us.

How far then mixed modes which admit of the various combinations of different fimple ideas, and their infinite modes, are from being few and fcanty, we may eafily imagine. So that before we have done, we fhall fee that no-body need be afraid he fhall not have scope and compass enough for his thoughts to range in, though they be, as I pretend, confined only to fimple ideas received from fenfation or reflection, and their feveral combinations.

Motion, thinking, and power have been moft modified.

§. 10. It is worth our obferving, which of all our fimple ideas have been moft modified, and had most mixed ideas made out of them, with names given to them; and those have been these three; thinking and mo

tion (which are the two ideas which comprehend in them all action) and power, from whence thefe actions are conceived to flow. The fimple ideas, I fay, of thinking, motion, and power, have been those which have been moft modified, and out of whofe modifications have been made moft complex modes, with names to them. For action being the great bufinefs of mankind, and the whole matter about which all laws are converfant, it is no wonder that the feveral modes of thinking and motion. fhould be taken notice of, the ideas of them obferved, and laid up in the memory, and have names affigned to them; without which, laws could be but ill made, or vice and diforder repreffed. Nor could any communication be well had amongst men, without fuch complex ideas, with names to them and therefore men have fettled names, and fuppofed fettled ideas in their minds of modes of action distinguished by their caufes, means, objects, ends, inftruments, time, place, and other circumftances, and also of their powers fitted for those actions: v. g. boldness is the power to speak or do what we intend, before others, without fear or disorder; and the Greeks call the confidence of speaking by a peculiar name, appnoía: which power or ability in man, of doing any thing, when it has been acquired by frequent doing the fame thing, is that idea we name habits when it is forward, and ready upon every occa

fion to break into action, we call it difpofition. Thus teftiness is a difpofition or aptnefs to be angry.

To conclude: Let us examine any modes of action, v. g. confideration and affent, which are actions of the mind; running and fpeaking, which are actions of the body; revenge and murder, which are actions of both together and we fhall find them but fo many collections of fimple ideas, which together make up the complex ones fignified by thofe names.

action, fig

nify but the

effect.

§. 11. Power being the fource from Several whence all action proceeds, the fubftances words feemwherein these powers are, when they exerting to fignify this power into act, are called caufes; and the fubftances which thereupon are produced, or the fimple ideas which are introduced into any fubject by the exerting of that power, are called effects. The efficacy whereby the new substance or idea is produced, is called, in the fubject exerting that power, action; but in the fubject wherein any fimple idea is changed or produced, it is called paf fion: which efficacy however various, and the effects almoft infinite, yet we can, I think, conceive it, in intellectual agents, to be nothing else but modes of thinking and willing; in corporeal agents, nothing else but modifications of motion. I fay, I think we cannot conceive it to be any other but thefe two: for whatever fort of action, befides thefe, produces any effects, I confess myself to have no notion or idea of; and fo it is quite remote from my thoughts, apprehenfions, and knowledge; and as much in the dark to me as five other fenfes, or as the ideas of colours to a blind man and therefore many words, which feem to exprefs fome action, fignify nothing of the action or modus operandi at all, but barely the effect, with fome circumstances of the fubject wrought on, or caufe operating; v. g. creation, annihilation, contain in them no idea of the action or manner whereby they are produced, but barely of the cause, and the thing done. And when a countryman fays the cold freezes water, though the word freezing feems to import some action, yet truly it fignifies nothing but the effect, viz. that water that was before

before fluid is become hard and confiftent, without containing any idea of the action whereby it is done.

Mixed modes made alfo of other ideas.

§. 12. I think I fhall not need to remark here, that though power and action make the greatest part of mixed modes, marked by names, and familiar in the minds and. mouths of men; yet other fimple ideas, and their several combinations, are not excluded: much lefs, I think, will it be neceffary for me to enumerate all the mixed modes, which have been fettled, with names to them. That would be to make a dictionary of the greatest part of the words made ufe of in divinity, ethicks, law, and politicks, and feveral other fciences. All that is requifite to my prefent defign, is, to fhow what fort of ideas thofe are which I call mixed modes, how the mind comes by them, and that they are compositions made up of fimple ideas got from fenfation and reflection which, I fuppofe, I have done.

CHAP. XXIII

Of our complex Ideas of Subftances.

Ideas of fubftances how

§. I.

made.

ΤΗ

HE mind being, as I have declared, furnished with a great number of the fimple ideas, conveyed in by the fenfes, as they are found in exterior things, or by reflection on its own operations, takes notice alfo, that a certain number of thefe fimple ideas go` conftantly together; which being presumed to belong to one thing, and words being fuited to common apprehenfions, and made ufe of for quick dispatch, are cal led, fo united in one fubject, by one name; which, by inadvertency, we are apt afterward to talk of, and confider as one fimple idea, which indeed is a complica tion of many ideas together: because, as I have faid, not imagining how thefe fimple ideas can fubfift by themselves, we accustom ourselves to suppose some sub

9

ftratum

;

ftratum wherein they do fubfift, and from which they do refult; which therefore we call substance (1).

Our idea of general.

fubftance in

§. 2. So that if any one will examine himself concerning his notion of pure fubftance in general, he will find he has no other idea of it at all, but only a fuppofition of he knows not what fupport of fuch qualities, which are capable of producing fimple ideas in us; which qualities are commonly called accidents. If any one should be asked, what is the subject wherein colour or weight

(1) This fection, which was intended only to fhow how the individuals of diftinct fpecies of fubftances came to be looked upon as fimple ideas, and fo to have fimple names, viz. from the fuppofed fubftratum or fubftance, which was looked upon as the thing itself in which inhered, and from which refulted that complication of ideas, by which it was reprefented to us, hath been mistaken for an account of the idea of fubftance in general; and as fuch, hath been reprefented in these words; But how comes the general idea of fubftance to be framed in our minds ? Is this by abftracting and enlarging fimple ideas? No: But it is by a £ complication of many fimple ideas together: becaufe, not imagining how thefe fimple ideas can fubfift by themselves, we accuftom ourselves to fuppofe fome fubftratum wherein they do fubfift, and from whence they do refult; which therefore we call fubftance.' And is this all, indeed, that is to be faid for the being of fubftance, That we accustom ourfelves to fuppofe a fubftratum? Is that cuftom grounded upon true reafon, or not? If not, then accidents or modes muft fubfift of themfelves; and thefe fimple ideas need no tortoife to fupport them: for figures and colours, &c. would do well enough of themselves, but for fome fancies men have accustomed themselves to.

To which objection of the bishop of Worcester, our author* answers thus: Herein your lordship feems to charge me with two faults: one, That I make the general idea of fubstance to be framed, not by abstracting and enlarging fimple ideas, but by a complication of many fimple ideas together: the other, as if I had faid, the being of fubftance had no other foundation but the fancies of men.

As to the first of these, I beg leave to remind your lordship, that I fay in more places than one, and particularly Book 3. Chap. 3. §. 6. and Book 1. Chap. 11. §. 9. where, ex profeffo, I treat of abstraction and general ideas, that they are all made by abftracting, and therefore could not be understood to mean, that that of fubftance was made any other way; however my pen might have flipt, or the negligence of expreffion, where I might have fomething else than the general idea of substance in view, might make me feem to fay fo.

That I was not fpeaking of the general idea of fubftance in the paffage your lordship quotes, is manifeft from the title of that chapter, which * In his first Jetter to the bishop of Worcester,

is

weight inheres, he would have nothing to fay, but the folid extended parts: and if he were demanded, what is it that folidity and extension adhere in, he would not be in a much better cafe than the Indian beforementioned, who, faying that the world was fupported by a great elephant, was afked what the elephant refted on; to which his anfwer was, a great, tortoife. But being again preffed to know what gave fupport to the broad-backed tortoife, replied, fomething, he knew not what. And thus here, as in all other cafes where

we

is, Of the complex ideas of fubftances: and the firft fection of it, which your lordship cites for those words you have fet down.

In which words I do not obferve any that deny the general idea of fubftance to be made by abstracting, nor any that fay it is made by a complication of many fimple ideas together. But fpeaking in that place of the ideas of diftinct fubftances, fuch as man, horfe, gold, &c. I fay they are made up of certain combinations of fimple ideas, which combinations are looked upon, each of them, as one fimple idea, though they are many; and we call it by one name of fubftance, though made up of modes, from the custom of fuppofing a fubftratum, wherein that combination does fubfift. So that in this paragraph I only give an account of the idea of distinct fubftances, such as oak, elephant, iron, &c. how, though they are made up of diftinét complications of modes, yet they are looked on as one idea, called by one name, as making distinct forts of fubftance.

But that my notion of fubftance in general, is quite different from these, and has no fuch combination of fimple ideas in it, is evident from the immediate following words, where I fay, The idea of pure fubftance in general, is only a fuppofion of we know not what fupport of fuch qualities as are capable of producing fimple ideas in us. And thefe two I plainly diftinguifh all along, particularly where I fay, whatever therefore be the fecret and abstract nature of fubftance in general, all the ideas we have of particular diftinct fubftances, are nothing but feveral combinations of fimple ideas, co-exifting in fuch, though un⚫ known cause of their union, as makes the whole fubfift of itself,”

The other thing laid to my charge, is, as if I took the being of fubftance to be doubtful, or rendered it fo by the imperfect and ill-grounded idea I have given of it. To which I beg leave to fay, that I ground not the being, but the idea of fubftance, on our accuftoming ourselves to fuppofe fome fubftratum; for it is of the idea alone I fpeak there, and not of the being of fubftance. And having every where affirmed and built upon it, that a man is a fubftance, I cannot be fuppofed to queftion or doubt of the being of fubftance, till I can queftion or doubt of my own being. Farther, I fay, +Senfation convinces us, that there are + Ib. §. 29.

* B. 2. C. 23. §. 2v,