The court of aldermen is the bench of magistrates for the city of London. It also tries the validity of the elections of some officers in the corporation, including the aldermen and common councilmen. It has the power of ordering money to be expended from the City cash. It appoints many functionaries, consisting principally of officers employed in administering justice or superintending the police. It licenses all brokers within the City.

The court of common council is the legislative body of the corporation. In this character it has by custom, now confirmed by statute, a much larger power of modifying the constitution of the corporation than the law allows to other municipal bodies. The language of the custom, as set out and established on different legal proceedings, purports that, where any customs in the City are difficult in practice or defective, or where new cases arise for which the existing state of things affords no remedy, the common council may apply a remedy congruum bona fidei et rationi consonum," subject to the proviso that the remedying ordinance be useful to the King and people; a qualification vague in its terms, and not precisely explained or defined by decisions of courts of law. Under this power, however, the common council continually carries into effect important alterations in the constitution of the corporation. This body has also the power of dispensing money, and has the exclusive management of the great landed property of the City. It has many other important executive functions; among these are the care of London and Blackfriars Bridges, the navigation of the Thames, and the metage of corn, coal, fruit, salt, &c. The common council also elects the great majority of the most important functionaries of the corporation.

The business of the court of common hall is almost entirely confined to the election of certain officers.

In the courts, both of aldermen and common council, many important duties, in some instances executive, are performed by committees. Some of these are standing committees, and others are appointed for the special occasion. These committees, though varying in their particular details, have an organization of nearly an uniform character, the general principle of which is to distribute power, as equally as possible, among the members representing the several wards. In several of the committees of the common council a custom prevails of setting apart a certain portion of the sum allowed for the expenses of the committee by the common council, for the remuneration of such members as attend by a given hour. This sum is trifling in the case of each member; it is, however, said to ensure to a great degree punctuality of attendance.

The wards are very unequal in size and population. The consequence of course is, that the elective right is very unequally distributed throughout the City. The inconsistency is aggravated by the difference in the methods of election pursued in the several wards.

The court of aldermen still offers an instance of that union of magisterial, judicial, and legislative authority which Parliament has recently condemned and dissolved in other corporations. An additional inconvenience is found in London from the separate existence of the court of aldermen as a municipal court, the exclusive character of which appears to excite jealousy, whilst, at the same time, by the constitution of the City, whatever advantages might be obtained from it as a second legislative chamber, are not secured or aimed at. An unlimited command over the funds of the City is held by two independent bodies, the court of aldermen and the court of common council. The members of the former, though elected in the first instance by a popular constituency, hold their office for life; a circumstance not desirable when the party elected is to have the power of unlimited expenditure of the income of the municipal body to which the electors belong. In practice, however, the court of aldermen generally limit the exercise of their power over the funds of the corporation to objects connected with their functions as magistrates rather than as corporators.

The power, which the same court possesses, of trying the validity of certain elections, appears to us to be one of which the advantage is very questionable. Still stronger objections seem to us to exist against a privilege, which this court possesses, of rejecting, without any reason assigned, any person chosen for alderman by the electors, and, after three such rejections, of nominating an alderman to the yacancy.

A very important question, as to the common council, is, whether the aldermen ought to continue members of it, or whether the whole of it should be periodically elected. It seems clear to us that the aldermen have become unpopular, as members of the common council, in consequence of their holding seats in the legislative body from which they cannot be displaced by the constituency. Again, the performance of their other functions is watched with a jealous and unkind feeling, which is, we

consider, mainly attributable to their position in the common council. The union of the two characters produces this embarrassment, that at present the legislative body contains members upon whom the constituency has no check, and that, if the principle of re-election were made universal, there would be continual re-elections of magistrates by a popular constituency, which would be at least a violation of a principle hitherto almost universally recognised in this country.

The lord mayor possesses, as presiding officer of the common council, a control over its proceedings, which is liable to be capriciously or arbitrarily exercised, or at any rate to the suspicion of being so exercised. In fact, it appears that the common council was, in its origin, not so much a legislative body as an assembly of which the duty was to assist the lord mayor by counsel or otherwise, and that hence his power in this assembly is much greater than that ordinarily exercised by the president of a deliberative body.

It is a very serious and difficult question, whether the extensive power of internal legislation possessed by the common council ought to be continued. The case is certainly altogether anomalous: we have, however, no reason for believing that the power has been dishonestly or injudiciously exercised, so far as the interests of the corporation are concerned. At any rate this body appears to us to have legislated for the constitution of the corporation more wisely than the Legislature of the country did in the instance of the great organic alteration introduced by the statute 11 Geo. I. c. 18. It is, nevertheless, a matter requiring much consideration, whether so strong an exception to the general law of corporations should be permitted to continue, upon a full revision of the municipal system of the country.

The number of two hundred and sixty-six persons, of which the common council consists, appears to us much too large, and more likely to be detrimental to their efficiency and respectability than to be favourable to calm deliberation. Less than one-fourth part of the present number of the common council could, perhaps, perform even all their present multifarious duties with as much efficacy, and with as little fatigue to themselves, as on the present system.

The highest classes of commercial men do not ordinarily take a share in the management of the corporation. Many causes have been assigned for this; no one completely satisfactory in itself. The fact unquestionably is, that a large proportion of the highest classes of those who might, if they pleased, take an important part in the corporation, feel a repugnance in doing so. It did not appear from any evidence given to the commissioners that this had produced positive evil; yet it must be considered as a very undesirable characteristic of the present state of things. It would perhaps disappear if the corporation of London were no longer confined to its present limited district, which now comprehends scarcely any but the commercial part of the metropolis.

One governing body, the common hall, consists exclusively of freemen who are liverymen. Supposing that any useful purpose is answered by such an assembly, we know of no circumstance justifying this restriction to the livery. In the first place, no reason has occurred to us for withholding such a right from the general body of freemen; and, secondly, if a selection must be made, we think that a more capricious and unreasonable method of restriction could scarcely have been devised. There are, perhaps, hardly any two companies in which the same circumstances are supposed to create a claim to an admission to the livery, or an obligation to take it up (for in some companies it is considered a privilege, in others a burthen); and in no one does it appear to us that the selection rests upon any principle which can be shown to be applicable with advantage to the distinction between different classes of municipal rights. There is at present a manifest absurdity in attaching political and municipal privileges to the nominees of corporations which claim to be private, independent of the City, and irresponsible. The origin of this restriction is, historically, matter of some doubt; but it is now affirmed by a statute passed in the reign of George I., which excited great opposition at the time. The objection which we have made is, in effect, an objection to the court of common hall altogether, under its present constitution.

CORPORATE OFFICERS.

The functionaries of the corporation of London may be divided practically into nine classes. The first comprehends those possessing legislative power; the second those connected with courts of law; the third, those acting in matters of police; the fourth, those employed in the City prisons; the fifth, those to whom the care of public buildings or works is assigned; the sixth, those engaged in the management of the corporation property; the seventh, those superintending tolls and markets, and the metages entrusted to the corporation; the eighth, the

household of the lord mayor, the members of which, however, now in fact perform functions falling under some of the other heads; and the ninth, a miscellaneous class, such as attendants on occasions of ceremony, attendants at public buildings, &c. This classification must be taken as an imperfect one, and many officers may be considered as belonging to more than one of these classes.

The mayor, the two sheriffs, the chamberlain, the auditors, and a few others, are elected in the common hall; but the mayor not exclusively so. He is chosen from such aldermen as have served the office of sheriff. Of these the common hall names two, who are ordinarily the two senior persons who are able and willing to serve. Of the two thus named by the common hall the court of aldermen selects one, ordinarily the senior one.

The functions of the mayor are very multifarious. He is the principal magistrate of the City, and a very great part of his time is absorbed by his magisterial duties. He presides over the courts of aldermen, common council, and common hall. He is expected to take the lead in many questions of public interest which occur from time to time; and he is continually applied to in private concerns as arbitrator and adviser. He also fills several other functions which have now become of less importance, such as conservator of the Thames, escheator, &c. ; of some other departments he is the nominal head, the actual duties being performed by others; thus he is technically the head of a city court of law, of which the actual president is the recorder. The pecuniary allowance made to him amounts nearly to 80007. per annum; but he is expected to expend a much larger sum than this during his year of office.

The offices of the sheriffs and auditors will be understood from their titles. The sheriffs are expected to expend much more than the sum allowed to them, which amounts to 4007. or 5007. for each.

The chamberlain is the treasurer of the corporation, and he also admits to the freedom, adjudicates upon disputes between apprentices and their masters, and directs the prosecutions of persons who carry on retail business in the City without being free. His fixed annual emoluments amount to from 11007. to 12007., and he has also the profits arising from holding balances in his hands, which profits are said to amount annually to from 10007. to 20007.

The court of aldermen elects several officers, whose functions are for the most part connected with the administration of justice, the police and the prisons. The most important of these is the recorder, who is the principal judge of the corporation, and also their principal law adviser.

The court of common council elects the great majority of the most important officers, including the town clerk. Some of them, such as the common sergeant, and the judges of the sheriffs' courts, are connected to a most important extent with the administration of justice; others with the revenue of the corporation; and some with the police. The officers who have been elected since 1816 hold their offices for a year, but are almost invariably re-elected. This regulation, however, does not apply to the common sergeant, town clerk, or judges of the sheriffs' courts. The elections are guarded by many checks; such is a provision excluding from office members of the common council. In the case of most of the officers elected by the common council, the confirmation of the court of aldermen is required; whether, in these cases, the act of the latter court is more than merely ministerial seems not to be settled.

It is a common practice with the common council, when offices of any importance become vacant, to refer to a committee the business of examining into the duties of the office, and reporting whether they should be changed, whether the office itself should be abolished or consolidated with any other, whether the salary should be altered, and questions of a similar kind. The reports which have resulted from these inquiries furnish most valuable accounts of all relating to the office; and many most important reforms have been effected from time to time with a very scrupulous regard to existing interests. We believe that the history of no other corporation furnishes such honourable testimonials of the vigilance, good sense, and justice of its legislative body.

Several of the officers are appointed by the committees, to which certain executive departments are confided.

We have described the methods of electing the aldermen and common councilmen, by freemen being ten pound householders.

Some subordinate officers are appointed by the superior officers.

A few offices are disposed of by sale. The holder has the power of disposing of his office during his life; but, if he die without doing so, the corporation disposes of it. The right of disposing of many of these offices, in default of their being sold by the owner, was formerly enjoyed either by the lord mayor or the sheriffs.

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consider, mainly attributable to their position in the common council. The union of the two characters produces this embarrassment, that at present the legislative body contains members upon whom the constituency has no check, and that, if the principle of re-election were made universal, there would be continual re-elections of magistrates by a popular constituency, which would be at least a violation of a principle hitherto almost universally recognised in this country.

The lord mayor possesses, as presiding officer of the common council, a control over its proceedings, which is liable to be capriciously or arbitrarily exercised, or at any rate to the suspicion of being so exercised. In fact, it appears that the common council was, in its origin, not so much a legislative body as an assembly of which the duty was to assist the lord mayor by counsel or otherwise, and that hence his power in this assembly is much greater than that ordinarily exercised by the president of a deliberative body.

It is a very serious and difficult question, whether the extensive power of internal legislation possessed by the common council ought to be continued. The case is certainly altogether anomalous : we have, however, no reason for believing that the power has been dishonestly or injudiciously excrcised, so far as the interests of the corporation are concerned. At any rate this body appears to us to have legislated for the constitution of the corporation more wisely than the Legislature of the country did in the instance of the great organic alteration introduced by the statute 11 Ģeo. I. c. 18. It is, nevertheless, a matter requiring much consideration, whether so strong an exception to the general law of corporations should be permitted to continue, upon a full revision of the municipal system of the country.

The number of two hundred and sixty-six persons, of which the common council consists, appears to us much too large, and more likely to be detrimental to their efficiency and respectability than to be favourable to calm deliberation. Less than one-fourth part of the present number of the common council could, perhaps, perform even all their present multifarious duties with as much efficacy, and with as little fatigue to themselves, as on the present system.

The highest classes of commercial men do not ordinarily take a share in the management of the corporation. Many causes have been assigned for this; no one completely satisfactory in itself. The fact unquestionably is, that a large proportion of the highest classes of those who might, if they pleased, take an important part in the corporation, feel a repugnance in doing so. It did not appear from any evidence given to the commissioners that this had produced positive evil; yet it must be considered as a very undesirable characteristic of the present state of things. It would perhaps disappear if the corporation of London were no longer confined to its present limited district, which now comprehends scarcely any but the commercial part of the metropolis.

One governing body, the common hall, consists exclusively of freemen who are liverymen. Supposing that any useful purpose is answered by such an assembly, we know of no circumstance justifying this restriction to the livery. In the first place, no reason has occurred to us for withholding such a right from the general body of freemen; and, secondly, if a selection must be made, we think that a more capricious and unreasonable method of restriction could scarcely have been devised. There are, perhaps, hardly any two companies in which the same circumstances are supposed to create a claim to an admission to the livery, or an obligation to take it up (for in some companies it is considered a privilege, in others a burthen); and in no one does it appear to us that the selection rests upon any principle which can be shown to be applicable with advantage to the distinction between different classes of municipal rights. There is at present a manifest absurdity in attaching political and municipal privileges to the nominees of corporations which claim to be private, independent of the City, and irresponsible. The origin of this restriction is, historically, matter of some doubt; but it is now affirmed by a statute passed in the reign of George I., which excited great opposition at the time. The objection which we have made is, in effect, an objection to the court of common hall altogether, under its present constitution.

CORPORATE OFFICERS.

The functionaries of the corporation of London may be divided practically into nine classes. The first comprehends those possessing legislative power; the second those connected with courts of law; the third, those acting in matters of police; the fourth, those employed in the City prisons; the fifth, those to whom the care of public buildings or works is assigned; the sixth, those engaged in the management of the corporation property; the seventh, those superintending tolls and markets, and the metages entrusted to the corporation; the eighth, the

household of the lord mayor, the members of which, however, now in fact perform functions falling under some of the other heads; and the ninth, a miscellaneous class, such as attendants on occasions of ceremony, attendants at public buildings, &c. This classification must be taken as an imperfect one, and many officers may be considered as belonging to more than one of these classes.

The mayor, the two sheriffs, the chamberlain, the auditors, and a few others, are elected in the common hall; but the mayor not exclusively so. He is chosen from such aldermen as have served the office of sheriff. Of these the common hall names two, who are ordinarily the two senior persons who are able and willing to serve. Of the two thus named by the common hall the court of aldermen selects one, ordinarily the senior one.

The functions of the mayor are very multifarious. He is the principal magistrate of the City, and a very great part of his time is absorbed by his magisterial duties. He presides over the courts of aldermen, common council, and common hall. He is expected to take the lead in many questions of public interest which occur from time to time; and he is continually applied to in private concerns as arbitrator and adviser. He also fills several other functions which have now become of less importance, such as conservator of the Thames, escheator, &c.; of some other departments he is the nominal head, the actual duties being performed by others; thus he is technically the head of a city court of law, of which the actual president is the recorder. The pecuniary allowance made to him amounts nearly to 80007. per annum; but he is expected to expend a much larger sum than this during his year of office.

The offices of the sheriffs and auditors will be understood from their titles. The sheriffs are expected to expend much more than the sum allowed to them, which amounts to 4007. or 500l. for each.

The chamberlain is the treasurer of the corporation, and he also admits to the freedom, adjudicates upon disputes between apprentices and their masters, and directs the prosecutions of persons who carry on 1etail business in the City without being free. His fixed annual emoluments amount to from 11007. to 12007., and he has also the profits arising from holding balances in his hands, which profits are said to amount annually to from 1000l. to 20007.

The court of aldermen elects several officers, whose functions are for the most part connected with the administration of justice, the police and the prisons. The most important of these is the recorder, who is the principal judge of the corporation, and also their principal law adviser.

The court of common council elects the great majority of the most important officers, including the town clerk. Some of them, such as the common sergeant, and the judges of the sheriffs' courts, are connected to a most important extent with the administration of justice; others with the revenue of the corporation; and some with the police. The officers who have been elected since 1816 hold their offices for a year, but are almost invariably re-elected. This regulation, however, does not apply to the common sergeant, town clerk, or judges of the sheriffs' courts. The elections are guarded by many checks; such is a provision excluding from office members of the common council. In the case of most of the officers elected by the common council, the confirmation of the court of aldermen is required; whether, in these cases, the act of the latter court is more than merely ministerial seems not to be settled.

It is a common practice with the common council, when offices of any importance become vacant, to refer to a committee the business of examining into the duties of the office, and reporting whether they should be changed, whether the office itself should be abolished or consolidated with any other, whether the salary should be altered, and questions of a similar kind. The reports which have resulted from these inquiries furnish most valuable accounts of all relating to the office; and many most important reforms have been effected from time to time with a very scrupulous regard to existing interests. We believe that the history of no other corporation furnishes such honourable testimonials of the vigilance, good sense, and justice of its legislative body.

Several of the officers are appointed by the committees, to which certain executive departments are confided.

We have described the methods of electing the aldermen and common councilmen, by freemen being ten pound householders.

Some subordinate officers are appointed by the superior officers.

A few offices are disposed of by sale. The holder has the power of disposing of his office during his life; but, if he die without doing so, the corporation disposes of it. The right of disposing of many of these offices, in default of their being sold by the owner, was formerly enjoyed either by the lord mayor or the sheriffs.

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