fion of an inexhaustible Treasure of Ideas sufficient to employ it to the full Extent of all its Powers, and furnish Matter for those various Opinions, Fancies, and Views of Things, that make up the Subject of its Thoughts and Contemplations. Let us but reflect upon the single Idea of Unity or One, and observe what a Variety of Combinations are formed, by continually adding it to itself; infomuch that the Understanding finds no Stop or Boundary in its Progress from Number to Number. In what an Infinity of different Lights may Extenfion alone be confidered? What Limits can be fet to that endless Diversity of Figures, which it is in the Power of the Imagination to fashion and represent to itself? If to these we add those numberless other Combinations that result from varioufly compounding and comparing the rest of our fimple Ideas, we shall have little Reason to complain of being limited to a scanty Measure of Knowledge, or that the Exercife of the human Faculties is confined within narrow Bounds. But having traced the Progress of the Mind through its original and fimple Ideas, until it begins to enlarge its Conceptions by uniting and tying them together; it is now Time to take a Survey of it as thus employed in multiplying its Views, that we may fee by what Steps it advances from one Degree of Improvement to another, and how it contrives to manage that infinite Stock of Materials it finds itself possessed of.

The Division of complex those of real Existences, and those framed by

VI. WHOEVER attentively confiders his own Thoughts, and takes a View of the several complicated Ideas that from Time to Time offer themselves to his Understanding, will readily observe, that many of them are such as have been derived from without, and suggested by different Objects affecting his Perception; others again are formed by the Mind itself, variously combining its fimple Ideas, as seems best to answer those Ends and Purposes it has for the present in View. Of the first Kind are all our Ideas of Substances, as of a Man, a Horse, a Stone, Gold: Of the second are those arbitrary Collections of Things, which we on all Occasions put together, either for their Ufefulness in the Commerce of Life, or to further the Pursuit of Knowledge: Such are our Ideas of stated Lengths, whether of Duration or Space, as Hours, Months, Miles, Leagues, &c. which Divisions are apparently the Creatures of the Mind, inasmuch as we often find them different in different Countries; a fure Sign that they are taken from no certain and invariable Standard in Nature. Many of our Ideas of human Actions Actions may be also referred to this Head, as Treason, Inceft, Manslaughter; which complex Notions we do not always derive from an actual View of what these Words describe, but often from combining the Circumstances of them in our own Minds, or, which is the most usual Way, by hearing their Names explained, and the Ideas they stand for enumerated. These two Classes comprehend all our complex Conceptions; it being impoffible to conceive any that are not either suggested to the Understanding by some real Existence, or formed by the Mind itself, arbitrarily uniting and compounding its Ideas. We shall treat of each in Order.

I.

CHAP. III.

Of our Ideas of Substances.

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HE first Head of complex Ideas, mentioned in the foregoing Chapter, is that of Substances, which I chuse to handle before the other, because, as will afterwards appear,

Ideas of Subftances, Collections of Simple Ideas, held together the Notices derived from this Source very by unknown much help us in forming those arbitrary ColSupport. lections which make up the second Divifion. For in many of them we take our Hints from the Reality of Things, and combine Ideas that actually exift together, though often with an Exclusion of others, as will be explained when we come to treat of abstract and universal Notions. It has been already observed, that the Impressions conveyed into the Understanding from external Objects, confift for the most Part of many different Ideas joined together, which all unite to make up one Whole. These Collections of various Ideas, thus co-exifting in the fame common Subject, and held together by some unknown Bond of Union, have been diftinguished by the Name of Substances, a Word which implies their subsisting of themselves, without Dependence (at least as far as our Knowledge reaches) on any other created Beings. Such are the Ideas we have of Gold, Iron, Water, a Man, &c. For if we fix upon any one of these, for instance, Gold, the Notion under which we represent it to ourselves, is that of a Body, yellow, very weighty, hard, fufible, malleable, &c, Where we may observe, that the several Properties that go to the Compofition of Gold are represented represented to us by clear and evident Perceptions; the Union too of these Properties, and their thereby conftituting a distinct Species of Body, is clearly apprehended by the Mind; but when we would push our Inquiries farther, and know wherein this Union confifts, what holds the Properties together, and gives them their Self-subsistence, here we find ourselves at a Lofs. However, as we cannot conceive Qualities, without at the same Time supposing some Subject in which they inhere; hence we are naturally led to form the Notion of a Support, which, ferving as a Foundation for the Coexistence and Union of the different Properties of Things, gives them that separate and independent Existence, under which they are represented to our Conception. This Support we denote by the Name Substance; and as it is an Idea applicable to all the different Combinations of Qualities that exist any where by themselves, they are accordingly all called Substances. Thus a House, a Bowl, a Stone, &c. having each their diftinguishing Properties, and being conceived to exist independent one of another, the Idea of Substance belongs

alike to them all.

II. IN Substances therefore there are two The Division Things to be confidered: First, the general No- of Modes into tion of Self-fubsistence, which, as I have faid, Effential and belongs equally to them all; and then the feve- Accidental. ral Qualities or Properties, by which the different Kinds and Individuals are diftinguished one from another. These Qua lities are otherwise called Modes; and have been diftinguished into Essential and Accidental, according as they are con+ ceived to be feparable or infeparable from the Subject to which they belong. Extenfion and Solidity are essential Modes of a Stone, because it cannot be conceived without them; but Roundness is only an accidental Mode, as a Stone may exist under any Shape or Figure, and yet still retain its Nature and other Properties.

III. I MIGHT run farther into these Divisions The Notion of and Subdivisions, in which Logicians have been self-fubfiftvery fertile; but as they tend little to the Ad- ence insepavancement of real Knowledge, and serve rather rable from to fill the Memory with Words and their Signifi- Subtances. cations, than furnish clear and distinct Apprehenfions of Things, I shall not trouble the Reader with them. It is more matefial to observe, that the Change of Properties in any Substance, though it oft-times changes the Nature of that Substance, that is, its Species or Kind; yet it never destroys VOL. II.

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the

the general Notion of Self-subsistence, but leaves that equally clear and applicable, as before any such Alteration happened. Wood, by the Application of Fire, is turned into Charcoal; but Charcoal, however different from Wood, is still a Substance. In like Manner, Wax may be converted into Flame and Smoak, a human Body will moulder into Dust, yet these Alterations destroy not their Being or F.xistence; they are still Substances as before, though under a different Form and Appearance. In the several Experiments made by Chymifts, Bodies undergo many Changes, and put on successively a great Variety of different Shapes; and yet, by the Skill and Address of the Operator, they are often brought back to their first and primitive Form. What Alteration can we suppose the Fire, or the Application of any other Body to make, unleis on the Configuration, Texture, or Cohesion of the minute Parts? When these are changed, the Body is proportionably changed; when they return to their original State, the Body likewife puts on its first and natural Appearance.

Foundation

IV. ALL that is essential to Matter, therefore, of the diffe- is the Cohesion of folid extended Parts; but as rent Species these Parts are capable of innumerable Configuof corporeal rations, as their Texture may be very various, Subftances. and the internal Constitution thence arifing be of Consequence extremely different in different Bodies, we may, from thefe Confiderations, conceive pretty clearly the Source and Foundation of all the different Species of corporeal Substances. Nor is this a Notion taken up at Random, or one of those chimerical Fancies in Philosophy, derived rather from a Warmth and Liveliness of Imagination, than Observations drawn from Things themselves. Do we not daily fee our Food, by the Changes it undergoes in the different Avenues of the Body, converted first into Blood, and thence employed in nourishing, building up, and enlarging the several Parts of that wonderful Fabrick? Rain defcending from the Clouds, and mixing with the Mould or Earth of a Garden, becomes Aliment for Trees of various Kinds, puts on a Diversity of Forms, according to the different Channels and Conveyances thro' which it paffes, and at last, after innumerable Changes and Transinutations, sprouts forth in Leaves, opens in Buds, or is converted into the Substance of the Tree itself. Can we conceive any greater Difference between the component Parts of Gold, and those of a Stone, than between the moistened Particles of Garden Mould, and those new Forms and Figures under which they appear, after they have

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been thus fashioned by Nature, for the Purposes of Growth and Nourishment?

Effence of
Substances
nothing but
the internal

Structure
and Confti-
tution:

V. IF this be duly attended to, it will not appear wonderful to affert, that the Variety of material Substances arises wholly from the different Configuration, Size, Texture, and Motion of the minute Parts. As these happen to be varioufly combined and knit together under different Forms, Bodies put on a Diversity of Appearances; and convey into the Mind, by the Senfes, all those several Impressions, by which they are diftinguished one from another. This internal Conftitution or Structure of Parts, from which the several Properties that diftinguish any Substance flow, is called the Effence of that Substance, and is in Fact unknown to us, any farther than by the perceivable Impreffions it makes upon the Organs of Sense. Gold, as has been faid, is a Body yellow, very weighty, hard, fusible, malleable, &c. That inward Structure and Conformation of its minute Particles, by which they are so closely linked together, and from which the Properties above-mentioned are conceived to flow, is called its Essence; and the Properties themselves are the perceivable Marks that make it known to us, and diftinguish it from all other Substances. For our Senfes are not acute enough to reach its inward Texture and Constitution. The Parts themselves, as well as their Arrangement, lie far beyond the utmost Penetration of human Sight, even when assisted by Microscopes, and all the other Contrivances of Art.

un

VI. THUS as to the Effence or internal Constitution of Gold, we are wholly in the Dark; known to us, Is wholly but many of the Properties derived from this Ef- nor ferves to fence make obvious and distinct Impressions, as diftinguish the Weight, Hardness, and yellow Colour, &c. the Species: These Properties combined together, and conceived as co-ex isting in the fame common Subject, make up our complex Idea of Gold. The fame may be faid of all the other Species of corporeal Substances, as Lead, Glafs, Water, &r. our Ideas of them being nothing else but a Collaction of the ordinary Qualities obfervable in them.

VII. THIS however ought to be observed, Yet is rightly that though the Effence or inward Structure of presumed to Bodies is altogether unknown to us, yet we be diftinet in rightly judge, that in all the several Species the all the feverd Effences are diftinct. For each Species being a Kinds.

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Collection