in, have no knowledge beyond that, much less of the internal conftitution, and true nature of things, being deftitute of faculties to attain it. And therefore experimenting and discovering in ourselves knowledge, and the power of voluntary motion, as certainly as we experiment, or difcover in things without us, the cohefion and feparation of folid parts, which is the extenfion and motion of bodies; we have as much reafon to be fatisfied with our notion of immaterial fpirit, as with our notion of body, and the existence of the one as well as the other. For it, being no more a contradiction that thinking should exift, feparate and independent from folidity, than it is a contradiction that folidity fhould exift, feparate and independent from thinking, they being both but fimple ideas, independent one from another; and having as clear and diftinct ideas in us of thinking, as of folidity: I know not why we may not as well allow a thinking thing without folidity, i. e. immaterial, to exist, as a folid thing without thinking, i. e. matter, to exift; especially fince it is not harder to conceive how thinking fhould exift without matter, than how matter should think. For whenfoever we would proceed beyond these fimple ideas we have from sensation and reflection, and dive farther into the nature of things, we fall presently into darkness and obfcurity, perplexednefs and difficulties; and can difcover nothing farther but our own blindness and ignorance. But whichever of these complex ideas be cleareft, that of body, or immaterial spirit, this is evident, that the fimple ideas that make them up are no other than what we have received from fenfation or reflection; and fo is it of all our other ideas of fubftances, even of God himself.

Idea of God.

S. 33. For if we examine the idea we

have of the incomprehenfible fupreme being, we shall find, that we come by it the fame way; and that the complex ideas we have both of God and feparate fpirits are made up of the fimple ideas we receive from reflection: v. g. having, from what we experiment in ourselves, got the ideas of existence and duration; of knowledge and power; of pleasure and happiness; and of feveral other qualities and powers,

which

which it is better to have than to be without: when we would frame an idea the most suitable we can to the fupreme being, we enlarge every one of thefe with our idea of infinity; and fo putting them together, make our complex idea of God. For that the mind has, fuch a power of enlarging fome of its ideas, received from fenfation and reflection, has been already shown.

§. 34. If I find that I know fome few things, and fome of them, or all, perhaps imperfectly, I can frame an idea of knowing twice as many; which I can double again, as often as I can add to number; and thus enlarge my idea of knowledge, by extending its comprehenfion to all things exifting, or poffible. The fame alfo I can do of knowing them more perfectly; i. e. all their qualities, powers, caufes, confequences, and relations, &c. till all be perfectly known that is in them, or can any way relate to them; and thus frame the idea of infinite or boundlefs knowledge. The fame may also be done of power, till we come to that we call infinite; and alfo of the duration of exiftence, without beginning or end; and fo frame the idea of an eternal being. The degrees or extent wherein we afcribe existence, power, wisdom, and all other perfections (which we can have any ideas of) to that fovereign being which we call God, being all boundless and infinite, we frame the best idea of him our minds are capable of: all which is done, I fay, by enlarging thofe fimple ideas we have taken from the operations of our own minds, by reflection; or by our fenfes, from exterior things; to that vaftness to which infinity can extend them.

Idea of God.

$ 35. For it is infinity, which joined to our ideas of existence, power, knowledge, &c. makes that complex idea, whereby we reprefent to ourselves, the best we can, the fupreme being. For though in his own effence (which certainly we do not know, not knowing the real effence of a pebble, or a fly, or of our own felves) God be fimple and uncompounded; yet, I think, I may fay we have no other idea of him, but a complex one of exiftence, knowledge, power, happiness, &c. infinite and eternal: which are

X 4

all

all diftinct ideas, and fome of them, being relative, are again compounded of others; all which being, as has been fhown, originally got from fenfation and reflection, go to make up the idea or notion we have of God.

No idea in our complex one of fpirits, but thofe got from fenfa

tion or reflec

tion,

§. 36. This farther is to be observed, that there is no idea we attribute to God, bating infinity, which is not alfo a part of our complex idea of other fpirits. Because, being capable of no other fimple ideas, belonging to any thing but body, but those which by reflection we receive from the operation of our own minds, we can attribute to fpirits no other but what we receive from thence: and all the difference we can put between them in our contemplation of spirits, is only in the feveral extents and degrees of their knowledge, power, duration, happinefs, &c. For that in our ideas, as well of fpirits, as of other things, we are reftrained to those we receive from fenfation and reflection, is evident from hence, that in our ideas of fpirits, how much foever advanced in perfection beyond thofe of bodies, even to that of infinite, we cannot yet have any idea of the manner wherein they discover their thoughts one to another: though we must neceffarily conclude, that feparate spirits, which are beings that have perfecter knowledge and greater happiness than we, muft needs have also a perfecter way of communicating their thoughts than we have, who are fain to make use of corporeal figns and particular founds; which are therefore of moft general use, as being the best and quickest we are capable of. But of immediate communication, having no experiment in ourselves, and confequently no notion of it at all, we have no idea how fpirits, which use not words, can with quickness, or much lefs how fpirits, that have no bodies, can be mafters of their own thoughts, and communicate or conceal them at pleafure, though we cannot but neceffarily fuppofe they have fuch a power.

Recapitula- §. 37. And thus we have feen, what kind of ideas we have of fubftances of all kinds,

tion.

wherein

wherein they confift, and how we came by them. From whence, I think, it is very evident,

First, That all our ideas of the feveral forts of substances are nothing but collections of fimple ideas, with a fuppofition of fomething to which they belong, and in which they fubfift; though of this fuppofed fomething we have no clear diftinct idea at all.

Secondly, That all the fimple ideas, that thus united in one common fubftratum make up our complex ideas of feveral forts of fubftances, are no other but fuch as we have received from fenfation or reflection. So that even in those which we think we are moft intimately acquainted with, and that come nearest the comprehenfion of our most enlarged conceptions, we cannot go beyond thofe fimple ideas. And even in thofe which feem most remote from all we have to do with, and do infinitely furpass any thing we can perceive in ourselves by reflection, or discover by sensation in other things, we can attain to nothing but thofe fimple ideas, which we originally received from fenfation or reflection; as is evident in the complex ideas we have of angels, and particularly of God himself.

Thirdly, That most of the fimple ideas, that make up our complex ideas of fubftances, when truly confidered, are only powers, however we are apt to take them for pofitive qualities; v. g. the greateft part of the ideas that make our complex idea of gold are yellownefs, great weight, ductility, fufibility and folubility in aqua regia, &c. all united together in an unknown fubftratum: all which ideas are nothing elfe but so many relations to other fubftances, and are not really in the gold, confidered barely in itfelf, though they depend on thofe real and primary qualities of its internal conftitution, whereby it has a fitnefs differently to operate, and be operated on by feveral other fubftances,

CHAR

One idea.

§. I.

Beveral fingle fubftances, as of

ESIDES thefe complex ideas of

man, horse, gold, violet, apple, &c. the mind hath also complex collective ideas of substances; which I fo call, because fuch ideas are made up of many particular fubftances confidered together, as united into one idea, and which fo joined are looked on as one; v. g. the idea of fuch a collection of men as make an army, though confifting of a great number of diftinct fubftances, is as much one idea, as the idea of a man: and the great collective idea of all bodies whatfoever, fignified by the name world, is as much one idea, as the idea of any the leaft particle of matter in it; it fufficing to the unity of any idea, that it be confidered as one reprefentation or picture, though made up of ever fo many particulars.

Made by the power of compofing

in the mind.

§. 2. These collective ideas of substances the mind makes by its power of compofition, and uniting feverally either simple or complex ideas into one, as it does by the fame faculty make the complex ideas of particular fubftances, confifting of an aggregate of divers fimple ideas, united in one fubftance: and as the mind, by putting together the repeated ideas of unity, makes the collective mode, or complex idea of any number, as a fcore, or a grofs, &c. fo by putting together feveral particular substances, it makes collective ideas of subftances, as a troop, an army, a swarm, a city, a fleet ; each of which, every one finds, that he represents to his own mind by one idea, in one view; and fo under that notion confiders thofe feveral things as perfectly one, as one ship, or one atom. Nor is it harder to conceive, how an army of ten thousand men fhould make one idea, than how a man fhould make one idea: it being as eafy to the mind to unite into one the idea of a great number