fider how we conduct ourselves amidft so great a Variety, and by what Rules we proceed in making those Combinations to which we have affixed particular Names, while others, perhaps no less obvious, are neglected. The Idea of Killing, for Instance, joined to that of a Father, makes a diftinct Species of Action, known by the Name of Parricide. It was doubtless as obvious to diftinguish between the killing of an old Man and a Child, which yet we find is not done, both these Actions being comprehended under the general Name of Murder. By what Views therefore does the Mind regulate these its Combinations? Why is it determined to one Collection of Ideas rather than another? This cannot be well understood, without observing, that it is the End of Language to communicate our Thoughts one to another. Words are the Signs of our Ideas, and serve to express the Conceptions of the Mind. Now it is apparent, that fuch Conceptions as are most apt to occur in the Commerce of Life would be first distinguished by particular Names; the frequent Occafion Men have of mentioning these among themselves, rendering this absolutely necessary. But as many of these Conceptions are Collections of different simple Ideas, hence we are insensibly led to fuch peculiar Combinations as are most serviceable to Purposes of mutual Intercourse and Communication,

man Actions

XVI. LET us suppose, in the first Beginnings Ideas of huof Society, a Company of Legiflators met together, in order to confult the proper Regula- often formed tions for the Government of the Community. before the If they are Men of Prudence and Forefight, they Actions them will naturally observe many new Occurrences felves exist. likely to arise from this Coalition of Mankind, and their living together in Crowds. Perhaps the Age in which they live has not produced an Instance of one Man's killing another; yet from the Knowledge of their own Frame, and their Power of doing Hurt, they conceive this is a poffible Cafe, and are willing to provide against it. Thus all the Ideas that enter into the complex one of Murder are brought together, and united into one Conception, before the Action itself really exists. It is not however thought necessary to take into Consideration the Age of the Person, the chief Thing in View being to prevent the putting an End to another's Life unjustly, whether old or young; and therefore the Penalty equally affects both Cafes. But when they come to confider the Relation in which the Person killed may stand to the Mure derer, here there appears a manifest Difference, at it adds to the Crime when committed upon a Benefactor, and renders

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ît particularly heinous in the Cafe of a Father. This last therefore is made to constitute a distinct Species of Action, and has a peculiar Punishment allotted to it. Thus we fee, how Men, according to their different Manner of Life, and the Relations they stand in to one another, are naturally led to form 'feveral Collections of fumple Ideas preferably to others, as foreseeing they may have frequent Occafion to take Notice of, fuch precife Combinations. And because it would be tedious in Conversation, every Time these complex Notions occur, to enumerate all the Ideas of which they confift; therefore, for the Sake of Ease and Dispatch, they give them particular Names, and thereby render the Compositions fixed and permanent.

The Neceffity XVII. THAT it is in this Manner we come of mutual In- by our complex Ideas, which multiply upon us tercourse, and according as the Exigencies of Society require, Men's partior our Pursuits, Method of Life, and different Čular Aims in Life, a great Aims, throw Occafions in our Way of comSource of combining fuch and such Perceptions together, plex Ideas. might be easily made appear by a fhort View of the Combinations themselves. Human Actions, as occurring most frequently, and affording large Matter of Converfation, Debate, and Inquiry among Men, have been very nicely modified and diftinguished into Classes, according to the several Circumstances most likely to attend them. In like Manner, the Arts and Sciences, in Proportion as they are cultivated, leading us into many compound Views of Things, which otherwise would never offer themselves to the Confideration of the Mind; the complex Ideas of this Sort, with the Names by which they are expressed, are, we find, the Work of fuch particular Nations where these Arts and Sciences have chiefly flourished. The Greeks, for Instance, excelled in Learning and polite Knowledge; hence many of the Terms belonging to Rhetorick, Poetry, Philosophy, Phyfic, &c. come originally from their Language. Modern Fortification has received its greatest Improvements among the French; and accordingly the Ideas and Terms of the Art are mostly derived from Writers of that Nation. In Italy, Architecture, Mufick, and Painting, have been the great Exercise of the Men of Genius: It is therefore among them that we find the several complex Notions belonging to these Parts of Study, as well as the Names by which they are expressed; nor can we difcourse accurately and minutely of the above-mentioned Arts, without having Recourse to the Language of that Climate. And if we descend into the particular Callings

and

and Professions of Men, they have all their peculiar Collections of Ideas diftinguished by their several Names, and hardly known but to fuch as are conversant in that Manner of Life. Thus Calcination, Cohobation, Filtration, &c. are Words standing for complex Ideas frequently framed in the Minds of Chymists, and therefore familiar to Men of that Employment. Yet as these, and such like Combinations, seldom occur in common Life, the Generality of Mankind, we see, are in a great Meafure unacquainted with then.

them prevail in different Countries, and Words in one Language bave none to answer them

XVIIL I MIGHT pursue these Speculations Hence diffe-farther, and shew how the feveral Fashions, rent Sets of Customs, and Manners of one Nation, leading them to form many complex Notions, which come not so naturally in the Way of another; different Sets of Ideas prevail in different Countries, and of course have Names appropriated to them in one Language, to which there are no Words that anfwer in another. The Pro- in another. cedure and Forms of our Courts of Justice have introduced many Terms into the English Law, which stand for Collections of Ideas framed among no other People. Nor would it be possible to render these Terms by any fingle Words of another Language; because, where the Ideas themselves prevail not, there are no Names provided to express them. In this Cafe therefore it becoines neceffary to use Circumlocutions, and enumerate the several Ideas comprehended in the Collection, if we would so express ourselves as to be understood in the Language of other Nations. Nay, even among the fame People, the Change of Customs and Opinions frequently bring new Sets of Ideas, which of course must be diftinguished by particular Names, while at the same Time the Notions of former Ages grow into Difufe, and the Words answering them are either wholly laid afide, or employed in a Signification different from what they had before.

XIX. THUS Languages are in a perpetual This too the Flux, and by Degrees vary fo much from their Cause that original Frame as to become unintelligible even Languages to the Defcendents of those who speak them. are in a perIf we run back into the Ages of Chivalry in petual Flux. England, when Tilts and Tournaments were in Fashion, how many complex Ideas, peculiar to that Mode of Life, shall we find familiar among the Men of those Times, which are now little known or attended to? On the contrary, the Improvements in Arts and Sciences, that have fince taken place, have

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have led us into innumerable Views of Things, to which our Forefathers were perfect Strangers. But I shall not push these Reflections any farther, believing that what has been faid will be sufficient to shew the Original and Progress of our compound Ideas, and how the Mind is directed in the Choice of the Combinations it makes. We therefore proceed to the Confideration of abstract Ideas, which make the Subject of the following Section.

SECT. II.

I.

Of Abstract or Universal Ideas.

General Ideas AVING dispatched what was necessary formed by the to be said concerning our compound Abstraction of Ideas, confidered merely as they are Combinathe Mind. tions of the Understanding, it is now Time to explain how we come by our general Notions, which serve to represent to us a Multitude of Individuals, and are the Standards by which we rank Things into Sorts. And this, as we have before intimated, is done by the Abstraction of the Mind; which Act may be extended to all our Ideas, whether fimple, compound, or of Substances. If, for Instance, we fix our Attention on any particular Colour, as Scarlet, we can leave out the Confideration of all present Circumstances, as the Subject in which it inheres, the Time and Place of feeing it, &c. and, retaining only the Impression itself, make it a Representative of that Quality or Appearance, wherever we chance to meet with it. It is thus that abstract and universal Ideas are framed; for the Mind, regarding only the Scarlet Colour, which one Day it observes perhaps in a Piece of Cloth, another in a Picture, and a third in the Rainbow; the Appearance is conceived to be the fame in all these Objects, and therefore is called by the same Name.

All the Per

II. BUT to enter a little more closely into ceptions of the. this Matter, and shew that these our general Underflanding Conceptions are the inere Creatures of the Unparticular. derstanding, it may not be amiss to take Notice thst all our Perceptions of Things, whether we derive them from Senfation or Reflection, are of their own Nature particular, ticular, and represent to us single determinate Objects. When we fee a Horse, for Instance, in the Fields, our Idea is that of an Individual. If we hear a Sound, it is something particular, and different from what we hear at any other Time. Every Perception of the Mind is distinct from every other Perception; nay, and every Idea brought into View by the Imagination, as when we frame the Image of a Lion standing before us, is still fingular, and reprefents a single Object.

III. BUT when we come to take a View of The Idea of these several Particulars, we readily observe the Species among fome of them a Resemblance; and, fram- represents what is coming to ourselves an Idea of those Things in mon to diffewhich any of them are found to agree, we rent Indivithereby get a general Notion, applicable to duals. many Individuals. Thus Horses are found to resemble one another in Shape, Voice, and Structure of Parts. The Idea which takes in only the Particulars of this Refemblance, excluding what is peculiar to each single Animal, becomes of course common to all Creatures of that Kind, and is therefore the Representative of a whole Class of Beings. Accordingly the Name of that general Idea is given to every Animal in which that Shape, Voice, and Structure is found; for the Word Horse, implying only these Particulars, muft belong to all Creatures wherein they exist. This is the first Step or Gradation in the forming of abstract Notions, when the Mind confines itself to the Confideration of Individuals, and frames an Idea that comprehends fuch only under it. The Rank or Class of Things answering to this Idea, is called Species in the Language of the Schools. So a Horse is a certain Species of Animals, an Oak is a Species of Trees, and a Square is a Species of four-fided Figures.

IV. WHEN we have thus learnt to rank In- The Idea of dividuals into Sorts and Classes, according to the Genus rethe Resemblance found among them, the Mind Presents what proceeds next to confider the Species themselves, severat Speand often in these too observes a certain Like- cies.

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neis. Whereupon, throwing out all those Particulars wherein the several Species are found to difagree, and retaining only fuch as are common to them all, we thereby frame a still more general Idea, comprehending under it a Variety of different Species. Thus a Sparrow, a Hawk, an Eagle, &c. are distinct Species of Birds, which have each their peculiar Shape and Make. They nevertheless resemble one another, in being covered with Feathers, and provided with Wings that

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