What, then, is this new doctrine? Is it true that the offices of this government are subject to the claims of individual citizens? Is it to be believed that what is here implied-that there is in this and that citizen a right to this or that office-is a true doctrine? Who gave them this right? In what part of law or equity do we find this right-right to office? "Ours is an agency government," says a most liberal and learned authority, "and of the kind denominated free;' but if the office-holder is the agent of those who elect or appoint him, does his right begin with his appointment or election, or does it lie in him while he is a private citizen? In governments of the kind denominated free,' the right to office surely lies in those only who are in office-not in those who are out of office. And that right is given by the laws, and not by any natural claim in the person chosen or elected. It is necessary to dismiss this new opinion of a right to office in any person not chosen by the people or appointed under the law, into the general chaos of demagogical opinion, as unworthy of any serious discussion.

"Is it political intolerance," they continue, "to claim a proportionate share in the direction of public affairs?"

A valid inquiry! Is any person so simple as to imagine that the Whig party, since they are well in power, intend to give their adversaries, as such, "a proportionate share" in the administration of "public affairs?" That were indeed to commit a folly. They do not, we think, intend in that way, at least, to become contemptible. Such power as they have, they no doubt mean to use to its full extent, to carry out

But that is not all that is implied by the question of our friends which we have just quoted, as they quote it. When "shares" are talked of, rights are supposed. In whom, then, lie these rights? In whom does the "right" lie of conducting the affairs of this nation, if not in those men who have been elected by the people? And are they thinking of sharing? What a simplicity of understanding do our friends attribute to those whom they have assisted to elect, when they quote such ill-digested sentences for their instruction!

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"Shares" and "rights!" Shares in the administration of the empire; shares in the fishmongers' company; shares in this and that. But, indeed, our dear fellowcitizens know more than they seem know. They know that there is a difference, a profound difference, between property and power; that power is a sacred trust, for which men are responsible to God and the nation; and that they can no more think of sharing it with the minority than of putting it to sale.

The election, by a majority of the people, of particular men to fill the great offices of government, is in order to an exact execution of the measures of that majority; and the men thus elected and for that purpose, under the Constitution, are responsible, by the spirit of the Constitution which has put them in power for that purpose, for the full execution of those measures. They cannot, in honor, pursue any others. They therefore have no "right," (in honor,) indeed, to endanger the failure of that intent by "sharing" their power, or by conferring the least particle of it upon such persons as may endanger its fulfillment. We repeat it with a perfect confidence, that as the whole system of the government looks towards a rule of majorities, everything must be done by those elected to fulfill the wishes of the legally ascertained majority who elected them. That majority exists, and is in full force until it is annihilated by a succeeding election. As it is evident, that the fundamental law permits the opinion. of the legally ascertained majority to rule, it provides also, by consequence, that those elected shall be free to carry out that opinion. Majorities are ascertained by law

once in four years; they exist, in full force, in the interim, by a necessary supposition. There is indeed no remedy for the betrayal of the people, except by the ejection from office of those who dishonor their own election, at the end of their term. If governments were like calculating machines, it might be differently arranged; but they are moral machines, or rather, they are moral responsibilities, and moral responsibilities are liable to moral contingencies. Governments, being moral powers, cannot be adjusted to a calculation of variable moralities.

But is the jealousy of the majority to extend itself over every petty office in the commonwealth, without any regard to the political importance of the occupant, or the power and responsibility of his place? We trust not. Let us consider it.

There is a certain clerk in the customhouse of a certain seaport, which shall be nameless, who maintains a worthy family out of a salary of a thousand dollars; from which he is obliged also to deduct an election tax levied upon him by the club of which he is a member. This clerk is a very honest man, but quite ignorant, though we grieve to say it, of the science of political economy. His notions of free trade, and the utility of ad valorem, are of the crudest, and those of his friends who respect his understanding, are shy of testing him on the tariff. Though his demeanor is altogether grave and quiet, he was never suspected of an intrigue, nor would his bitterest enemy go so far as to charge him with a design of altering the Constitution.

The person aimed at in the above paragraph, will be instantly identified by the knowing reader, when we give his initials. J. S., as his neighbor J. B. is ready to make oath, is a notorious democrat, and has voted the party ticket these eight years. His father, he avers, did vote so before him, and for aught he knows, his ancestors too, as far back as the days of Charles I., whose head, he says, was cut off by a democrat, but whether in the tenth or the eleventh century he seems generally to be in doubt. Mr. Smith, (for it is idle, after so glaring a description of the man, to make a secret of his name,) is just at this moment in danger of proscription. His neighbor, Mr. John Brown, has lodged a

political information against him in the Treasury office at Washington, and he is at this moment sitting by his poor little grate, looking into the fire with the air of a man who expects every moment to receive sentence of death. His wife is weeping beside him, and his children gather about him, and cling to his knees with an affectionate, inquisitive sorrow.

Poor Smith deserted a very good business to become an office-holder. He came in with his party, and now, after four years of regular and ill-paid industry, during which he has formed no new connections, and has lost his hold upon his old ones, he is about to be turned out upon the world a beggar and a vagabond. Mr. John Brown, who now comes in with his party, steps into his place, leaving a better business than his predecessor, to be in his turn spoiled and ruined, and at length turned out upon the world to die of hard work and misery.

As the calamity of Messrs. Smith and Brown is the calamity of thousands, it were perhaps injudicious to expend much sympathy upon them as individuals. Let their wives and children, their mothers and sisters bewail their unhappy fate or folly; for ourselves, it seems more appropriate to inquire into the merits of the system itself, the system of political proscription which inflicts all this mischief, and, if possible, to ascertain by what good, if by any good, it is compensated. It seems to be the duty of those citizens whose political successes have given efficacy to their opinions, to weigh very carefully the merits of this system, which the Mr. John Browns are so assiduously urging upon them, and to consider whether, taken in the whole, and viewed in its origin and consequences, it is not at once a vicious and an injurious system, injurious not only to the people at large, but to the party that relies upon it. First, however, it seems proper, in deference to some great names, and to the practice of many wise politicians, to set forth in fair colors the good aims and honest purposes of the system, if it can be thought to have any, and to offer all the excuses and defenses that reason imagination can bring together, lest we lay ourselves open to the charge of ignorance, or of using partisan logic, when our design is purely to effect a good; and though we

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confess that we are actuated by the strongest party enthusiasm, we wish to have it so tempered with reason, that it shall appear that our enthusiasm is itself created by a conviction of reason, and not by any factious heat or prejudice.

The apologist of the system relies for its defense upon three arguments; the first of which, being the doctrine of rotation, is purely theoretic; the second, drawn from political expediency, is founded on an imperfect experience; and the third, from convenience, for the filling of offices with younger and more assiduous functionaries, an over-refinement upon policy; and it has a face too specious and proper not to move a doubt. Let us consider each of these, and if they carry any force with them, let us allow them to affect us without prejudice; until it be shown that the injury inflicted by the system in practice, bears down all argument, and defies all theory, expediency and policy, to defend it.

We shall assume it to be a rule established and certain, that offices of political responsibility, or that carry with them a weight of political opinion, for the impeding or accomplishing the measures of the party in power, should be filled by men of that party. For the same reason that the majority of a State legislature will send only such a senator as will truly represent their opinion, it is necessary for a President to choose such persons to be members of his cabinet as will represent the opinion of the party. It were clearly an absurdity to do otherwise; it would be a defeating of the design of the Constitution, which intends that the majority of opinion shall have its way. That offices of responsibility, or, in other words, such offices as enable their incumbents to operate exofficio upon the opinion of the people, or to thwart or execute the laws, according to their pleasure or displeasure-that such offices should be filled by the appointment of members of the ruling party is, we think, most necessary; for if it is provided by the Constitution that the majority should shape the conduct of the government, it is also provided, by necessity, that those only should be appointed to execute them, by whom we are most sure they will be freely and willingly executed. From this point of view it appears just, and even constitutional, that the entrance of a new

party into power should be followed by an ejectment of all from office who were the originators, supporters and executors, in a moral sense, of the measures of the displaced party. The important offices in the gift of the people have been changed by the people, and their old incumbents ejected; and it is equally necessary that all important offices which carry with them a representative influence, bearing upon opinion, and the character of whose incumbents confirms or impairs, by official influence, the prevailing party, should be also ejected. Independently, therefore, of all theories of a rotation in office; independently of that political expediency which stimulates the canvasser with the hopes of office; independently, also, of all arguments that look to the effect of officeholding upon the characters of men, we hold it to be a necessity created by the nature of our government, that the change of rulers accomplished by the votes of the citizens should be followed by a change in the character of the government itself, sufficiently, but not more than sufficiently extended, for the complete establishment of the party, and the accomplishment of all its measures, during the four years of its probation. What these offices may be, can be known only by experience. might not seem, at first view, to be a matter of the least importance, whether the cabinet should be of one mind on the leading questions of policy; and yet experience has shown that their unanimity on all important measures is necessary for the efficient conduct of the government.

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In a word, every office of political importance, or that confers a power to impede or favor the execution of the laws, or that has any executive responsibility to be exercised for or against the measures of the majority, must necessarily be filled by members of the prevailing party. The filling of the elective offices with that party by the people, gives them a liberty of carrying out the popular will by filling appointments with the same. pose of the popular election was to give the supporters of a certain system of policy and economy, a fair opportunity of trying it. The majority judged that it should be tried. But if the opinion of the majority prevails at all, it should prevail entire, else it is of no force. Half measures, or

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impeded measures-impeded by the personal opposition of members of the government, would not answer the end; when a party is in power, it must instate itself to the full, and rely upon the full efficacy of its policy to secure the favor of the nation, and not upon any compromises, or bribes to influential persons, who, in the end, would certainly thwart and traverse the measures of a government which they despise.

But while we advocate the filling of every office that carries a weight of political influence with it, by members of the prevailing party, in order that the policy and economy of the party may be fairly and fully tried, without thwart or hindrance, we do this upon grounds of common sense and common justice, and in fulfillment of the spirit of the constitution; making no concessions to those who advocate a system of rotation in office.

It is implied by the doctrine of rotation, that the office is created for the convenience and benefit of its incumbent, and not for that of the citizens at large. And because it were improper to favor one man more than another, therefore each man must at some time in his life enjoy an office.

Let us suppose for a moment that of fices are in fact created for the benefit of those who hold them, in the nature of pensions and annuities. Unless they are equally distributed among all, they are converted into the most odious of all monopolies. The party who have just now lost their power, were divided into two factions, one monopolizing, the other demanding office. The latter faction is created by the opinion that there ought to be a rotation in office, and that those who have not "enjoyed" office should in their turn "enjoy" it. The opinion and the desire seem at first sight so very just and natural, and are held by some of our modern democrats in such a simple spirit, that they even declare their willingness to give the Whigs their turn; it being due to them that they take their turns with the rest. These simple-minded persons look upon offices as they do upon pensions and annuities, as benefits created for those who hold them, and they very justly conIclude that those benefits should be enjoyed in rotation; but when it is perceived

that offices are not established for the benefit of their incumbents, the idea of a right to office, or a turn in office, vanishes quite away. It is then only necessary to inquire by what system of appointments the performance of official duties will be best secured; the offices being established for the public benefit, and not for the convenience of office-loving citizens.

We might, therefore, dismiss the argument from this doctrine of rotation at this point, and give ourselves no further trouble about it; but as the opportunity is too good to be passed by, we cannot refrain from mentioning a few of the absurd consequences that flow from it in practice. For, first it would happen, that if any system of rotation were established, the necessity of elections and appointments would be done away with, and each citizen would come to office in his turn, whether qualified or not. But as the number of offices is small, and that of citizens great, a vast number would lose their turns of appointments, the life of one man being an insufficient time for a complete rotation of all the citizens through every office in the commonwealth. And if, in consideration of this difficulty, it happens that a certain class or body of citizens are selected and set aside by law to hold office in rotation for their lives, they are thus constituted a class of office.

If, on the other hand, some of the citizens coming to their turns should pass them over, caring only for such offices as were very lucrative, it would be necessary to exclude them entirely; for, being on an equality with the others, they have no right to be picking and choosing.

The system of election is directly opposed in spirit to the system of rotation; for while election leaves it free to the electors to choose whom they think fit, and the party in power to appoint whom they think will best accomplish the designs of their constituents; rotation, on the other hand, takes away all power from the electors, and indeed from every one else, and leaves no remedy for malversation. And should a rotated official misbehave, it is a matter of no consequence; no impeachment can be brought against him, since the office was made for him, and not for the people, who have therefore no right to complain. Such are the