John Locke und die mechanische Naturauffassung: Eine kritisch-philosophische UntersuchungBagel, 1915 - 77 sider |
Almindelige termer og sætninger
absolute absolute Raum anschauliche Anschauung Ausdehnung Ausdruck Bacon Baeumker Begriff besonders Bewegung Beziehung Boyle Cassirer Charakter daher Dasein Denken Descartes dogmatisch duration empirische Empirismus empiristische Erdmann Erfahrung Erkennen Erkenntnistheorie Erklärung Essay Existenz Falckenberg Fechtner first Fraser Galilei Geistes Gewissheit Gravitation Grund Hertling Hume ideas Ideen infinity John Locke Kant Kausalität kenntnis knowledge Körper Korpuskel korpuskulare Grundlage Korpuskulartheorie Kraft Kraftbegriff Kritizismus Leipzig Leonardo da Vinci lichen Lockeschen Mathematik mechanische Auffassung mechanische Erkenntnis mechanischen Naturauffassung Mechanismus menschlichen Methode mind Möglichkeit motion naiv Natur Newton Notwendigkeit objects objektive Occasionalismus perceive perception Philosophie physikalische primären Qualitäten primären und sekundären Problem psychologische qualitativer qualities Rationalismus Raum real Realität Reflexion reinen Relation Riehl scharf sekundären Qualitäten sensation und reflection sense sensitive Wissen simple idea sinnlichen space Spinoza Standpunkte Stillingfleet substantiellen Substanz Substanzbegriff Teil Tendenz things Uebereinstimmung understanding Unendlichkeit unsere Erkenntnis unseren Sinnen unseres Wissens Untersuchung Unzulänglichkeit Veitstanzes Verstand Volkelt völlig Vorstellungen Wesen der Dinge wirklichen Zahl
Populære passager
Side 10 - This therefore being my purpose, to inquire into the original, certainty, and extent of human knowledge, together with the grounds and degrees of belief, opinion, and assent...
Side 8 - ... a vacuum, without the mediation of anything else, by and through which their action and force may be conveyed from one to another, is to me so great an absurdity, that I believe no man who has in philosophical matters a competent faculty of thinking, can ever fall into it. Gravity must be caused by an agent acting constantly according to certain laws ; but whether this agent be material or immaterial, I have left to the consideration of my readers.
Side 26 - Our observation employed either, about external sensible objects, or about the internal operations of our minds perceived and reflected on by ourselves, is that which supplies our understandings with all the materials of thinking. These two are the fountains of knowledge, from whence all the ideas we have, or can naturally have, do spring.
Side 45 - ... observable bigness may be perceived at a distance by the sight, it is evident some singly imperceptible bodies must come from them to the eyes, and thereby convey to the brain some motion which produces these ideas which we have of them in us.
Side 14 - Wenn aber gleich alle unsere Erkenntnis mit der Erfahrung anhebt, so entspringt sie darum doch nicht eben alle aus der Erfahrung. Denn es könnte wohl sein, daß selbst unsere Erfahrungserkenntnis ein Zusammengesetztes aus dem sei, was wir durch Eindrücke empfangen, und dem, was unser eigenes Erkenntnisvermögen (durch sinnliche Eindrücke bloß veranlaßt) aus sich selbst hergibt, welchen Zusatz wir von jenem Grundstoffe nicht eher unterscheiden, als bis lange Übung uns darauf aufmerksam und zur...
Side 13 - One who thinks ideas are nothing but perceptions of the mind annexed to certain motions of the body by the will of God, who hath ordered such perceptions always to accompany such motions, though we know not how they are produced ; does in effect conceive those ideas or perceptions to be only passions of the mind, when produced in it, whether we will or no, by external objects.
Side 18 - ... to examine our own abilities, and see what objects our understandings were, or were not, fitted to deal with.
Side 8 - You sometimes speak of gravity as essential and inherent to matter. Pray do not ascribe that notion to me, for the cause of gravity is what I do not pretend to know, and therefore would take more time to consider of it.
Side 7 - Rationem vero harum gravitatis proprietatum ex phaenomenis nondum potui deducere, et hypotheses non fingo. Quicquid enim ex phaenomenis non deducitur, hypothesis vocanda est; et hypotheses seu metaphysicae, seu physicae, seu qualitatum occultarum, seu mechanicae, in philosophia experimentali locum non habent.
Side 7 - Rationem vero harum Gravitatis proprietatum ex Phaenomenis nondum potui deducere, et Hypotheses non fingo. Quicquid enim ex Phaenomenis non deducitur, Hypothesis vocanda est; et Hypotheses seu Metaphysicae, seu Physicae, seu Qualitatum occultarum, seu Mechanicae, in Philosophia Experimentali locum non habent.