mative. As well might an Abyssinian pretend to delineate the whole course of the Nile, in consequence of having traced the windings of the infant river for a few miles contiguous to his hut. As well might a fisherman infer, that his line, which has reached the bottom of the creek in which he exercises his trade, is capable of fathoming the depth of the Atlantic.

"If this argument wanted confirmation, it might receive it from a view of the moral, to say nothing of the natural, government of the world. Even though we are previously convinced that the great object of the Almighty is the happiness of his creatures, in numerous instances we see very imperfectly how the detail of his operations conduces to the end which he has in view. Sometimes presumptuous ignorance would lead us to imagine that we perceive circumstances which militate against it, as the permission of moral evil; others, wherein there is an appearance of imperfection, as in the late establishment and partial diffusion of Christianity; and numbers which seem indifferent to the design proposed, or neither fully nor directly to conduce to it. If, then, we are so far from discovering the propriety and excellence of the parts of a system, which we are certain is framed in exact conformity to the standard of general expediency, we may be convinced how little our utmost sagacity can discover of the ultimate tendency and effects of our conduct; we may be assured that we are wholly unqualified to determine whether those actions, which seem to further the particular expediency within the reach of our foresight, would or would not conduce to general good; that the limited knowledge of expe

diency attainable by the wisest of men is unfit to be adopted as the basis of moral rectitude; and that if it were adopted, we should very frequently be acting in direct opposition to the will of God, at the time when we had fondly persuaded ourselves that we were most strenuously employed in promoting it*."

CHAPTER XII.

ON THE DIFFERENT THEORIES OF MORALS.

HAVING shewn the grounds and principles of moral obligation, and having attempted to prove that moral distinctions are immutable and eternal,-I shall conclude this division of my subject with a few observations on the different theories of morals.

The object of all such theories is to account for the origin of our moral sentiments. The earliest formed in modern times is that of Hobbes, an author whose acuteness and genius have seldom been surpassed. A favourite dogma with him, in common with some of the ancients, was, that the notion of the being and providence of God, and of religious worship, is the effect of human fear and weakness. Yet, he elsewhere asserts, that the mechanical contrivance of the human body affords so clear a proof of a wise Maker, that he must be without a mind who does not admit its

* Gisborne's Principles of Moral Philosophy.

having been made by a Being of intelligence*. Our ideas of right and wrong, of justice and injustice, have their origin, according to him, in the institutions of priests and legislators, that is, in the authority of political enactment.

To enter on the refutation of this theory, would only be to repeat what has been already stated. If the observations formerly made are not sufficient to shew that moral distinctions are fixed and unchangeable, I cannot hope to produce conviction of this by any additional illustrations.

Who does not remark the utter impotency of all the legislators of the world in changing one virtue into vice, or, in altering the essential laws of right and wrong? Has the most profligate prince ever presumed to declare that his government patronised deceit, fraud, cruelty, and oppression, and that only the deceitful, the fraudulent, the cruel, and oppressive, were to expect protection and reward? Has the tyrant at the head of his mercenary armies acknowledged that he was influenced solely by unprincipled ambition, and that he led them to the field, not to combat for the liberty and happiness of mankind, but to rivet more firmly the chains of the conquerors and the conquered?

"There is, indeed, a power," as has been remarked, by which princes decree justice; but it is a power above the mere voice of kings-a power, which has previously fixed in the breasts of those who receive the decree, a love of the very virtue which kings, even when kings are most virtuous, can only enforce. And it is well for man that the feeble authorities of this

*Hobb, de Homine, 1. i. c. 1.

earth cannot change the sentiments of our hearts with the same facility, as they can throw fetters on our hands. There would, then, indeed, be no hope to the oppressed, the greater the oppression, the stronger motive would there be to make obedience to oppression a virtue, and every species of guilt, which the powerful might love to exercise, amiable in the eyes even of the miserable victims. All virtue in such circumstances would soon perish from the earth. Nature has not thrown us on the world with such feeble principles as these: she has given us virtue of which no power can deprive us, and has fixed in the soul of Him whom more than fifty nations obey, a restraint on his power, from which the servile obedience of all the nations of the globe could not absolve him*."

The fundamental doctrines inculcated in the political writings of Hobbes are contained in the following propositions:-All men are by nature equal; and prior to government, they had all an equal right to enjoy the good things of the world. Man, too, is (according to Hobbes) by nature a solitary and purely selfish animal; the social union being entirely an interested league, suggested by prudential views of personal advantage. The necessary consequence is, that a state of nature must be a state of perpetual warfare, in which no individual has any other means of safety than his own strength or ingenuity; and in which there is no room for regular industry, because no secure enjoyment of its fruits. In confirmation of this view of the origin of society, Hobbes appeals to facts falling daily within the circle of our own experience. "Does not a man, (he asks,) when taking a journey, arm himself, and seek to go well accompanied? When going to sleep, does he not lock his doors. Nay, even in his own house, does he not lock his chests? Does he not there as much accuse mankind by his actions, as I do by my words.”

For the sake of peace and security, it is necessary that each individual should surrender a part of his natural right, and be contented with such a share of liberty as he is willing to allow to others; or, to use Hobbes's own language," every man must divest himself of the right he has to all things by nature; the right of all men to all things being in effect no better than if no man had a right to any thing." In consequence of this transference of natural rights to an individual, or to a body of individuals, the multitude become one person, under the name of a state or republic, by which person the common will and power are exercised for the common VOL. II.

F

Nearly allied to the theory which would resolve all our notions of right and wrong into political enactment as their source, is that of Mandeville, which represents what the world has agreed to call virtue as the mere production of political skill, the sacrifice of one kind of individual gratification for the sake of attaining gratification of another kind, namely, that praise for which it is alleged that the natural appetite of man is insatiable. According to this theory, the exercise of virtue exhibits only the indulgence of human frailty, and the practice of hypocrisy.

That which gives to this, and to all similar theories, any plausibility, is the unquestionable corruption of human nature, which so often exists under the garb of virtue, and which is so apt to mingle itself with all that is praiseworthy in man. But, to admit the truth of Mandeville's doctrines, were to admit that the nature of man is degraded to an extent far beyond what either Scripture or reason authorizes us to believe. This theory is, besides, fundamentally erro

defence. The ruling power cannot be withdrawn from those to whom it has been committed; nor can they be punished for misgovernment. The interpretation of the laws is to be sought, not from the comments of philosophers, but from the authority of the ruler; otherwise society would every moment be in danger of resolving itself into the discordant elements of which it was at first composed. The will of the magistrate, therefore, is to be regarded as the ultimate standard of right and wrong, and his voice to be listened to by every citizen as the voice of conscience.-Professor Stewart's Dissertation, &c. p. i. p. 63.

This doctrine. which Hobbes revived, was held, in substance, by several of the ancient philosophers. Plato speaks of some, who maintained "that the things which are accounted just, are not so by nature; for that men are always differing about them, and making new constitutions: and as often as they are thus constituted, they obtain authority, being made just by art and by the laws, not by any natural force or virtue." (Plato de Leg. 1. 10.) The same doctrine was held by Aristippus, Pyrrho, and in general by the Sceptics.