idea, I mean such an one as consists of a determinate number of certain simple or less complex ideas, joined in such a proportion and situation, as the mind has before its view, and sees in itself, when that idea is present in it, or should be present in it, when a man gives a name to it: I say, should be; because it is not every one, not perhaps any one, who is so careful of his language, as to use no word, till he views in his mind the precise determined idea, which he resolves to make it the sign of. The want of this is the cause of no small obscurity and confusion in men's thoughts and discourses. I know there are not words enough in any language, to answer all the variety of ideas that enter into men's discourses and reasonings. But this hinders not, but that when any one uses any term, he may have in his mind a determined idea, which he makes it the sign of, and to which he should keep it steadily annexed, during that present discourse. Where he does not, or cannot do this, he in vain pretends to clear or distinct ideas: it is plain his are not so'; and therefore there can be expected nothing but obscurity and confusion, where such terms are made use of, which have not such a precise determination. Upon this ground I have thought determined ideas a way of speaking less liable to mistakes, than clear and distinct: and where men have got such determined ideas of all that they reason, inquire, or argue about, they will find a great part of their doubts and disputes at an end. The greatest part of the questions and controversies that perplex mankind, depending on the doubtful and uncertain use of words, or (which is the same) indetermined ideas, which they are made to stand for; I have made choice of these terms to signify, 1. Some immediate object of the mind, which it perceives and has before it, distinct from the sound it uses as a sign of it. 2. That this idea, thus determined, i. e. which the mind has in itself, and knows, and sees there, be determined without any change to that name, and that name determined to that precise idea. If men had such determined ideas in their inquiries and discourses, they would both discern how far their own inquiries and discourses went, and avoid the greatest part of the disputes and wranglings they have with others. Besides this, the bookseller will think it necessary I should advertise the reader, that there is an addition of two chapters wholly new; the one of the association of ideas, the other of enthusiasm. These, with some other larger additions never before printed, he has engaged to print by themselves after the same manner, and for the same purpose, as was done when this essay had the second impression. In the sixth edition, there is very little added or altered; the greatest part of what is new, is contained in the 21st chapter of the second book, which any one, if he thinks it worth while, may, with a very little labour, transcribe into the margin of the former edition. CONTENTS OF VOLUME FIRST. OF THE HUMAN UNDERSTANDING. CHAP. I. BOOK I. OF INNATE NOTIONS. The Introduction. SECT. 1. An enquiry into the un- 3. Method. 4. Useful to know the extent of our comprehension. 6. Knowing the extent of our capacities, will hin- 7. Occasion of this essay. CHAP. II. No innate principles in the mind, 1. The way shown how we sufficient to prove it not 2. General assent, the great 3. Universal consent proves 4. What is, is; and, it is 5. Not on the mind natu- 12. The coming to the use of reason, not the time we 13. By this they are not dis- 14. If coming to the use of supposed innate. 1. Idea is the object of 2. All ideas come from sen- sation or reflection. 5. All our ideas are of the one or the other of these. 8. Ideas of reflection later, because they need atten- perceive. 10. The soul thinks not al- ways; 11. It is not always conscious 12. If a sleeping man thinks man ought to be most raj |