that are raised about them, I fuppofe a great part of the difficulties that perplex men's thoughts, and entangle their understandings, would be much eafier refolved; and we should perceive where the confufed fignification of terms, or where the nature of the thing caufed the obfcurity. Freedom §. 27. First then, it is carefully to be remembered, that freedom confifts in the dependence of the existence, or not existence of any action, upon our volition of it; and not in the dependence of any action, or its contrary, on our preference. A man ftanding on a cliff, is at liberty to leap twenty yards downwards into the fea, not because he has a power to do the contrary action, which is to leap twenty yards upwards, for that he cannot do: but he is therefore free because he has a power to leap or not to leap. But if a greater force than his either holds him faft, or tumbles him down, he is no longer free in that cafe; because the doing or forbearance of that particular action is no longer in his power. He that is a close prifoner in a room twenty feet fquare, being at the north fide of his chamber, is at liberty to walk twenty feet fouthward, because he can walk or not walk it; but is not, at the fame time, at liberty to do the contrary, i. e. to walk twenty feet northward. Volition, what. In this then confifts freedom, viz. in our being able to act or not to act, according as we shall choose or will, §. 28. Secondly, we must remember, that volition or willing is an act of the mind directing its thought to the production of any action, and thereby exerting its power to produce it. To avoid multiplying of words, I would crave leave here, under the word action, to comprehend the forbearance too of any action propofed: fitting ftill, or holding one's peace, when walking or speaking are propofed, though mere forbearances, requiring as much the determination of the will, and being as often weighty in their confequences as the contrary actions, may, on that confideration, well enough pafs for actions too: but this I fay, that I may not be mistaken, if for brevity fake I speak thus. What determines the will. §. 29. Thirdly, The will being nothing. but a power in the mind to direct the operative faculties of a man to motion or rest, as far as they depend on fuch direction: to the queftion, What is it determines the will? the true and proper anfwer is, The mind. For that which determines the general power of directing to this or that particular direction, is nothing but the agent itself exercifing the power it has, that particular way. If this anfwer fatisfies not, it is plain the meaning of the quef tion, What determines the will? is this, What moves the mind, in every particular inftance, to determine its general power of directing to this or that particular motion or reft? And to this I answer, the motive for continuing in the fame ftate or action, is only the prefent fatisfaction in it; the motive to change, is always fome uneasiness; nothing fetting us upon the change of state, or upon any new action, but fome uneafinefs. This is the great motive that works on the mind to put it upon action, which for fhortnefs fake we will call determining of the will; which I fhall more at large explain. Will and de fire must not be confound ed. §. 30. But, in the way to it, it will be neceffary to premife, that though I have above endeavoured to exprefs the act of volition by choofing, preferring, and the like terms, that fignify defire as well as volition, for want of other words to mark that act of the mind, whose proper name is willing or volition; yet it being a very fimple act, whofoever defires to understand what it is, will better find it by reflecting on his own mind, and obferving what it does when it wills, than by any variety of articulate founds whatsoever... This caution of being careful not to be mifled by expreffions that do not enough keep up the difference between the will and feveral acts of the mind that are quite diftinct from it, I think the more neceffary; becaufe I find the will often confounded with feveral of the affections, efpecially defire, and one put for the other; and that by men, who would not willingly be thought not to have had very diftinct notions of things, and not to have writ very clearly about them. This, I imagine, has been no fmall occafion of obfcurity and mistake in this matter; and therefore is, as much as may be, to be avoided. For he that fhall turn his thoughts inwards upon what paffes in his mind when he wills, fhall fee that the will or power of volition is converfant about nothing, but that particular determination of the mind, whereby barely by a thought the mind endeavours to give rife, continuation, or ftop, to any action which it takes to be in its power. This well confidered, plainly fhows that the will is perfectly diftinguished from defire; which in the very fame action may have a quite contrary tendency from that which our will fets us upon. A man whom I cannot deny, may oblige me to ufe perfuafions to another, which, at the fame time I am fpeaking, I may with may not prevail on him. In this cafe, it is plain the will and defire run counter. I will the action that tends one way, whilft my defire tends another, and that the direct contrary way. A man who by a violent fit of the gout in his limbs finds a doziness in his head, or a want of appetite in his ftomach removed, defires to be eased too of the pain of his feet or hands (for wherever there is pain, there is a defire to be rid of it) though yet, whilft he apprehends that the removal of the pain may tranflate the noxious humour tc a more vital part, his will is never determined to any one action that may ferve to remove this pain. Whence it is evident that defiring and willing are two diftinci acts of the mind; and confequently that the will, which is but the power of volition, is much more diftinct from: defire. Uneafinefs determines the will. §. 31. To return then to the inquiry, What is it that determines the will in regard to our actions? And that, upon fecond thoughts, I am apt to imagine is not, as is generally fuppofed, the greater good in view; but fom (and for the most part the most preffing) uneafinefs man is at prefent under. This is that which fuccef fively determines the will, and fets us upon thofe ac tions we perform. This uneafinefs we may call, as i is, defire; which is an uneasiness of the mind for war Book 2. of fome abfent good. All pain of the body, of what fort foever, and difquiet of the mind, is uneafinefs: and with this is always joined defire, equal to the pain or uneafiness felt, and is fcarce diftinguishable from it. For defire being nothing but an uneafinefs in the want of an abfent good, in reference to any pain felt, cafe is that abfent good; and till that eafe be attained, we may call it defire, no-body feeling pain that he wishes not to be eased of, with a defire equal to that pain, and infeparable from it. Befides this defire of eafe from pain, there is another of abfent pofitive good; and here alfo the defire and uneafinefs are equal. As much as we defire any abfent good, fo much are we in pain for it. But here all abfent good does not, according to the greatnefs it has, or is acknowledged to have, cause pain equal to that greatnefs; as all pain caufes defire equal to it itfelf: because the abfence of good is not always a pain, as the prefence of pain is. And therefore abfent good may be looked on, and confidered without defire. But fo much as there is any where of defire, so much there is of uneafiness. Defire is uneafinefs. §. 32. That defire is a state of uneafiness, every one who reflects on himself will quickly find. Who is there, that has not felt in defire what the wife man fays of hope, (which is not much different from it) "that it being deferred inakes the heart fick?" and that ftill proportionable to the greatness of the defire: which fometimes raises the uneafinefs to that pitch, that it makes people cry out, Give me children, give me the thing defired, or I die? Life itself, and all its enjoyments, is a burden cannot be born under the lafting and unremoved preffure of fuch an uneafinefs. The uneafi letermines he will. §. 33. Good and evil, prefent and abefs of defire fent, it is true, work upon the mind: but that which immediately determines the will, from time to time, to every volunary action, is the uneafinefs of defire, fixed on some bfent good; either negative, as indolence to one in ain; or pofitive, as enjoyment of pleasure. That it ; this uneafinefs that determines the will to the fuccef five voluntary actions, whereof the greateft part of our lives is made up, and by which we are conducted through different courfes to different ends: I fhall endeavour to fhow, both from experience and the reason of the thing. This is the fpring of action. §. 34. When a man is perfectly content with the ftate he is in, which is, when he is perfectly without any uneafinefs, what industry, what action, what will is there left, but to continue in it? of this every man's obfervation will fatisfy him. And thus we fee our All-wife Maker, fuitably to our conftitution and frame, and knowing what it is that determines the will, has put into man the uneafinefs of hunger and thirft, and other natural defires, that return at their feafons, to move and determine their wills, for the prefervation of themfelves, and the continuation of their fpecies. For I think we may conclude, that if the bare contemplation of these good ends, to which we are carried by these feveral uneafineffes, had been fufficient to determine the will, and fet us on work, we should have had none of these natural pains, and perhaps in this world little or no pain at all. "It is better to marry than to burn," fays St. Paul; where we may fee what it is that chiefly drives men into the enjoyments of a conjugal life. A little burning felt pushes us more powerfully, than greater pleasures in profpect draw or allure. The greateft pofitive good determines not the will, but uneali nefs. §. 35. It feems fo established and fettled a maxim by the general confent of all mankind, that good, the greater good, determines the will, that I do not at all wonder, that when I first published my thoughts on this fubject, I took it for granted; and I imagine that by a great many I fhall be thought more excufable, for having then done fo, than that now I have ventured to recede from fo received an opinion. But yet upon a ftricter inquiry, I am forced to conclude, that good, the greater good, though apprehended and acknowledged to be fo, does not determine the will, until our defire, raifed proportionably to it, makes us uneafy in the want of it. Convince a man eyer fo much |