OF HHuman Understanding. fs 5. BOOK I. CHAP. I. Introduction. SINCE it is the understanding, that into the un ufeful. fets man above the rest of fenfible ings, and gives him all the advantage ddominion, which he has over them; it certainly a fubject, even for its noblefs, worth our labour to enquire into. The underanding, like the eye, whilft it makes us fee and pereive all other things, takes no notice of itself; and it quires art and pains to fet it at a distance, and make its own object. But, whatever be the difficulties that e in the way of this enquiry; whatever it be, that eeps us fo much in the dark to ourselves; fure I am, hat all the light we can let in upon our own minds, all he acquaintance we can make with our own undertandings, will not only be very pleafant, but bring us great advantage, in directing our thoughts in the fearch of other things. Defign. §. 2. This, therefore, being my purpose, to enquire into the original, certainty, and extent of human knowledge; together with the grounds, and degrees of belief, opinion, and affent; I fhall not at prefent meddle with the phyfical confideration of the mind; or trouble myself to examine, wherein its effence confifts, or by what motions of our fpirits, VOL. I. B or or alterations of our bodies, we come to have any fenfation by our organs, or any ideas in our underftandings; and whether those ideas do in their formation, any, or all of them, depend on matter or no: These are fpeculations, which, however curious and entertaining, I fhall decline, as lying out of my way in the design I am now upon. It fhall fuffice to my prefent purpofe, to confider the difcerning faculties of a man, as they are employed about the objects, which they have to do with: And I fhall imagine I have not wholly mifemployed myfelf in the thoughts I fhall have on this occafion, if, in this hiftorical, plain method, I can give any account of the ways, whereby our understandings come to attain thofe notions of things we have, and can fet down any measures of the certainty of our knowledge, or the grounds of those perfuafions, which are to be found amongft men, fo various, different, and wholly contradictory; and yet afferted, fomewhere or other, with fuch affurance and confidence, that he that shall take a view of the opinions of mankind, obferve their oppofition, and at the fame time confider the fondness and devotion wherewith they are embraced, the refolution and eagernefs wherewith they are maintained, may perhaps have reafon to fufpect, that either there is no fuch thing as truth at all; or that mankind hath no fufficient means to attain a certain knowledge of it. §. 3. It is, therefore, worth while to search Method. out the bounds between opinion and knowledge; and examine by what meafures, in things, whereof we have no certain knowledge, we ought to regulate our affent, and moderate our perfuafions. In order whereunto, I fhall purfue this following method. First, I fhall enquire into the original of thofe ideas, notions, or whatever elfe you pleafe to call them, which a man obferves, and is confcious to himself he has in his, mind; and the ways, whereby the understanding comes to be furnished with them.' Secondly, I fhall endeavour to fhew what knowledge the understanding hath by thofe ideas; and the certainty, evidence, and extent of it. Thirdly, Thirdly, I fhall make fome enquiry into the nature and grounds of faith, or opinion; whereby I mean that affent, which we give to any propofition as true, of whose truth yet we have no certain knowledge: and here we shall have occafion to examine the reafons and degrees of affent. Ufeful to know the excomprehen tent of our fion. S. 4. If, by this enquiry into the nature of the understanding, I can difcover the powers thereof; how far they reach; to what things they are in any degree proportionate; and where they fail us: I fuppofe it may be of ufe to prevail with the bufy mind of man, to be more cautious in meddling with things exceeding its comprehenfion; to ftop when it is at the utmost extent of its tether; and to fit down in a quiet ignorance of those things, which, upon examination, are found to be beyond the reach of our capacities. We fhould not then perhaps be fo forward, out of an affectation of an univerfal knowledge, to raise questions, and perplex ourfelves and others with difputes about things, to which our understandings are not fuited; and of which we cannot frame in our minds any clear or diftinct perceptions, or whereof (as it has perhaps too often happened) we have not any notions at all. If we can find out how far the understanding can extend its view, how far it has faculties to attain certainty, and in what cafes it can only judge and guefs; we may learn to content ourselves with what is attainable by us in this state. §. 5. For, though the comprehenfion of our understandings comes exceeding fhort of the vast extent of things; yet we fhall have caufe enough to magnify the bountiful author of our being, for that proportion and knowledge he has beftowed on us, fo far above all the reft of the inhabitants of this our manfion. Men have reafon to be well fatisfied with what God hath thought. fit for them, fince he hath given them (as St. Peter fays) πάντα πρὸς ζωὴν καὶ εὐσέβειαν, whatfoever is neceffary for the conveniencies of life, and information of virtue ; and has put within the reach of their difcovery the comfortable provifion for this life, and the way that B 2 Our capacity fuited to our ftate and con cerns. degree of leads leads to a better. How fhort foever their knowledge may come of an univerfal or perfect comprehenfion of whatsoever is, it yet fecures their great concernments, that they have light enough to lead them to the knowledge of their maker, and the fight of their own duties. Men may find matter fufficient to bufy their heads, and employ their hands with variety, delight and fatisfaction; if they will not boldly quarrel with their own conftitution, and throw away the bleffings their hands are filled with, because they are not big enough to grafp every thing. We fhall not have much reafon to complain of the narrow nefs of our minds, if we will but employ them about what may be of ufe to us; for of that they are very capable: and it will be an unpardonable, as well as childish peevishnefs, if we undervalue the advantages of our knowledge, and neglect to improve it to the ends for which it was given us, because there are fome things that are fet out of the reach of it. It will be no excufe to an idle and untoward fervant, who would not attend his bufinefs by candle-light, to plead that he had not broad fun-fhine. The candle, that is fet up in us, fhines bright enough for all our purposes. The difcoveries we can make with this, ought to fatisfy us; and we fhall then ufe our underftandings right, when we entertain all objects in that way and proportion that they are fuited to our faculties, and upon thofe grounds they are capable of being propofed to us; and not peremptorily, or intemperately require demonftration, and demand certainty, where probability only is to be had, and which is fufficient to govern all our concernments. If we will difbelieve every thing, because we cannot certainly know all things; we all do muchwhat as wifely as he, who would not ufe his legs, but fit ftill and perish, because he had no wings to fly. Knowledge city, a cure §. 6. When we know our own ftrength, we fhall the better know what to undertake of our capa- with hopes of fuccefs: and when we have offcepticifm well furveyed the powers of our own minds, and idleness. and made fome estimate what we may expect from them, we fhall not be inclined either to fit |