becomes necessary to look out for fome third Idea that will admit of fuch an Application as the present Cafe requires; wherein if we fucceed, all Difficulties vanish, and the Relation we are in Quest of may be traced with Ease. Thus right-lined Figures are all reduced to Squares, by Means of which we can measure their Areas, and determine exactly their Agreement or Disagreement in Point of Magnitude.

at Truth termed Rea

II. IF now it be asked, how any third Idea can serve to discover a Relation between two others, This Manner I answer, by being compared severally with these of arriving others; for fuch a Comparison enables us to fee how far the Ideas with which this third is com- foning. pared are connected or disjoined between themselves. In the Example mentioned above of two right-lined Figures, if we compare each of them with fome Square whose Area is known, and find the one exactly equal to it, and the other less by a square Inch, we immediately conclude that the Area of the first Figure is a square Inch greater than that of the second. This Manner of determining the Relation between any two Ideas, by the Intervention of fome third with which they may be compared, is that which we call Reasoning, and is indeed the chief Instrument by which we push on our Discoveries and enlarge our Knowledge. The great Art lies in finding out fuch intermediate Ideas, as, when compared with the others in the Question, will furnith evident and known Truths, because, as will afterwards appear, it is only by Means of them that we arrive at the Knowledge of what is hidden and remote.

The Parts

that confiitute an Act of Reasoning and a Syllogifm.

III. FROM what has been faid it appears, that every Act of Reasoning necessarily includes three diftinct Judgements; two wherein the Ideas whose Relation we want to discover are severally compared with the middle Idea, and a third wherein they are themselves connected or disjoined, according to the Result of that Comparison. Now as in the second Part of Logick our Judgements, when put into Words, were called Propofitions, fo here in the third Part the Expref-. fions of our Reafoning are termed Syllogisms. And hence it follows, that as every Act of Reasoning implies three several Judgements, so every Syllogism must include three distinct Propofitions. When a Reasoning is thus put into Words, and appears in Form of a Syllogifm, the intermediate Idea made Ufe of, to discover the Agreement or Difagreement we fearch for, is called the middle Term; and the two Ideas themselves, with which this third is compared, go by the Name of the Extremes.

IV. BUT

Instance, Man IV. BUT as these Things are best illuftrated and Account by Examples; let us, for Instance, set ourselves ableness. to enquire, Whether Men are accountable for their Artions. As the Relation between the Ideas of Man and Accountableness comes not within the immediate View of the Mind, our first Care must be to find out fome third Idea that will enable us the more easily to discover and trace it. A very small Measure of Reflection is sufficient to inform us, that no Creature can be accountable for his Actions, unless we suppose him capable of diftinguishing the good from the bad; that is, unless we suppose him poffefsed of Reason. Nor is this alone sufficient. For what would it avail him to know good from bad Actions, if he had no Freedom of Choice, nor could avoid the one and pursue the other? Hence it becomes neceffary to take in both Confiderations in the present Cafe. It is at the fame Time equally apparent, that wherever there is this Ability of diftinguishing good from bad Actions, and of pursuing the one and avoiding the other, there also a Creature is accountable. We have then got a third Idea, with which Accountableness is infeparably connected, viz. Reason and Liberty; which are here to be confidered as making up one complex Conception. Let us now take this middle Idea, and compare it with the other Term in the Question, viz. Man, and we all know by Experience that it may be affirmed of him. Having thus by Means of the intermediate Idea formed two several Judgements, viz. that Man is poffefsfed of Reason and Liberty; and that Reason and Liberty imply Accountableness; a third obviously and necessarily follows, viz. that Man is accountable for his Actions. Here then we have a compleat Act of Reafoning, in which, according to what has been already observed, there are three distinct Judgements; two that may be Ailed previous, inasmuch as they lead to the other, and arife from comparing the middle Idea with the two Ideas in the Queftion: The third is a Consequence of these previous Acts, and flows from combining the extreme Ideas between themselves. If now we put this Reasoning into Words, it exhibits what Logicians term a Syllogifm, and, when proposed in due Form,

runs thus:

Every Creature poffeffed of Reason and Liberty is accountable for his Actions.

Man is a Creature poffeffed of Reason and Liberty:
Therefore Man is accountable for his Attions.

V. In this Syllogism we may observe, that there are three feveral Propofitions, expreffing the three Judgements implied in the Act of Reafon

ing; and so difpofed, as to represent distinctly what passes within the Mind in tracing the more distant Relations of its Ideas. The two first Propofitions anfwer the two previous Judgements in Reasoning, and are called the Premises, because they are placed before the other. The third is terined the Conclufion, as being gained in confequence of what was afferted in the Premises. We are alfo to remember, that the Terms expreffing the two Ideas whose Relations we inquire after, as here Man and Accountableness, are in general called the Extremes; and that the intermediate Idea, by Means of which the Relation is traced, viz. A Creature poffeffed of Reason and Liberty, takes the Names of the middle Term. Hence it follows, that by the Premises of a Syllogifin we are always to understand the two Propositions, where the middle Term is severally compared with the Extremes; for these constitute the previous Judgements, whence the Truth we are in Quest of is by Reasoning deduced. The Conclusion is that other Propofition, in which the Extremes themselves are joined or feparated agreeably to what appears upon the above Comparifon. All this is evidently seen in the foregoing Syllogifm, where the two first Propofitions which represent the Premises, and the third that makes the Conclufion, are exactly agreeable to the Definitions here given.

Minor Pro

VI. BEFORE we take Leave of this Article, it Major and will be farther necessary to observe, that as the Minor Term, Conclufion is made up of the extreme Terms of Major and the Syllogifm, so that Extreme, which ferves as the Predicate of the Conclusion, goes by the Name position. of the Major Term: The other Extreme, which makes tlre Subject in the fame Proposition, is called the Minor Term. From this Diftinction of the Extremes arifes also a Diftinction between the Premises, where these Extremes are severally compared with the middle Term. That Propofition which coinpares the greater Extreme, or the Predicate of the Conclufion with the middle Term, is called the Major Propofition: The other, wherein the fame middle Term is compared with the Subject of the Conclusion or lesser Extreme, is called the Minor Proposition. All this is obvious from the Syllogifm already given, where the Conclufion is, Man is accountable for his Actions. For here the Predicate Accountable for his Actions, being connected with the middle Term in the first of the two Premifes; Every Creature poffeffod of Reason and Liberty is accountable for his Actions, gives what we call the Major Proposition. In the second of the Premises; Man is a Creature poffeffed of Reafon and Liberty, we find the leffer Extreme, or Subject

:

Subject of the Conclufion, viz. Man, connected with the fame middle Term, whence it is known to be the Minor Propofition. I shall only add, that when a Syllogifim is proposed in due Form, the Major Proposition is always placed first, the Minor next, and the Conclufion last, according as we have done in that offered above.

Judgement
and Propo-
fition, Rea-
foning and

VII. HAVING thus cleared the Way, by explaining fuch Terms as we are likely to have Occafion for in the Progress of this Treatise; it may

not be amiss to observe, that though we have careSyllogifm, dif- fully diftinguished between the Act of Reasoning tinguished. and a Syllogism, which is no more than the Expreffion of it, yet common Language is not so critical on this Head; the Term Reasoning being promiscuoufly used to fignify either the Judgements of the Mind as they follow one another in Train, or the Propofitions expressing these Judgements. Nor need we wonder that it is so, inasmuch as our Ideas and the Terms appropriated to them are so connected by Habit and Ufe, that our Thoughts fall as it were spontaneoufly into Language as faft as they rife in the Mind; so that even in our Reasonings within ourselves, we are not able wholly to lay afide Words. But notwithstanding this strict Connection between mental and verbal Reasoning, if I may be allowed that Expreffion, I thought it needful here to diftinguish them, in order to give a juft Idea of the Manner of deducing one Truth from another. While the Mind keeps the Ideas of Things in View, and combines its Judgements according to the real Evidence attending them, there is no great Danger of Miftake in our Reasonings, because we carry our Conclufions no farther than the Clearness of our Perceptions warrants us. But, where we make use of Words, the Cafe is often otherwife, nothing being more common than to let them pass without attending the Ideas they reprefent; infomuch that we frequently combine Expreffions, which, upon Examination, appear to have no determinate Meaning. Hence it greatly imports us to diftinguish between Reasoning and Syllogifm; and to take Care that the one be in all Cafes the true and just Representation of the other. However, as I am unwilling to recede too far from the common Forms of Speech, or to multiply Distinctions without Neceffity, I shall henceforward confider Propofitions as representing the real Judgements of the Mind, and Syllogifins as the true Copies of our Reasonings; which indeed they ought always to be, and undoubtedly always will be, to Men who think justly, and are defirous of arriving at Truth. Upon this Suppofition, there will be no Danger in

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1

ufing the Words Judgement and Propofition promifcuoufly; or in confidering Reasoning as either a Combination of various Judgements, or of the Propofitions expreffing them; because, being the exact Copies one of another, the Result will be in all Cafes the fame. Nor is it a small Advantage that we can thus conform to common Speech, without confounding our Ideas or running into Ambiguity. By this Means we bring ourselves upon a level with other Men, readily apprehend the Meaning of their Expreffions, and can with Ease convey our own Notions and Sentiments in their Minds.

VIII. THESE Things premised, we may in the In a fingle general define Reasoning to be an Act or Operation Act of Reaof the Mind, deducing some unknown Propofition Soning the Premises muft from other previous ones that are evident and known. be intuitive These previous Propofitions, in a fimple Act of Truths. Reafoning, are only two in Number; and it is always required that they be of themselves apparent to the Understanding, infomuch that we afsent to and perceive the Truth of them as foon as proposed. In the Syllogifm given above, the Premises are supposed to be felf-evident Truths; otherwise the Conclufion could not be inferred by a fingle Act of Reasoning. If, for Instance, in the Major, Every Creature poffeffed of Reason and Liberty is accountable for his Actions, the Connection between the Subject and Predicate could not be perceived by a bare Attention to the Ideas themselves; it is evident, that this Propofition would no less require a Proof than the Conclufion deduced from it. In this Cafe a new middle Term must be fought for, to trace the Connection here supposed; and this of course furnishes another Syllogifm, by which having established the Propofition in Question, we are then, and not before, at Liberty to use it in any fucceeding Train of Reasoning. And should it fo happen, that in this second Essay there was still fome previous Propofition whose Truth did not appear at first Sight, we must then have Recourse to a third Syllogifm, in order to lay open that Truth to the Mind; because so long as the Premises remain uncertain, the Conclufion built upon them must be so too. When, by conducting our Thoughts in this Manner, we at last arrive at some Syllogifm where the previous Propositions are intuitive Truths; the Mind then rests in full Security, as perceiving that the several Conclufions it has paffed through stand upon the immoveable Foundation of Self-evidence, and when traced to their Source terminate in it.