ascribes to Socrates is that of an unseen world, to which the philosopher alone has access, where live the real, true, archetypal forms of things, of which all we see on the earth are rude copies and imperfect reflections. It is the object of the perfect life to emancipate itself from the world of sense, and gain entrance into the world of ideas. Central among them he places the ideal man, the archetype of humanity, the real true man himself, whom all earthly men are poor attempts to imitate. This, you see, which is all in black and white in Plato's "Republic," written two thousand two hundred years ago, is the last brand new theory to which I alluded as offering a nobler model for our research than any saint that ever lived, Socrates, Jesus, and all of them.

I accept the doctrine. Not that it can be proved; not that when lighted up by all Plato's gorgeous imagery and worked out with all Socratic subtlety it was anything more than an abstraction; not that modern philosophers have dressed it up with any better garments: but because, by God's grace, it is now real, living, life-giving; because the ideal man has existed for all men to see on earth and to imitate; because as he lived here then so now he lives in the unseen world; and because, beyond Washington, beyond John Eliot, beyond Milton, beyond St. Louis, beyond St. Bernard, beyond Aurelius, beyond Socrates, beyond Moses, beyond Buddha, there lives forever, in the glory of the Father, the ideal of humanity, the son of man, the man Christ Jesus.

4

* Rep. VI., VII.

WILLIAM EVERETT.

MIND BEFORE MATTER.

WHAT it is in the tendency of thought in our age which is unfavorable to the higher culture of humanity seems not to be clearly apprehended, either by those who accept or by those who deprecate it. That there is such a tendency there can be little doubt. The spontaneous original forces of human nature have lost their elasticity and spring. The God-like in man lacks confidence. Faith in ideas shrinks from the charge of sentimentalism. Inspiration fails in preacher, poet, and orator. That which "cometh not by observation" doubts its ability to make good its claim to existence; while a life based upon material values maintains itself with effrontery.

It is customary to characterize all this as materialism. In its ordinary use, this word has, probably, merely a moral significance. It implies a habit of exclusive attention to material phenomena, and of exclusive devotion to material pursuits. But such a habit is not without its cause. It necessarily connects itself with a theory, partly as source and partly as result.

Any field of thought, deeply investigated, brings us upon that mystery which is recognized as the secret source of life. A theory then arises, which finds that source of life in the field of. investigation, rather than in the mystery. If the field be matter, we have the theory of materialism, and its moral results.

These results are such as we have stated. All theories which tend to weaken man's consciousness of native force, and convince him that his actions are the resultant of necessary outward influences, will inevitably retard that development of humanity which is acknowledged to depend in some measure on a voluntary agency.*

But the apparent moral results of a theory are not the test of

"Every human life results from three factors: first, a nature originally determined to the individual; secondly, something freely chosen ; and thirdly, something which comes from circumstances." - Hase.

"Our volitions count for something as a condition of the course of events.” — Huxley.

its truth. They may be accidental and temporary. The theory must be judged by its ability to account for all the phenomena which it undertakes to explain. It is the inadequacy of the theory of materialism to account for all the facts of life and the universe, that we endeavor, at this time, to expose.

What, then, is the philosophic theory of materialism? It is, briefly, the theory that mind is an outcome of matter, - that intelligence is a product of evolution. It does not deny the present actual existence of mind, but answers the question of its origin. This is the most fundamental question of philosophy.

It is evidently under a misconception of its meaning and consequence, that the leading scientists disclaim the charge of materialism, while they virtually maintain it as a tendency of thought. For not only is there nothing in the conclusions of science which necessitates such a theory, but the scientists themselves, in the unconsciousness of a sincere spirit of inquiry, bear testimony to phenomena, for which it cannot account.

That the theory is misconceived, may be seen from such a declaration as is made by Mr. Huxley. He says, "I, individually, am no materialist; but, on the contrary, believe materialism to involve grave philosophical error. The materialistic position, that there is nothing in the world but matter, is utterly devoid of justification."

He might have said that it is no position at all. For it is plainly impossible to deny the present actual existence of that which language recognizes as mind. Whatever be the origin of the distinction between mind and matter, it is certain that there is such a distinction, now, in consciousness, and in language as expressing consciousness. To speak of holding a theory implies the existence of that which can hold a theory. That which can hold a theory we call mind. A theory that there is no mind is a theory that there can be no theory. This, if anything more than self-contradiction, is not materialism, but skepticism.

Materialism does not deny the present actual existence of mind. Idealism does not deny the present actual existence of matter. The question is as to which is the resultant of the other.

Consciousness is the source of all facts. Its testimony is twofold: that is, I existing here; and, over against me, something existing there. There can be no consciousness of the one fact without

the other; there can be no conception of anything without its correlative. Being can be conceived of only as contrasted against non-being; mind against matter; a thinking subject against an unthinking object.

Science analyzes these two fields of mind and matter furnished by consciousness, and classifies their phenomena. It finds, in the outward world of matter, a universal order or system of things, in which can be traced a development by gradual progression. It finds, also, in the inward world of mind, an order or system of thought gradually growing up in correspondence with the outward system of things.

Thus far, both consciousness and science merely give us facts. Consciousness sets off a world of mind and a world of matter. Science finds each to be an orderly world. No testimony is given as to their precedence. Why not let it rest so?

Sir William Hamilton maintains that this is the true philosophical position. He says, "Consciousness not only gives us duality, but it gives its elements in equal counterpoise and independence. The ego and non-ego mind and matter-are not only given together, but in absolute co-equality. The one does not precede, the other does not follow; and in their mutual relations each is equally dependent, equally independent."

But he adds, "Philosophers have not, however, been content to accept the fact in its integrity, but have been pleased to accept it only under such qualifications as it suited their systems to devise."

Now there is evidently some secret of this discontent of philosophers to accept the two data of consciousness in equipoise, which Hamilton did not take into account. There is evidently some tendency in the human mind from a source behind consciousness, which oversets the apparent equipoise of the facts to which consciousness testifies. At least, all attempts to preserve this equipoise in any system of philosophy, and to avoid inquiry into first causes, have signally failed. The position of Positivism, as accepting only phenomena, and leaving causes out of account, has been well characterized, by an eminent thinker, as a position of mind

*Thomas Hill.

#

similar to that of unstable equilibrium in physics. It cannot be held permanently. There is a necessary gravitation to the one side or the other.

So the mind naturally seeks for origin and precedence in the relation between the inward and the outward worlds. Is the outward world born of mind, or is mind itself but the consummate flower of matter? This is the most important question in philosophy. It is thus stated by Hamilton: "Some deny the evidence of consciousness to the equipoise of the subject and object as coordinate and co-original elements, and as the balance is inclined in favor of the one relative or the other, two opposite schemes of psychology are determined. If the subject be taken as the original and genetic, and the object evolved from it as its product, the theory of idealism is established. On the other hand, if the object be assumed as the original and genetic, and the subject evolved from it as its product, the theory of materialism is established."

This, then, is the philosophical position of materialism; and this, there can be no doubt, is the tendency of the scientific thought of our time. The accepted doctrine of evolution is supposed to necessitate the conclusion that the higher is a resultant of the lower, the more complex of the more simple, and, consequently, that mind must be the product of organization.

Two facts seem to corroborate this conclusion. Thought is found to be dependent on organic structure, and this organic structure is the last stage of a process through lower forms. Again, the history of human knowledge shows that our system of thought has but slowly adjusted itself to the discovered system of things, and thus may fairly be said to be dependent on such discovery.

So the current of scientific exposition sets in the direction of showing the generation of psychical from physical conditions. Upon the question as to which acts and which reacts, which takes the initiative and which merely responds, mind or matter, the leading writers upon science have one prevailing tone of argument. The position is expressly defended by Mr. Huxley, notwithstanding his denial of what he supposes to be materialism. He says, "In itself it is of little moment whether we express the phenomena of matter in terms of spirit, or the phenomena of spirit in terms of matter; matter may be regarded as a form of thought, thought