Collection of Properties, which, taken together, are different from those of every other Species, the Conformation of Parts on which those Properties depend, must in like Manner be different; and this, as we have faid, constitutes the Effence. Iron and Glass are evidently diftinct Kinds of Body, their perceivable Qualities have little or nothing common; and therefore the inward Structure or Conftitution from which these Qualities flow cannot be the fame in both. But. after all, this is the only Thing we can with Certainty affirm concerning these Effences, which lying so wholly in the Dark, we shall do well to lay them aside in our Reasonings about Things, and stick to those more intelligible and fettled Ideas got by joining together their various Properties and Powers. For thus only is true Knowledge promoted, when we argue from known Qualities, and not from a fuppofed internal Conftitution, which, however real in itself, yet comes not within the Reach of our Faculties, and therefore can never be a Ground to us for any Discoveries or Improvements. By what Steps we arrive at the Notion of immaterial Substances: VIII. MATERIAL Substance, as I have faid, includes the Idea of folid, cohering, extended Parts, and is divided into different Classes, ac cording to the different Impreffions made upon the Organs of Senfe. But, befides these sen fible Ideas received from without, we also experiment in ourselves Thinking and Volition. These Actions have no Connection with the known Properties of Body; nay, they feem plainly inconfiftent with fome of its most efsential Qualities For the Mind not only discovers no Relation between Thinking and the Motion or Arrangement of Parts; but it also perceives that Confciousness, a fimple individual Act, can never proceed from a compound Substance, capable of being divided into many. Let us suppose, for Instance, a Syftem of Matter endowed with Thought; then either all the Parts of which this System is composed must think, which would make it not one, but a Multitude of distinct confcious Beings; or its Power of Thinking must arife from the Connection of the Parts one with another, their Motion and Difpofition, &c. which, all taken together, contribute to the Production of Thought. But it is evident that the Motion of Parts, and Manner of combining them, cán produce nothing but an artful Structure, and various Modes of Motion. All Machines of human Compofition, as Watches, Clocks, &c. however artfully their Parts are set together, however complicated their Structure, though we conceive innumerable different Motions, varioufty conjoined, and running one into another, with an endless Diversity, yet never produce any Thing but Figure and Motion. If a Clock tells the Hour and Minute of the Day, it is only by the Motion of the different Hands, pointing fucceffively at the Figures marked on the Hour-Plate for that Purpose. We never imagine this to be the Effect of Thought or Intelligence; nor conceive it possible by any Refinement of Structure so to improve the Composition, as that it should become capable of Knowledge and Confciousness. The Reafon is plain: Thought is something altogether different from Motion and Figure; there is not the leaft Connection between them, and therefore it can never be supposed to result from them. Which we otherwise call. Spirits. IX. THIS then being evident, that Intelligence cannot arife from an Union or Combination of unintelligent Parts; if we suppose it to belong to any System of Matter, we must necessarily attribute it to all the Parts of which that System is composed; whereby, instead of one, we shall, as was before observed, have a Multitude of distinct confcious Beings. And because Matrer, how far foever we pursue the Minuteness of its Parts, is ftill capable of repeated Divisions, even to Infinity; it is plain, that this Absurdity will follow us through all the Suppositions that make Thought inherent in a material Substance. Finding therefore Consciousness incompatible with the Cohesion of folid separable Parts, we are necessarily led to place it in fome other Substance, of a distinct Nature and Properties, which we call Spirit. X. AND here it is carefully to be observed, Body and Spithat the several Species of corporeal Substances, rit, diftinet tho' diftinguished one from another, and ranked Substances. under different Names; yet agreeing in some common Properties, which, taken together, make up the Notion of Body, are thence all conceived to partake of this general Nature, and to differ only as different Modifications of the fame Substance. Whatever consists of solid extended Parts, is called Matter; and as all the various Species of Body, however diftinguished from one another by their several Properties, have yet this in common, that they are made up of fuch folid feparable Parts; hence they fall naturally under the general Denomination of material Beings, and are not conceived to differ but in their Form. Thus Gold, Antimony, Wood, &c. alike partake of the Notion of Body; they are all equally material Substances, and have no other Difference, but what arises from the different Structure and Conformation, &c. of Parts, as we have thewn above. But Spirit is something altogether distinct from Body, nay, and commonly placed in Oppofition to it; for which Reason, the Beings of this Class are called immaterial, a Word that implies not any Thing of their Nature, but merely denotes its Contrariety to that of Matter. There may be many various Species of Substance, besides those that come within the Reach of our Faculties. XI. BODY and Spirit, therefore, differ not as Species of the fame Substance, but are really diftinct Kinds of Substances, and serve as general Heads, under which to rank all the particular Beings that fall within the Compass of our Knowledge. For we having no Ways of Perception but Sense and Consciousness, can have no Notices of Things, but as derived from thefe two Inlets. By our Senses we are informed of the Existence of solid extended Substances; and Reflection tells us, that there are thinking confcious ones. Beyond thefe, our Conceptions reach not; and therefore, though there may be many other Kinds, as different from them as they are from one another, yet having no Faculties fuited to them, they are as remote from our Knowledge, as Light and Colours from the Apprehenfion of a Man born blind. I believe it will hardly be doubted, but the Substance of the Creator differs more from that of his Creatures, than any two created Substances can from one another; and therefore, when we call God a Spirit, we ought not rafhly to prefume, that he is so in the same Sense in which the human Soul is a Spirit. The Word is indeed used by us to denote in general all thinking intelligent Substances, in which Sense God is very fitly called a Spirit. But it were the Height of Folly to imagine, because this Name is applied as well to the Mind of Man as the Creator, that therefore they partake of one common Nature, and differ only as different Modifications of the fame Substance. This I mention here, to check the Presumption of the human Mind, always forward to conclude that every Thing comes within its Reach, and to deny Existence to whatever exceeds the Comprehenfion of its scanty and limited Powers. Beings of a fuperior Clafs may enjoy many Ways of Perception unknown to us, from which they receive Notices as different from those in our Minds, as the Ideas we apply to Spirit are from the Ideas we apply to Body. Solid and thinking Beings are, it is true, the only Ideas of Substance that we are able to frame; but this is no more an Argument against the Existence of other Kinds, than than the Want of the Ideas of Light and Colours in a blind Man would be a good Argument against the Reality or Poffibility of fuch Perceptions. Difference in the Manner of conceiving corporeal and Spiritual SubAances. XII. BEFORE I dismiss this Subject, it may not be improper to take Notice of a remarkable Difference as to the Manner of our conceiving corporeal and spiritual Substances. Those of the first Kind convey themselves into the Mind by Impreffions made upon the Organs of Senfe; and as these Impressions are different in different Bodies, the Ideas they produce must of course vary in Proportion. Thus we get Perceptions of distinct Powers and Properties; and range Bodies into Classes, according as we find them to agree or difagree in these their observable Qualities. But it is not so in our Notion of Spirits; for having no Conception of their Powers and Operations, but what we feel and experience within ourselves, we cannot ascribe to them Properties or Ways of Knowledge distinct from those suggested to us by our own Confciousness. And hence it is, that though we readily own there may be various Ranks of spiritual Beings, yet we are not apt to imagine them divided from one another by any Diversity of Powers and Operations, but merely by poffeffing the fame Powers, &c. in a higher or lower Degree. It is not however repugnant to Reafon, that they should be diftinguished by their several Properties, in like Manner as sensible Things are by the different Qualities observable in them; but Properties of intellectual Natures, distinct from those of our own Minds, being altogether remote from our Conception, cannot serve us as a Means whereby to diftinguith their different Orders. We are therefore neceffitated to conceive of them in a Manner suited to our Way of Knowledge; and when we would rank then into Species, according to the Degrees of Superiority they are imagined to possess in the Scale of Being, we ascribe to them what we find most excellent in ourselves, as Knowledge, Thinking, Forefight, &c. and those in different Meafures, proportioned to the Station peculiar to each Rank or Species. But that this is a very imperfect Way of diftinguishing the various Orders of intellectual Beings, will not, I think, need many Words to make appear; especially if we confider, that the Manner of communicating their Thoughts, without the Intervention of bodily Organs, is a Thing to us altogether. incomprehenfible, and neceffarily leads us to suppose, that they C 4 they have Ways of Perception and Knowledge which our Faculties cannot give us any Notice of. The Bounds of narrow. XIII. BUT I shall not pursue these Reflections farther, what has been faid sufficing to give us fome little Insight into the Extent and Capacity of our own Minds; to convince us, that our prefent State will not admit of a perfect and adequate Comprehenfion of Things; and to let us fee, that there may be other Ways of Knowledge beyond the Reach of the Faculties we now enjoy; which yet in succeeding Stages of our Existence we may arrive at, when being freed from the present cumbersome Load of the Body, we shall mount up to Stations of greater Eminence, and advance by a perpetual Series of Approaches towards Him who is the Standard of Perfection and Happiness. In framing wholly ac zive, and proceeds by a voluntary Choice. ar CHAP. IV. Of Ideas framed by the Mind. I. H ITHERTO we have confidered only fuch Combinations of our fimple Ideas as have a real Union in Nature, and are suggested to the Mind by Things themselves varioufly affecting our Perception; it is now Time to take a View of the other Class of our complex Notions, I mean those arbitrary Collections of different Ideas which we on many Occafions bring together by that Power which we find in ourselves, of uniting, comparing, and diversifying our Notices of Things. In the Reception of fimple Ideas, and even in those of Substances, the Understanding is wholly passive, and the Perceptions produced correspond to the Impressions made upon it. When we see a House or a Tree, they neceffarily appear each under its proper Form; nor is it in our Power to receive from these Objects other Ideas than what they are fitted to produce. But in this fecond Class of complex Conceptions, the Mind acts voluntarily and of Choice; it combines only fuch Ideas as are supposed best to fuit its present Purpose: and alters or Changes these Combinations, by inserting some and throwing out others, according as the Circumftances of |