Billeder på siden
PDF
ePub

of them, examine them on all fides, and weigh them with others. In this lies the liberty man has; and from the not ufing of it right comes all that variety of mistakes, errors, and faults which we run into in the conduct of our lives, and our endeavours after happinefs; whilft we precipitate the determination of our wills, and engage too foon before due examination, To prevent this, we have a power to fufpend the profecution of this or that defire, as every one daily may experiment in himfelf. This feems to me the fource of all liberty; in this feems to confift that which is (as I think improperly) called free-will, For during this fufpenfion of any defire, before the will be determined to action, and the action (which follows that determination) done, we have opportunity to examine, view, and judge of the good or evil of what we are going to do; and when, upon due examination, we have judged, we have done our duty, all that we can or ought to do in pursuit of our happinefs; and it is not a fault, but a perfection of our nature to defire, will, and act according to the last refult of a fair examination. $. 48. This is fo far from being a reTo be deter- ftraint or diminution of freedom, that it is mined by our own judgthe very improvement and benefit of it; it ment, is no is not an abridgment, it is the end and ufe restraint to of our liberty; and the farther we are reliberty. moved from fuch a determination, the nearer we are to mifery and flavery. A perfect indifferency in the mind, not determinable by its last judgment of the good or evil that is thought to attend its choice, would be fo far from being an advantage and excellency of any intellectual nature, that it would be as great an imperfection, as the want of indifferency to act or not to act till determined by the will, would be an imperfection on the other fide. A man is at liberty to lift up his hand to his head, or let it reft quiet; he is perfectly indifferent in either; and it would be an imperfection in him, if he wanted that power, if he were deprived of that indifferency. But it would be as great an imperfection if he had the fame indifferency, whether he would prefer the lifting up his

hand,

.

hand, or its remaining in reft, when it would fave his head or eyes from a blow he fees coming: it is as much a perfection, that defire, or the power of preferring, fhould be determined by good, as that the power of acting fhould be determined by the will; and the certainer fuch determination is, the greater is the perfection. Nay, were we determined by any thing but the laft refult of our own minds, judging of the good or evil of any action, we were not free: the very end of our freedom being, that we may attain the good we choose. And therefore every man is put under a neceffity by his conftitution, as an intelligent being, to be determined in willing by his own thought and judgement what is beft for him to do: elfe he would be under the determination of fome other than himself, which is want of liberty. And to deny that a man's will, in every determination, follows his own judge ment, is to fay, that a man wills and acts for an end that he would not have, at the time that he wills and acts for it. For if he prefers it in his prefent thoughts before any other, it is plain he then thinks better of it, and would have it before any other; unless he can have and not have it, will and not will it, at the fame time; a contradiction too manifeft to be admitted! §. 49. If we look upon thofe fuperior beings above us, who enjoy perfect happinefs, we fhall have reafon to judge that they are more fteadily determined in their choice of good than we; and yet we have no reason to think they are lefs happy, or lefs free than we are. And if it were fit for fuch poor finite creatures as we are to pronounce what infinite wifdom and goodness could do, I think we might fay, that God himself cannot choose what is not good; the freedom of the Almighty hinders not his being determined by what is best. §. 50. But to give a right view of this mistaken part of liberty, let me afk, "Would any one be a changeling, be"caufe he is lefs determined by wife confi"derations than a wife man? Is it worth "the name of freedom to be at liberty to 3

The freeft a determined.

gents are fo

A conftant determination to a pur fuit of happiness no abridgment of liberty. "play

"play the fool, and draw fhame and mifery upon a "man's felf?" If to break loofe from the conduct of reafon, and to want that reftraint of examination and judgment, which keeps us from choosing or doing the worfe, be liberty, true liberty, madmen and fools are the only freemen: but yet, I think, nobody would choose to be mad for the fake of fuch liberty, but he that is mad already. The constant defire of happiness, and the constraint it puts upon us to act for it, no-body, I think, accounts an abridgment of liberty, or at least an abridgment of liberty to be complained of. God Almighty himself is under the neceffity of being happy; and the more any intelligent being is fo, the nearer is its approach to infinite perfection and happiness. That in this ftate of ignorance we fhort-fighted creatures might not miftake true felicity, we are endowed with a power to fufpend any particular defire, and keep it from determining the will, and engaging us in action. This is ftanding ftill, where we are not fufficiently affured of the way: examination is confulting a guide. The determination of the will upon inquiry is following the direction of that guide: and he that has a power to act or not to act, according as fuch determination directs, is a free agent; fuch determination abridges not that power wherein liberty confifts. He that has his chains knocked off, and the prifon-doors fet open to him, is perfectly at liberty, because he may either go or ftay, as he beft likes; though his preference be determined to stay, by the darkness of the night, or illness of the weather, or want of other lodging. He ceafes not to be free, though the defire of fome convenience to be had there abfolutely determines his preference, and makes him stay in his prifon.

The neceffity of purfaing true happinefs the foundation

§. 51. As therefore the highest perfection of intellectual nature lies in a careful and conftant pursuit of true and folid happinefs, fo the care of ourselves, that we mistake not imaginary for real happiness, is the neceffary foundation of our liberty. The stronger ties we have to an unalterable pursuit of happiness in general, which is our greatest good, and

of liberty.

which, as such, our defires always follow, the more are we free from any neceffary determination of our will to any particular action, and from a neceffary compliance with our defire, fet upon any particular, and then appearing preferable good, till we have duly examined, whether it has a tendency to, or be inconsistent with our real happiness: and therefore till we are as much informed upon this inquiry, as the weight of the matter, and the nature of the cafe demands; we are, by the neceffity of preferring and pursuing true happiness as our greatest good, obliged to fufpend the fatisfaction of our defires in particular cafes.

The reafon

§. 52. This is the hinge on which turns the liberty of intellectual beings, in their of it. conftant endeavours after and a steady pro

secution of true felicity, that they can fufpend this profecution in particular cafes, till they had looked before them, and informed themselves whether that particular thing, which is then propofed or defired, lie in the way to their main end, and make a real part of that which is their greatest good: for the inclination and tendency of their nature to happiness is an obligation and motive to them, to take care not to mistake or mifs it; and fo neceffarily puts them upon caution, deliberation, and, warinefs, in the direction of their particular actions, which are the means to obtain it. Whatever neceffity determines to the purfuit of real blifs, the fame neceffity with the fame force eftablishes fufpenfe, deliberation, and fcrutiny of each fucceffive defire, whether the fatisfaction of it does not interfere with our true happiness, and miflead us from it. This, as feems to me, is the great privilege of finite intellectual beings; and I defire it may be well confidered, whether the great inlet and exercife of all the liberty men have, are capable of, or can be useful to them, and that whereon depends the turn of their actions, does not lie in this, that they can fufpend their defires, and ftop them from determining their wills to any action, till they have duly and fairly examined the good and evil of it, as far forth as the weight of the thing requires. This we are able to do; and when we

have done it, we have done our duty, and all that is in our power, and indeed all that needs. For fince the will fuppofes knowledge to guide its choice, and all that we can do is to hold our wills undetermined, till we have examined the good and evil of what we desire. What follows after that, follows in a chain of confequences linked one to another, all depending on the last determination of the judgment; which, whether it shall be upon a hafty and precipitate view, or upon a due and mature examination, is in our power: experience fhowing us, that in moft cafes we are able to fufpend the present fatisfaction of any defire.

Government of our paffions the right improvement of liberty.

§. 53. But if any extreme disturbance (as fometimes it happens) poffeffes our whole mind, as when the pain of the rack, an impetuous uneafinefs, as of love, anger, or any other violent paffion, running away with us, allows us not the liberty of thought, and we are not mafters enough of our own minds to confider thoroughly and examine fairly; God, who knows our frailty, pities our weakness, and requires of us no more than we are able to do, and fees what was and what was not in our power, will judge as a kind and merciful father. But the forbearance of a too hafty compliance with our defires, the moderation and reftraint of our paffions, fo that our understandings may be free to examine, and reafon unbiaffed give its judgment, being that whereon a right direction of our conduct to true happiness depends; it is in this we fhould employ our chief care and endeavours. In this we fhould take pains to fuit the relifh of our minds to the true intrinfick good or ill that is in things, and not permit an allowed or fuppofed poffible great and weighty good to flip out of our thoughts, without leaving any relifh, any defire of itself there, till, by a due confideration of its true worth, we have formed appetites in our minds fuitable to it, and made ourselves uneafy in the want of it, or in the fear of losing it. And how much this is in every one's power, by making refolutions to himself, fuch as he may keep, is cafy for every one to try. Nor let any one fay he cannot go

« ForrigeFortsæt »