conclude that the first Field is larger than the second. Here the two first Perceptions are plainly intuitive, and gained by an immediate Application of the Measure of a Yard to the two Fields, one after another. The Conclufion, though it produces no less certain Knowledge, yet differs from the others in this, that it is not obtained by an immediate Comparison of the Ideas contained in it one with another, but is a Deduction from the two preceding Judgements, in which these Ideas are severally compared with a third, and their Relation thereby discovered. We fee, therefore, that Reasoning is a much more complicated Act of the Mind than fimple Judgement, and necessarily presupposes it, as being ultimately founded on the Perceptions thence gained, and implying the various Comparisons of then one with another. This is the great Exercise of the human Faculties, and the, chief Instrument by which we push on our Discoveries, and enlarge our Knowledge. A Quickness of Mind to find out intermediate Ideas, and apply them skillfully in determining the Relations of Things, is one of the principal Distinctions among Men, and that which gives some so remarkable a Superiority over others, that we are apt to look upon them as Creatures of another Species.

VIII. THUS far we have traced the Progress Method. of the Mind in Thinking, and seen it rifing, by natural and easy Steps, from its first and simple Perceptions, to the Exercise of its highest and most distinguishing Faculty. Let us now view it in another Light, as enriched with Knowledge, and stored with a Variety of Discoveries, acquired by the due Application of its natural Powers. It is obvious to confider it in these Circumstances, as taking a general Survey of its whole Stock of intellectual Acquifitions, difpofing them under certain Heads and Classes, and. tying them together, according to those Connections and Dependences it difcerns between them. It often happens, in carrying on our Inquiries from Subject to Subject, that we stumble upon unxexpected Truth, and are encountered by Discoveries which our present Train of Thinking gave no Profpect of bringing in our Way. A Man of clear Apprehenfion, and distinct Reason, who, after due Search and Examination, has mastered any Part of Knowledge, and even made important Discoveries in it, beyond what he at first expected, will not fuffer his Thoughts to lie jumbled together in the fame confufed Manner as, Chance offered them; he will be for combining them into a regular System, where

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where their mutual Dependence may be easily traced, and the Parts feem to growone out of another. This is that Operation of the Mind, known by the Name of Disposition or Method, and comes the last in Order, according to the Division of the Logicians, presupposing some tolerable Meafure of Knowledge, before it can have an Opportunity of exetting itself in any extensive Degree.

Perception IX. WE fee then that this fourfold Diftincand Judge- tion of the Powers of the Mind, into Perception, ment, Terms Judgement, Reasoning, and Disposition, as well of a very ex- as the Order in which they are placed, have a tenfiove Signi, real Foundation in Nature, and arife from the

fication.

Method and Procedure of our own Thoughts. It is true, there are many other Actions and Modifications of the Understanding, besides those above-mentioned, as Believ ing, Doubting, Affenting, &c. but these are all implied in the Act of Reasoning, in the like Manner as Comprehending, Abstracting, Remembering, may be referred to the first Operation of the Mind, or Perception. This will appear more fully in the Sequel, when we come to handle the several Parts of Logick separately; at present we shall content ourselves with this general Account of Things; only it feems neceffary to obferve, that Perception and Judgement, in the Propriety of the English Tongue, have a much more extensive Signification than Logicians commonly allow them. We not only perceive the Ideas in our own Minds, but we are said alfo to perceive their Agreement and Disagreement; and hence arife the common Phrafes of intuitive Perceptions, Perceptions of Truth, and of the Justness of Arguments or Proofs; where it is manifest, that the Word is applied not only to our Judgements, but also to our Reasonings. In a Word, whatever comes under the View of the Mind, so as to be distinctly represented and taken Notice of, whether an Idea, Propofition, Chain of Reasoning, or the Order or Connection of Things, is thereby rendered an Object of Perception, and gives Employment to this first and most simple of our Faculties. In like Manner, the Word Judgement is seldom in common Difcourse confined to obvious and felf-evident Truths. It rather fignifies those Conjectures and Guesses that we form in Cafes which adınit not of undoubted Certainty, and where we are left to determine by comparing the various Probabilities of Things. Thus a Man of Sagacity and Penetration, who fees far into the Humours and Paffions of Mankind, and seldom mistakes in the Opinions he frames of Cha

Characters and Actions, is faid to judge well, or think judiciously. For these Reafons, it might not be improper to change the common Names of the two first Operations of the Mind, calling the one fimple Apprehenfion, and the other Intuition; which two Words feem better to express their Nature, and the Manner in which they are converfant about their feveral Objects. This Accuracy of diftinguishing, where there is any the least Difference, is in a peculiar Manner neceffary in a Treatife of Logick, as it is the professed Design of that Science to teach us how to form clear and diftinct Notions of Things, and thereby avoid being misled by their Similitude or Resemblance.

Logick di-
vided into

four Parts.
Its Usefulness,
and Excel-

X. HAVING thus given a general Idea of the four Operations of the Mind, and traced their Connection and Dependence one upon another, I would next observe, that in consequence of this Division of the Powers of the Understanding, Logick is also divided into four lency. Parts, which treat feverally of these Acts, and give Rules and Directions for their due Conduct and Regulation. The Operations themselves we have from Nature; but how to exert them justly, and employ them with Advantage in the Search of Truth, is a Knowledge that may be acquired by Study and Obfervation. It is certain, that we meet with false Reasonings as well as just. Some Men are diftinguished by an Accuracy of Thinking, and a happy Talent of unravelling and throwing Light upon the most obfcure and intricate Subjects. Others confound the easiest Speculations; their Understandings seem to be formed awry, and they are incapable of either conceiving clearly themselves, or making their Thoughts intelligible to others. If then we fet ourselves carefully to observe what it is that makes the one succeed so well, and how the others come to mifcarry, thefe Remarks will furnish us with an Art of the highest Ufe and Excellency in the Conduct of Life. Now this is the precise Business of Logick, to explain the Nature of the human Mind, and the proper Manner of conducting its feveral Powers, in order to the Attainment of Truth and Knowledge. It lays open those Errors and Mistakes we are apt through Inattention to run into, and teaches us how to diftinguish between Truth, and what carries only the Appearance of it. By this Means we grow acquainted with the Nature and Force of the Understanding, fee what Things lie within its Reach, where we may attain Certainty and Demonftration,

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Demonstration, and when we must be contented with bare Probability. These Confiderations fufficiently evince the Usefulness and Benefit of this Science, which ought to be established as the Foundation and Ground-work of all our other Knowledge, if we really with to fucceed in our Inquiries. But we shall now proceed to treat of its Parts separately, according to the Division given of them above.

THE

THE

ELEMENTS

OF

LOGICK.

BOOK I.

Of SIMPLE APPREHENSION, or

PERCEPΤΙΟΝ.

CHAP. Ι.

Of the Original of our Ideas.

HE first Thing we observe, when we
take View of what passes within us, Simple Ap-
is, that we are capable of receiving prehenfion

a

and Ideas.

Impressions from a Variety of Objects; that diftinct Notices are thereby conveyed into the Understanding, and that we are confcious of their being there. This Attention of the Mind to the Objects acting upon it, is what we call Simple Apprehension, and is in Fact the Mind itself, taking a View of Things as represented to it by its own Consciousness. It is by this Means that we come to be furnished with all those Ideas about which our Thoughts are employed. For, being sensible of the Impressions made upon us, and attending to the Perceptions they bring, we can renew them again upon Occafion,

い