosophy, of which the atheist cannot easily evade the force. In looking even at the more reasonable form of the argument, it certainly appears to be just as easy for one who finds no difficulty in affirming that all the proofs of a designing and superintending wisdom which the universe presents, are but mere chance, to urge exactly the same of the apparent voice of intuition, the uniform, or all but uniform tendencies of the constitution of the human mind; they are, he would say, quite as plausibly, (and we must say not more impudently,) simply one more of the infinite freaks of chance!

On that theory of 'innate ideas,' which has been generally, though falsely, attributed to Descartes, the answers are easy enough. Men in general will say, that if we have an innate idea' of God in this sense, if an idea thus powerful be impressed on each individual mind, it seems strange that it should need any inference or argument to make it plainer, or that it should admit of any dispute. Far from finding that all men have a 'clear and distinct idea of an infinite and 'eternal being,' they will say, that the ideas formed of God in the vast majority of instances have been most grossly inadequate and limited; that it is a common remark, borne out by all history, that so far from man's ideas of God being Godlike, his gods have usually been human, or even below that. It will seem strange indeed, they will argue, that if there be an ́ innate idea' in all men, coeval with the soul itself and congenital with its faculties, it should have been so uniformly debased and mutilated.

[ocr errors]

While we do not see the often vaunted superiority of the argument derived from the constitution of the human mind alone, even when it is put, as we conceive, in the most cautious terms and most favourable form, we are far from denying, when so put, its cogency. Powerful it undoubtedly is; and would to all but an atheist be very convincing. But in truth, if there be such a thing as a bona fide atheist-who is not also mad, argument with him, in any shape, is a very hopeless sort of an affair. If however, with such a man any argument be less inefficacious than another, it is, we firmly believe, what is called that à posteriori argument, which it has been the fashion of late years so absurdly to decry. At all events, it is that to which human nature, savage and civilised, appeals in one shape or other, when asked why it thinks there is a God at all. It points its finger at the sublime trophies of wisdom and power with which the universe is filled, and says, if not in so many words, in words of kindred meaning, the invisible things of the Creator are known

[ocr errors]

1852.

The Infinite and the Indefinite.

41

'by the visible things he hath made; even his eternal power and Godhead.' He that planted the eye, shall he not see? He that 'made the ear, shall he not hear?' But it is infinitely far from our purpose to exalt any one proof of this primal truth at the expense of the rest; and happily, as in other cases, some may be more forcible to one class of minds, and some to another.

In exhibiting the principal points of Descartes' argument on this great theme, we have passed by many of the metaphysical refinements by which he attempts to sustain or illustrate his views. In one of his illustrations there is a curious subtlety; more curious indeed than convincing. He endeavours to show in his Method,' or rather he confidently asserts without showing, that the clear and distinct idea of a triangle' does not involve the necessary existence of any triangle, but that the clear and distinct notion of God does involve his necessary existence. Yet both there* and in his Meditations,' he affirms that our idea of God involves his existence, just as our idea of a triangle involves the idea of the equality of its three angles to two right angles. One would imagine that a real parity of reasoning would imply, that as our clear and distinct idea of a Perfect Being involves his real existence; so our clear and distinct idea of a triangle involves its existence. Yet this he denies.

[ocr errors]

Similarly inconsistent appear to us his statements respecting our notions of the infinite. In his Principia,' he contents himself with briefly stating that infinity as attached to God is a positive and unique idea, and differs from the notion as applied to the infinite in magnitude and number. To the latter, he proposes applying the term indefinite. Gassendi endeavours to show the extreme precariousness of any conclusion based on such distinction, by affirming that the idea of the infinite in both cases is negative, founded on the absence of limit; that infinite space is space indefinitely vast; that infinite wisdom, in the same manner, is wisdom indefinitely great; and that both the one and the other result from successive augmentations of limited magnitudes and limited wisdom. Descartes, in his reply, says, 'It is not true that we conceive 'the infinite by the negation of the finite; seeing that, on the contrary, all limitation contains in itself the negation of 'the infinite' (p. 360. edition by M. Simon). Think not that 'the idea we have of God, is formed by perpetual augmentation ' of the perfection of the creatures; it is formed entire and alone,' —tout entière et tout à la fois,— from the conception by our mind

* La Methode, Partie Quatrième.

of infinite being-incapable of any sort of augmentation.' (Ibid. p. 365.) *

[ocr errors]

6

Now it is at all events curious, that in one of his letters Descartes distinctly concedes that our idea of the infinite perfection of God is deduced from the consciousness of similar, though very minute attributes in us - which are indefinitely enlarged and applied to him. The passage is hard to reconcile with the preceding, and with many others. As it has not, so far as we are aware, been noticed by modern critics, we translate it. The letter containing it (Epist. pars I. p. 279.) is in reply to certain objections. You say, that inasmuch as there is somewhat of wisdom, power, goodness, magni'tude, and so on in ourselves, we form the idea of infinite or ' at least indefinite wisdom, power, goodness, and the other per'fections which are attributed to God, just as we form the idea ' of infinite magnitude; all which I freely concede; and I am 'clearly persuaded that we have no other idea of God than what ' is formed in this manner. But the force of my argument' (the celebrated argument) consists in this, that I contend that it 'would be impossible for me, by my thinking faculty, to expand "those perfections which are minute in me to the notion of the 'infinite, except we derived our existence from a being in whom ' these perfections are in fact found infinite; as neither from the inspection of a minute quantity or a limited body, could I con'ceive indefinite quantity, unless the magnitude of the universe 'were, or at least might be, indefinite. By the way, it is wonderful that the last clause should not have convinced Descartes of the precariousness of his logic in his celebrated paralogism: for a parity of conclusion would have led him to say, that similarly he could not conceive the infinite, unless the Infinite Being did exist-or at least might exist. But as he could prove that God did exist from the very idea of him, so he would perhaps have been prepared to prove that he must exist, if he might have existed. However this may be, the statements in reference to the formation of the notion of the infinite remain to us somewhat inconsistent. It is certainly sufficiently perplexing, when not only different metaphysicians tell us, but even the same metaphysician, first, that the notion of the finite is formed from the negation of the infinite, and, secondly, that the notion of the infinite is formed from the augmentation of the finite.

[ocr errors]

But we must endeavour to secure a little space for the consideration of Descartes' Method.'

It is curious to see the widely different judgments which different men form of the merits of the very same philosophers. Descartes,' says M. Cousin, has established in France pre

[ocr errors]
« ForrigeFortsæt »