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CHAP. steps, marching to Paris, or besieging a great city. It was not with 4000 knights that he could hope to conquer France. He therefore determined to continue his retreat, placing himself in communication with the sea, and thus provide for the security of his prisoners and his booty. As his victory gave him a lesser opinion of the French, he resolved to complete their subjugation at a future opportunity, and for this purpose he wished to have a French port in the vicinity of his own shores, instead of being obliged to sail to Brittany or the Gironde. He therefore marched by Boulogne to Calais, and sat down before the latter place.

The defeat of Crecy is attributed by several modern French writers to the indiscipline and incapacity of the nobles and the inherent defects of feudalism. His want of command over his host was, however, in part owing to the unskilfulness and headlong chivalry of Philip of Valois, in part to the circumstance of the French army having been hastily collected in a few days. Its very numbers proved an obstruction and an embarrassment. Feudalism, indeed, was on the decline: when it was in its vigour, its chiefs brought their retainers, that is, the peasant population of the country, into the field, maintaining discipline amongst them, restraining and encouraging them, and, in fact, acting the part of leaders and officers; but now the knight came alone in his panoply, or with one or two attendants. The infantry, whether archers or pikemen, formed corps completely apart from the nobles, and receiving the king's pay. At a later period the nobles came to act as officers to these corps of infantry, constituting a regular army; but this change had not yet been accomplished. Feudalism was in a transitional, a perishing, and an unnatural state; and the nobles, reduced to act as soldiers of a corps, without support and without discipline, displayed, indeed, their wonted courage; but for military skill there was neither room nor opportunity.

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This was the fault not of feudalism, but of the court СНАР. legislation, which might have been improvement and progress in one respect, but was decadence and disor ganisation in a military point of view. Had feudalism still survived, Edward could not have marched across the country, and pillaged it from one end to the other. Fortunate, indeed, was it for France that its sole enemy was England, with its scant population; had it been a horde of Moguls or Turks, they would have swept over the country without resistance, and totally subdued it. There were elements of military strength both in the towns and in the peasantry. Had the town militia been kept up, they would have formed an infantry as formidable as that of Flanders; but, as has been before described, the kings of France dispensed with the town levies, and took money instead, with which the refuse of the population was enlisted. And although in the engagement with the English at Crecy the towns themselves did send armed contingents, it was only to perish, so unused were they to arms, to discipline, to precaution, or command. Missiles at that time were becoming of the first importance in war. The records of Rymer show what pains the English king took to raise and exercise his bowmen from the hardiest districts, and to supply them with the best weapons. Instead of taking any such care, the King of France procured his crossbowmen from the Genoese fleet. In England feudalism had also lost much of its power, and its rigour had been mitigated by laws which secured to all classes their rights; but, in order to enforce those laws, it had not been found necessary to destroy the local powers of the proprietor of the soil and to supersede him by royal bailiffs sent down from a court of legists. The gentry preserved their influence, the peasantry their respect; and the links remained between noble and peasant, knight and archer, which made Edward's little army at Crecy fight as one man, whilst that of Philip was a

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CHAP. congregation of disjointed elements, like those of the country and the kingdom itself, ignorant or jealous of each other.

The town of Calais, before which Edward encamped with the determination to reduce it, was not one of those fortresses close to whose walls it was easy to bring the battering engines of the time. It was easily surrounded with water, and defied the military science of those days. Edward therefore prepared to starve out the garrison, and he began by building for himself and his army a town, still called Villeneuve, between Calais and the camp round it. He even established markets there, well supplied from England and from Flanders. Jean de Vienne, a Burgundian knight, commanded in the town for the King of France, and seeing Edward's purpose, he first sent out seventeen hundred people, in order to make his provisions last. Edward

allowed them to pass, after keeping them some time in sufferance. The siege of Aiguillon had been raised in the south by the Duke of Normandy, who returned to Paris; and the Earl of Derby, seizing the opportunity to take the field, reduced St. Jean d'Angely and Poitiers. He might have held this town as long as he liked, says Froissart, for there was no one to resist, and the whole country, to the Loire, trembled; but the English chief abandoned it, and retired to Bordeaux, to take ship for Calais.

Edward spent the entire winter in the siege, and in endeavouring to bring the Flemings to lend their zealous co-operation. On the death, at Crecy, of the count, who had been so obnoxious and tyrannical, and after the previous murder of Arteveld, the Flemings were induced to receive Count Louis, a youth of sixteen. Being so young, he was in the hands of the burgomasters and the Flemish magistrates. There ensued intrigues for marrying the youth, the Duke of Brabant desiring to make his daughter Countess of Flanders,

and Edward putting forward the same proposal for his daughter Isabella. The towns of Flanders favoured the English match. Count Louis dared not openly object: he therefore affected acquiescence, and even met the English king and queen, and arranged all the preliminaries of the marriage; then taking advantage of a hawking excursion, the young count put spurs to his horse and escaped to Paris.

Philip had spent the winter in the levy of money from all classes, the clergy included, so much so, that even the court chronicle breaks into lamentations, and almost anathematizes the greed of officials, whilst expatiating upon the distress of the people. There were also symptoms of disaffection. Paris itself had shown discontent when the English approached so near, and when it was proposed to destroy the suburbs in order to the defence of the city. There was every reason indeed for extraordinary efforts and unusual levies, and the three orders of the north assembled in Paris granted Philip money and aide at this time. The object was to relieve Calais, which Edward kept closely blockaded, not only by the English fleet outside, but by means of a large wooden castle, mounting pringalles and bombardes, which commanded the harbour, and prevented any vessel from entering.

During the fine months of spring, Philip was disturbed from the relief of Calais by the Flemings, who marched in great force as far as Aire and St. Omers, and obliged him to repair with haste to Arras. As they retreated, the French king brought his army towards Calais. The inhabitants were gladdened to observe, by moonlight, the relieving army occupy a hill south of the town, and bordering on the sea. Robert of Avesbury mentions that Philip desired to assault the besiegers of Calais along the sea, both from north and south, but that the Flemings held their camp on the

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north. He offered them most advantageous condi tions, such as the restitution of French Flanders, if they would remain neutral. These offers, it is very probable, were what induced the Flemings to withdraw from the investment of Aire; this set Philip at liberty to approach Calais with the aim of relieving it. But it does not appear that they at all aided in the siege of that town more than by the transport of provisions from Ypres and Bruges to Edward's army. To attack Calais from the north, however, would have been dangerous in case of repulse, as the return towards Arras would have been cut off by both English and Flemings. There remained, therefore, but to force a way either along the coast south of the town, or over a bridge which crossed the marshes. This was held by the Earl of Derby, one of Edward's bravest captains, whilst the road along the sea was commanded by the English vessels, well provided with bombards and other engines for throwing missiles. The militia of Tournay undertook to assault and capture a strong tower which the English had erected on the downs. In this they succeeded, though with considerable loss. But when the town was reconnoitred by the marshals, they reported that it was impossible to advance farther, or reach the English, without a great loss of men.

Philip, in disappointment, then despatched four gentlemen to challenge the King of England, and to represent that the King of France had come for the purpose of combating, but that he could not get near enough for that purpose; he begged the King of England, therefore, to facilitate the encounter of the armies. Edward desired them to reply for him to Philip, "that he had been there a year, and had expended large sums in order to take Calais; that it was not his fault if Philip had not come sooner; that now he was on the point of taking the town, he would not stir till he had done so, nor abandon the advantage of his position. The King of