An Adventure In Moral PhilosophyRoutledge, 20. jul. 2020 - 288 sider Originally published in 1926, this book develops the Socratic thesis that morality is intelligence, that morality is not a matter of standards, laws and principles but in knowing what we do – in living self-consciously. The book develops this central theme in its bearings upon logic and science, art and religion and suggests that both intelligence and morality stand for much more than appears first obvious. |
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... perhaps primarily, to students of philosophy. It has been my hope to speak intelligibly to every cultivated man; to every person curious about the meaning of human life as presented, not in philosophy only, but in literature, art, and ...
... perhaps primarily, to students of philosophy. It has been my hope to speak intelligibly to every cultivated man; to every person curious about the meaning of human life as presented, not in philosophy only, but in literature, art, and ...
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... perhaps that he is more respectable than I am while saying to myself that there is something better than respectability. Yet this is not precisely what he means by being moral, as little as it is what I can let him mean. If we have ...
... perhaps that he is more respectable than I am while saying to myself that there is something better than respectability. Yet this is not precisely what he means by being moral, as little as it is what I can let him mean. If we have ...
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... perhaps the etymologist who reminds us that “morality”, like the correlative term “ethics”, is derived from a term meaning “custom”. With all of these distinctions, however described, I am more or less in agreement. But to that against ...
... perhaps the etymologist who reminds us that “morality”, like the correlative term “ethics”, is derived from a term meaning “custom”. With all of these distinctions, however described, I am more or less in agreement. But to that against ...
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... perhaps offer reputable authority by quoting those two famous sayings of Socrates, “Virtue is knowledge” and “Know thyself”, and I might then call myself a disciple of Socrates. The trouble here is that there seems to be no moral ...
... perhaps offer reputable authority by quoting those two famous sayings of Socrates, “Virtue is knowledge” and “Know thyself”, and I might then call myself a disciple of Socrates. The trouble here is that there seems to be no moral ...
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Warner Fite. and let the freedom come in where and how it can—perhaps only in a Pickwickian sense. The humanistic theories lay stress upon the freedom. They may offer a Pickwickian definition of obligation, or, in anarchistic fashion ...
Warner Fite. and let the freedom come in where and how it can—perhaps only in a Pickwickian sense. The humanistic theories lay stress upon the freedom. They may offer a Pickwickian definition of obligation, or, in anarchistic fashion ...
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aesthetic animal answer anthropomorphic Aristotle artist authoritarian authority beauty Bishop Butler categorical imperative chapter conceive conception consciousness convention criticism Croce difference distinction divine enjoy enjoyment Epicurean Epicurus ethics expression fact feeling George Eliot grasp Greek human nature idea ideal illusion imagination implies impression insight interesting J. S. Mill Kant knowledge least less literature living logic Lucretius man’s mark marriage matter means merely mind modern moral law moral philosophy moral world moralist motive never objective one’s order of reverence ordered society orthodox morality perhaps picture Plato poetry point of view possible practical pragmatic attitude present problem Professor Dewey psychology purpose question reality relation religion religious reverence scientific seems self-consciousness sense significance simple social Socrates soul spirit standard suggest suppose suspect T. H. Green taste theory things thought tradition true truth understand utilitarian utility virtue wonder words