that any notion is originally by nature imprinted in the mind in its firft conftitution, because it comes first to be obferved and affented to, when a faculty of the mind, which has quite a diftinct province, begins to exert itfelf? And therefore, the coming to the use of speech, if it were fuppofed the time that these maxims are first affented to (which it may be with as much truth, as the time when men come to the ufe of reafon) would be as good a proof that they were innate, as to fay, they are innate, because men affent to them, when they come to the ufe of reafon. I agree then with these men of innate principles, that there is no knowledge of these general and feif-evident maxims in the mind, till it comes to the exercife of reafon: but I deny that the coming to the ufe of reafon is the precife time when they are first taken notice of; and if that were the precife time, I deny that it would prove them innate. All that can with any truth be meant by this propofition, that men affent to them when they come to the ufe of reafon, is no more but this, that the making of general abftract ideas, and the understanding of general names, being a concomitant of the rational faculty, and growing up with it, children commonly get not thofe general ideas, nor learn the names that ftand for them, till, having for a good while exercifed their reason about familiar and more particular ideas, they are, by their ordinary difcourfe and actions with others, acknowledged to be capable of rational converfation. If af fenting to thefe maxims, when men come to the use of reason, can be true in any other fenfe, I defire it may be fhown; or at least, how in this, or any other sense, it proves them innate. The fteps by which the mind attains feveral truths 6. 15. The fenfes at firft let in particular ideas, and furnish the yet empty cabinet; and the mind by degrees growing familiar with fome of them, they are lodged in the memory, and names got to them. Afterwards the mind, proceeding farther, abftracts them, and by degrees learns the ufe of general names. In this manner the mind comes to be furnished with ideas and language, the ma terials terials about which to exercife its difcurfive faculty: and the ufe of reafon becomes daily more vifible, as thefe materials, that give it employment, increase. But though the having of general ideas, and the use of geReral words and reafon, ufually grow together; yet, I fee not, how this any way proves them innate. The knowledge of fome truths, I confefs, is very early in the mind; but in a way that shows them not to be innate. For, if we will obferve, we fhall find it still to be about ideas, not innate, but acquired: It being about those first which are imprinted by external things, with which infants have earlieft to do, which make the most frequent impreffions on their fenfes. In ideas thus got, the mind discovers that some agree, and others differ, probably as foon as it has any ufe of memory; as foon as it is able to retain and perceive diftinct ideas. But whether it be then, or no, this is certain, it does fo long before it has the use of words, or comes to that, which we commonly call "the use of reafon." For a child knows as certainly, before it can speak, the difference between the ideas of fweet and bitter (i. e. that fweet is not bitter) as it knows afterwards (when it comes to speak) that wormwood and fugar-plums are not the fame thing. §. 16. A child knows not that three and four are equal to seven, till he comes to be able to count seven, and has got the name and idea of equality: and then, upon explaining thofe words, he prefently affents to, or rather perceives the truth of that propofition. But neither does he then readily affent, because it is an innate truth, nor was his affent wanting till then, because he wanted the ufe of reafon; but the truth of it appears to him, as soon as he has fettled in his mind the clear and diftinct ideas, that these names ftand for and then he knows the truth of that propofition, upon the fame grounds, and by the fame means, that he knew before, that a rod and a cherry are not the fame thing; and upon the fame grounds alfo, that he may come to know afterwards, "that it is impoffible for the fame thing to be, and not to be," as fhall be more fully fhown here C 3 after. after. So that the later it is before any one comes to have those general ideas, about which thofe maxims are; or to know the fignification of thofe general terms that stand for them; or to put together in his mind the ideas they ftand for; the later alfo will it be before he comes to affent to those maxims, whofe terms, with the ideas they ftand for, being no more innate than those of a cat or a weefel, he muft ftay till time and obfervation have acquainted him with them; and then he will be in a capacity to know the truth of these maxims, upon the firft occafion that fhall make him put together thofe ideas in his mind, and obferve whether they agree or difagree, according as is expreffed in those propofitions. And therefore it is, that a man knows that eighteen and nineteen are equal to thirty-feven, by the fame felfevidence, that he knows one and two to be equal to three yet a child knows this not fo foon as the other; not for want of the ufe of reafon, but because the ideas the words eighteen, nineteen, and thirty-seven stand for, are not fo foon got, as those which are fignified by one, two, and three. Affenting as foon as propofed and understood, proves them not innate. §. 17. This evafion therefore of general affent, when men come to the ufe of reafon, failing as it does, and leaving no difference between thofe fuppofed innate, and other truths, that are afterwards acquired and learnt, men have endeavoured to fecure an univerfal affent to thofe they call maxims, by faying, they are generally affented to as foon as propofed, and the terms they are proposed in, understood: seeing all men, even children, as foon as they hear and underftand the terms, affent to these propofitions, they think it is fufficient to prove them innate. For fince men never fail, after they have once understood the words, to acknowledge them for undoubted truths, they would infer, that certainly these propofitions were firft lodged in the understanding, which, without any teaching, the mind, at the very first propofal, immediately clofes with, and affents to, and after that never doubts again. If fuch an affent be a mark of innate, one and two are equal to three; that fweetness is nefs;" and a thoufand the like, must be then" that not bitter innate. §. 18. In answer to this, I demand "whether ready affent given to a propofition upon first hearing, and understanding the terms, be a certain mark of an innate principle?" If it be not, fuch a general affent is in vain urged as a proof of them: if it be said, that it is a mark of innate, they must then allow all fuch propofitions to be innate, which are generally affented to as foon as heard, whereby they will find themselves plentifully stored with innate principles. For upon the fame ground, viz. of affent at first hearing and understanding the terms, that men would have those maxims pafs for innate, they must also admit several propofitions about numbers to be innate and thus, that one and two are equal to three; that two and two are equal to four; and a multitude of other the like propofitions in numbers, that every body affents to at first hearing and understanding the terms, muft have a place amongst these innate axioms. Nor is this the prerogative of numbers alone, and propofitions made about feveral of them; but even natural philofophy, and all the other sciences, afford propofitions, which are fure to meet with affent as foon as they are understood. That two bodies cannot be in the fame place, is a truth, that nobody any more flicks at, than at these maxims, "that it is impoffible for the fame thing to be, and not to be; that white is not black: that a fquare is not a circle; that yellownefs is not fweetnefs:" thefe and a million of fuch other propofitions, as many at leaft as we have diftinct ideas of, every man in his wits, at first hearing, and knowing what the names ftand for, muft neceffarily affent to. If thefe men will be true to their own rule, and have affent at first hearing and understanding the terms, to be a mark of innate, they muft allow, not only as many innate propofitions as men have diftinct ideas; but as many as men can make propofitions wherein different ideas are denied one of another. Since every propofition, wherein one different idea is denied of another, will as certainly find affent at first hearing and underftanding the terms, as this general one, "it is impoffible for the fame thing to be, and not to be;" or that which is the foundation of it, and is the eafier underftood of the two, "the fame is not different:" by which account they will have legions of innate propofitions of this one fort, without mentioning any other. But fince no propofition can be innate, unlefs the ideas, about which it is, be innate; this will be, to suppose all our ideas of colours, founds, taftes, figure, &c. innate; than which there cannot be any thing more oppofite to reafon and experience. Univerfal and ready affent upon hearing and understanding the terms is (I grant) a mark of felf-evidence: but felf-evidence, depending not on innate impreffions, but on fomething elfe (as we fhall fhow hereafter) belongs to feveral propofitions, which nobody was yet fo extravagant as to pretend to be innate. Such lefs ge fitionsknown before thefe §. 19. Nor let it be faid, That those more neral propo- particular felf-evident propofitions, which are affented to at first hearing, as, that one and two are equal to three; that green is not red; &c; are received as the confequences of thofe more univerfal propofitions, which are looked on as innate principles; fince any one, who will but take the pains to obferve what paffes in the understanding, will certainly find, that thefe, and the like lefs general propofitions, are certainly known, and firmly affented to, by those who are utterly ignorant of thofe more general maxims; and fo, being earlier in the mind than thofe (as they are called) first principles, cannot owe to them the affent wherewith they are received at first hearing. One and one §. 20. If it be faid, that" these proequal to two, pofitions, viz. two and two are equal to &c. not gene four; red is not blue; &c.; are not general maxims, nor of any great ufe:" I anfwer, that makes nothing to the argument of univerfal affent, upon hearing and understanding. For, if that be the certain mark of innate, whatever propo 1 ral nor ufeful, answered |