pofition; it is the very nature of both of them to confift of parts: but their parts being all of the fame kind, and without the mixture of any other idea, hinder them not from having a place amongft fimple ideas. Could the mind, as in number, come to fo small a part of extenfion or duration, as excluded divifibility, that would be, as it were, the indivifible unit, or idea; by repetition of which it would make its more enlarged ideas of extenfion and duration. But fince the mind is not able to frame an idea of any space without parts; instead thereof it makes ufe of the common measures, which by familiar ufe, in each country, have imprinted themselves on the memory (as inches and feet; or cubits and parafangs; and fo feconds, minutes, hours, days, and years in duration :) the mind makes use, I fay, of fuch ideas as thefe, as fimple ones; and these are the component parts of larger ideas, which the mind, upon occafion, makes by the addition of fuch known lengths

It has been objected to Mr. Locke, that if fpace confifts of parts, as it is confeffed in this place, he should not have reckoned it in the num ber of fimple ideas: because it seems to be inconfiftent with what he fays elsewhere, that a fimple idea is uncompounded, and contains in it no thing but one uniform appearance or conception of the mind, and is not diftinguishable into different ideas. It is farther objected, that Mr. Locke has not given in the eleventh chapter of the fecond book, where he begins to fpeak of fimple ideas, an exact definition of what he under ftands by the word fimple ideas. To thefe difficulties Mr. Locke an fwers thus: To begin with the laft, he declares, that he has not treated his fubject in an order perfectly fcholaftic, having not had much familiarity with thofe fort of books during the writing of his, and not re membering at all the method in which they are written; and therefore his readers ought not to expect definitions regularly placed at the begin ning of each new fubject. Mr. Locke contents himself to employ the principal terms that he ufes, fo that from his ufe of them the reader may eafily comprehend what he means by them. But with refpect to the term fimple idea, he has had the good luck to define that in the place cited in the objection; and therefore there is no reafon to fupply that defect. The queftion then is to know, whether the idea of extenfion agrees with this definition? which will effectually agree to it, if it be understood in the fenfe which Mr. Locke had principally in his view: for that compofition which he defigned to exclude in that definition, was a compofition of different ideas in the mind, and not a compofition of the fame kind in a thing whose effence confifts in having parts of the fame kind, where you can never come to a part entirely exempted from this compofition. So

that

lengths which it is acquainted with. On the other fide, the ordinary smallest measure we have of either is looked on as an unit in number, when the mind by divifion would reduce them into lefs fractions. Though on both fides, both in addition and divifion, either of space or duration, when the idea under confideration becomes. very big or very fmall, its precife bulk becomes very obfcure and confufed; and it is the number of its repeated additions or divifions, that alone remains clear and distinct, as will eafily appear to any one who will let his thoughts loofe in the waft expanfion of fpace,, or divifibility of matter. Every part of duration is duration too; and every part of extenfion is extenfion, both of them capable of addition or divifion in infinitum. But the leaft portions of either of them, whereof we have clear and diftinct ideas, may perhaps be fitteft to be confidered by us, as the fimple ideas of that kind, out of which our complex modes of space,

that if the idea of extenfion confifts in having partes extra partes, (as the schools fpeak) it is always, in the sense of Mr. Locke, a fimple idea; hecaufe the idea of having partes extra partes cannot be refolved into two other ideas. For the remainder of the objection made to Mr. Locke, with refpect to the nature of extenfion, Mr. Locke was aware of it, as may be feen in §. 9. chap. 15. of the fecond book, where he fays, that "the leaft portion of fpace or extenfion, whereof we have a clear and "diftinct idea, may perhaps be the fittest to be confidered by us as a fimple idea of that kind, out of which our complex modes of space and "extenfion are made up." So that, according to Mr. Locke, it may very fitly be called a fimple idea, fince it is the leatt idea of space that the mind can form to itself, and that cannot be divided by the mind into any lefs whereof it has in itself any determined perception. From whence it follows, that it is to the mind one fimple idea; and that is fufficient to take away this objection: for it is not the defign of Mr. Locke, in this place to difcourfe of any thing but concerning the idea of the mind. But if this is not fufficient to clear the difficulty, Mr. Locke hath nothing more to add, but that if the idea of extenfion is fo peculiar that it cannot ex-, actly agree with the definition that he has given of thofe fimple ideas, fo that it differs in fome manner from all others of that kind, he thinks it is better to leave it there expofed to this difficulty, than to make a new divifion in his favour. It is enough for Mr. Locke that his meaning can be understood. It is very common to obferve intelligible difcourfes fpoiled by too much fubtilty in nice divifions. We ought to put things together as well as we can, doctrinæ causâ; but, after all, feveral things will not be bundled up together under our terms and ways of fpeaking.

extenfion

extenfion, and duration, are made up, and into which they can again be diftinctly refolved. Such a small part in duration may be called a moment, and is the time of one idea in our minds in the train of their ordinary fucceffion there. The other, wanting a proper name, I know not whether I may be allowed to call a fenfible point, meaning thereby the leaft particle of matter or Ipace we can difcern, which is ordinarily about a minute, and to the sharpeft eyes feldom less than thirty seconds of a circle, whereof the eye is the centre.

§. 10. Expanfion and duration have this Their parts farther agreement, that though they are both infeparable. confidered by us as having parts, yet their parts are not feparable one from another, no not even in thought: though the parts of bodies from whence we take our measure of the one, and the parts of motion, or rather the fucceffion of ideas in our minds, from whence we take the measure of the other, may be interrupted and separated; as the one is often by reft, and the other is by fleep, which we call reft too.

Duration is as a line, expanfion as a folid.

§. II. But there is this manifeft difference between them, that the ideas of length, which we have of expansion, are turned every way, and fo make figure, and breadth, and thickness; but duration is but as it were the length of one ftraight line, extended in infinitum, not capable of multiplicity, variation, or figure; but is one common measure of all existence whatsoever, wherein all things, whilft they exift, equally partake. For this present moment is common to all things that are now in being, and equally comprehends that part of their existence, as much as if they were all but one fingle being; and we may truly fay, they all exift in the fame moment of time. Whether angels and fpirits have any analogy to this, in respect to expansion, is beyond my comprehenfion and perhaps for us, who have understandings and comprehenfions fuited to our own prefervation, and the ends of our own being, but not to the reality and extent of all other beings; it is near as hard to conceive any exiftence, or to have an idea of any real being, with a perfect negation of all manner of expan

fion; as it is to have the idea of any real existence, with a perfect negation of all manner of duration; and therefore what fpirits have to do with space, or how they communicate in it, we know not. All that we know is, that bodies do each fingly poffefs its proper portion of it, according to the extent of folid parts; and thereby exclude all other bodies from having any fhare in that particular portion of fpace, whilft it remains there.

Duration has

never two

parts toge

ther.

§. 12. Duration, and time which is a part of it, is the idea we have of perishing dif tance, of which no two parts exist togesher, expanther, but follow each other in fucceffion; fion all togeas expansion is the idea of lafting distance, all whose parts exift together, and are not capable of fucceffion. And therefore, though we cannot conceive any duration without fucceffion, nor can put it together in our thoughts, that any being does now exift to-morrow, or poffefs at once more than the present moment of duration; yet we can conceive the eternal duration of the Almighty far different from that of man, or any other finite being. Because man comprehends not in his knowledge, or power, all paft and future things; his thoughts are but of yesterday, and he knows not what to-morrow will bring forth. What is once past he can never recall; and what is yet to come he cannot make prefent. What I fay of man I fay of all finite beings; who, though they may far exceed man in knowledge and power, yet are no more than the meaneft creature, in comparison with God himself. Finite of any magnitude holds not any proportion to infinite. God's infinite duration being accompanied with infinite knowledge, and infinite power, he fees all things paft and to come; and they are no more diftant from his knowledge, no farther removed from his fight, than the prefent: they all lie under the fame view; and there is nothing which he cannot make exist each moment he pleafes. For the existence of all things depending upon his good-pleasure, all things exift every moment that he thinks fit to have them exift. To conclude, expanfion and duration do mutually embrace and comprehend each other; every part of space being in every part of du

ration,

ration, and every part of duration in every part of expanfion. Such a combination of two diftinct ideas is, I fuppofe, fcarce to be found in all that great variety we do or can conceive, and may afford matter to farther fpeculation.

§. 1.

CHAP. XVI.

Of Number.

AMONGST all the ideas we have, Number the

as there is none fuggefted to the fimpleft and

moft univer

fal idea.

mind by more ways, fo there is none more fimple, than that of unity, or one. It has no fhadow of variety or compofition in it; every object our fenfes are employed about, every idea in our understandings, every thought of our minds, brings this idea along with it. And therefore it is the most intimate to our thoughts, as well as it is, in its agreement to all other things, the most univerfal idea we have. For number applies itself to men, angels, actions, thoughts, every thing that either doth exift, or can be imagined.

made by ad

dition.

$. 2. By repeating this idea in our minds, Its modes and adding the repetitions together, we come by the complex ideas of the modes of it. Thus by adding one to one, we have the complex idea of a couple; by putting twelve units together, we have the complex idea of a dozen; and fo of a score, or a million, or any other number.

§. 3. The fimple modes of numbers are Each mode of all other the most diftinct; every the distinct. leaft variation, which is an unit, making

each combination as clearly different from that which approacheth heareft to it, as the most remote: two being as diftinct from one, as two hundred; and the idea of two as diftinct from the idea of three, as the magnitude of the whole earth is from that of a mite. This is not fo in other fimple modes, in which it is not fo easy,

nor