Complex ideas are vo luntary combinations,

§. 3. Though the mind be wholly paffive in refpect of its fimple ideas; yet I think, we may fay, it is not fo in refpect of its complex ideas: for those being combinations of fimple ideas put together, and united under one general name; it is plain that the mind of man uses some kind of liberty, in forming those complex ideas how elfe comes it to pafs that one man's idea of gold, or juftice, is different from another's? but because he has put in, or left out of his, fome fimple idea, which the other has not. The question then is, which of thefe are real, and which barely imaginary combinations? What collections agree to the reality of things, and what not? And to this I say, That,

Mixed

modes made of confiftent ideas, are real.

§. 4. Secondly, mixed modes and relations having no other reality but what they have in the minds of men, there is nothing more required to this kind of ideas to make them real, but that they be fo framed, that there be a poffibility of existing conformable to them. These ideas themselves, being archetypes, cannot differ from their archetypes, and fo cannot be chimerical, unless any one will jumble together in them inconfiftent ideas. Indeed, as any of them have the names of a known language affigned to them, by which he that has them in his mind would fignify them to others, fo bare poffibility of exifting is not enough; they must have a conformity to the ordinary fignification of the name that is given them, that they may not be thought fantastical: as if a man would give the name of justice to that idea, which common ufe calls liberality. But this fantasticalnefs relates more to propriety of speech, than reality of ideas: for a man to be undisturbed in danger, fedately to confider what is fittest to be done, and to execute it fteadily, is a mixed mode, or a complex idea of an action which may exist. But to be undisturbed in danger, without using one's reafon or industry, is what is alfo poffible to be; and fo is as real an idea as the other. Though the first of

these,

thefe, having the name courage given to it, may, in refpect of that name, be a right or wrong idea: but the other, whilft it has not a common received name of any known language affigned to it, is not capable of any deformity, being made with no reference to any thing but itself.

Ideas of fubstances are real, when

they agree with the exiftence of things.

§. 5. Thirdly, our complex ideas of fubstances being made all of them in reference to things exifting without us, and intended to be representations of fubftances, as they really are; are no farther real, than as they are fuch combinations of fimple ideas, as are really united, and co-exist in things without us. On the contrary, thofe are fantastical which are made up of fuch collections of fimple ideas as were really never united, never were found together in any substance; v. g. a rational creature, confifting of a horfe's head, joined to a body of human shape, or fuch as the centaurs are defcribed: or, a body yellow, very malleable, fufible, and fixed; but lighter than common water: or an uniform, unorganized body, confifting, as to fenfe, all of fimilar parts, with perception and voluntary motion joined to it. Whether fuch fubftances as thefe can poffibly exift or no, it is probable we do not know: but be that as it will, these ideas of substances being made conformable to no pattern exifting that we know, and confifting of fuch collections of ideas, as no fubftance ever fhowed us united together, they ought to pafs with us for barely imaginary; but much more are thofe complex ideas fo, which contain in them any inconfiftency or contradiction of their parts.

CHAP.

CHAP. XXXI.

Of Adequate and Inadequate Ideas.

Adequate ideas are

fuch as per fectly reprefent their

archetypes.

§. I. Four real ideas, fome are adequate, and fome are inadequate. Thofe I call adequate, which perfectly reprefent those archetypes which the mind fuppofes them taken from; which it intends them to ftand for, and to which it refers them. Inadequate ideas are fuch, which are but a partial or incomplete reprefentation of thofe archetypes to which they are referred. Upon which account it is plain,

Simple ideas

all adequate.

§. 2. First, that all our fimple ideas are adequate. Because being nothing but the effects of certain powers in things, fitted and ordained by God to produce fuch fenfations in us, they cannot but be correfpondent and adequate to those powers and we are fure they agree to the reality of things. For if fugar produce in us the ideas which we call whiteness and fweetnefs, we are fure there is a power in fugar to produce thofe ideas in our minds, or elfe they could not have been produced by it. And fo each fenfation anfwering the power that operates on any of our fenfes, the idea fo produced is a real idea, (and not a fiction of the mind, which has no power to produce any fimple idea;) and cannot but be adequate, fince it ought only to anfwer that power: and fo all fimple ideas are adequate. It is true, the things producing in us thefe fimple ideas are but few of them denominated by us, as if they were only the causes of them; but as if thofe ideas were real beings in them. For though fire be called painful to the touch, whereby is fignified the power of producing in us the idea of pain, yet it is denominated alfo light and hot; as if light and heat were really fomething in the fire more than a power to excite these ideas in us; and therefore are called qualities in, or of the fire. But thefe being

nothing,

nothing, in truth, but powers to excite fuch ideas in us, I must in that fenfe be understood, when I fpeak of fecondary qualities, as being in things; or of their ideas, as being the objects that excite them in us. Such ways of fpeaking, though accommodated to the vulgar notions, without which one cannot be well understood, yet truly fignify nothing but thofe powers which are in things to excite certain fenfations or ideas in us: fince were there no fit organs to receive the impreffions fire makes on the fight and touch, nor a mind joined to thofe organs to receive the ideas of light and heat by thofe impreffions from the fire or fun, there would yet be no more light or heat in the world, than there would be pain, if there were no fenfible creature to feel it, though the fun fhould continue juft as it is now, and mount Etna flame higher than ever it did. Solidity and extenfion, and the termination of it, figure, with motion and reft, whereof we have the ideas, would be really in the world as they are, whether there were any fenfible being to perceive them or no; and therefore we have reafon to look on thofe as the real modifications of matter, and fuch are the exciting caufes of all our various fenfations from bodies. But this being an inquiry not belonging to this place, I fhall enter no farther into it, but proceed to fhow what complex ideas are adequate, and what not.

Modes are all S. 3. Secondly, our complex ideas of adequate. modes, being voluntary collections of fimple ideas which the mind puts together whout reference to any real archetypes or standing patterns exifting any-where, are and cannot but be adequate ideas. Because they not being intended for copies of things really exifting, but for archetypes made by the mind to rank and denominate things by, cannot want any thing: they having each of them that combination of ideas, and thereby that perfection which the mind intended they fhould: fo that the mind acquiefces in them, and can find nothing wanting. Thus by having the idea of a figure, with three fides meeting at three angles, I have a compleat idea, wherein I require nothing else to make it perfect. That the

mind is fatisfied with the perfection of this its idea, is plain in that it does not conceive, that any understanding hath, or can have a more compleat or perfect idea of that thing it fignifies by the word triangle, fuppofing it to exift, than itself has in that complex idea of three fides and three angles; in which is contained all that is, or can be effential to it, or neceffary to compleat it, wherever or however it exifts. But in our ideas of fubftances it is otherwife. For there defiring to copy things as they really do exift, and to represent to ourfelves that conftitution on which all their properties depend, we perceive our ideas attain not that perfection we intend: we find they ftill want fomething we should be glad were in them; and fo are all inadequate. But mixed modes and relations, being archetypes without patterns, and fo having nothing to reprefent but themfelves, cannot but be adequate, every thing being fo to itself. He that at first put together the idea of danger perceived, abfence of diforder from fear, fedate confideration of what was juftly to be done, and executing that without difturbance, or being deterred by the danger of it, had certainly in his mind that complex idea made up of that combination; and intending it to be nothing elfe, but what is, nor to have in it any other fimple ideas, but what it hath, it could not alfo but be an adequate idea: and laying this up in his memory, with the name courage annexed to it, to fignify to others, and denominate from thence any action he should obferve to agree with it, had thereby a standard to meafure and denominate actions by, as they agreed to it. This idea thus made, and laid up for a pattern, muft neceffarily be adequate, being referred to nothing else but itself, nor made by any other original, but the good-liking and will of him that first made this combination.

Modes, in reference to

fettled

§. 4. Indeed another coming after, and in conversation learning from him the word courage, may make an idea, to which he gives the name courage, different from be inadewhat the first author applied it to, and has in his mind, when he ufes it. And in

6

names, may