this cafe, if he defigns that his idea in thinking fhould be conformable to the other's idea, as the name he ufes in fpeaking is conformable in found to his, from whom he learned it, his idea may be very wrong and inadequate because in this cafe, making the other man's idea the pattern of his idea in thinking, as the other man's word or found is the pattern of his in fpeaking, his idea is fo far defective and inadequate, as it is diftant from the archetype and pattern he refers it to, and intends to exprefs and fignify by the name he ufes for it; which name he would have to be a fign of the other man's idea (to which, in its proper ufe, it is primarily annexed) and of his own, as agreeing to it: to which, if his own does not exactly correfpond, it is faulty and inadequate.

§. 5. Therefore thefe complex ideas of modes, when they are referred by the mind, and intended to correfpond to the ideas in the mind of fome other intelligent being, expreffed by the names we apply to them, they may be very deficient, wrong, and inadequate; because they agree not to that, which the mind designs to be their archetype and pattern: in which refpect only, any idea of modes can be wrong, imperfect, or inadequate. And on this account our ideas of mixed modes are the moft liable to be faulty of any other; but this refers more to proper fpeaking, than knowing right.

Ideas of fubftances, as referred to real effences,

§. 6. Thirdly, what ideas we have of fubftances, I have above fhowed. Now thofe ideas have in the mind a double renot adequate. ference: 1. Sometimes they are referred to a fuppofed real effence of each fpecies of things. 2. Sometimes they are only defigned to be pictures and reprefentations in the mind of things that do exift by ideas of thofe qualities that are difcoverable in them. In both which ways, thefe copies of thofe originals and archetypes are imperfect and inadequate.

First, it is ufual for men to make the names of fubftances ftand for things, as fuppofed to have certain real effences, whereby they are of this or that

fpecies:

fpecies and names standing for nothing but the ideas that are in men's minds, they must conftantly refer their ideas to fuch real effences, as to their archetypes. That men (efpecially fuch as have been bred up in the learning taught in this part of the world) do fuppofe certain specific effences of fubftances, which each individual, in its feveral kinds, is made conformable to, and partakes of; is fo far from needing proof, that it will be thought strange if any one fhould do otherwise. And thus they ordinarily apply the fpecific names they rank particular fubftances under to things, as diftinguished by fuch specific real effences. Who is there almost, who would not take it amifs, if it fhould be doubted, whether he called himself a man, with any other meaning, than as having the real effence of a man? And yet if you demand what thofe real effences are, it is plain men are ignorant, and know them not. From whence it follows, that the ideas they have in their minds, being referred to real effences, as to archetypes which are unknown, must be fo far from being adequate, that they cannot be fuppofed to be any reprefentation of them at all. The complex ideas we have of fubftances are, as it has been fhown, certain collections of fimple ideas that have been observed or fuppofed conftantly to exift together. But fuch a complex idea cannot be the real effence of any fubftance; for then the properties we discover in that body would depend on that complex idea, and be deducible from it, and their neceffary connection with it be known; as all properties of a triangle depend on, and, as far as they are difcoverable, are deducible from the complex idea of three lines, including a space. But it is plain, that in our complex ideas of fubftances are not contained fuch ideas, on which all the other qualities, that are to be found in them, do depend. The common idea men have of iron, is a body of a certain colour, weight and hardness; and a property that they look on as belonging to it, is malleablenefs. But yet this property has no neceffary connexion with that complex idea, or any part of it; and there is no more reason to think that malleablenefs depends on that colour, weight, VOL. I.

D d

and

and hardness, than that colour, or that weight depends on its malleablenefs. And yet, though we know nothing of these real effences, there is nothing more ordinary, than that men fhould attribute the forts of things to fuch effences. The particular parcel of matter, which makes the ring I have on my finger, is forwardly, by most men, fuppofed to have a real effence, whereby it is gold; and from whence thofe qualities flow, which I find in it, viz. its peculiar colour, weight, hardness, fufibility, fixedness, and change of colour upon a flight touch of mercury, &c. This effence, from which all these properties flow, when I inquire into it, and fearch after it, I plainly perceive I cannot discover the fartheft I can go is only to prefume, that it being nothing but body, its real effence, or internal conftitution, on which thefe qualities depend, can be nothing but the figure, fize, and connexion of its folid parts; of neither of which having any diftinct perception at all, can I have any idea of its effence, which is the cause that it has that particular fhining yellownefs, a greater weight than any thing I know of the fame bulk, and a fitnefs to have its colour changed by the touch of quickfilver. If any one will fay, that the real effence and internal conftitution, on which these properties depend, is not the figure, fize, and arrangement or connexion of its folid parts, but fomething elfe, called its particular form; I am farther from having any idea of its real effence, than I was before: for I have an idea of figure, fize, and fituation of folid parts in general, though I have none of the particular figure, fize, or putting together of parts, whereby the qualities above-mentioned are produced; which qualities I find in that particular parcel of matter that is on my finger, and not in another parcel of matter, with which I cut the pen I write with. But when I am told, that fomething befides the figure, fize, and posture of the folid parts of that body, is its effence, fomething called fubftantial form; of that, I confefs, I have no idea at all, but only of the found form, which is far enough from an idea of its real effence, or conftitution. The like ignorance as I have of the real effence of

403 this particular fubftance, I have alfo of the real effence of all other natural ones: of which effences, I confefs, I have no distinct ideas at all; and I am apt to fuppofe others, when they examine their own knowledge, will find in themselves, in this one point, the fame fort of ignorance.

§. 7. Now then, when men apply to this particular parcel of matter on my finger, a general name already in use, and denominate it gold, do they not ordinarily, or are they not understood to give it that name as belonging to a particular fpecies of bodies, having a real internal effence; by having of which effence, this particular fubftance comes to be of that fpecies, and to be called by that name? If it be fo, as it is plain it is, the name, by which things are marked, as having that effence, must be referred primarily to that effence; and confequently the idea to which that name is given, must be referred alfo to that effence, and be intended to represent it. Which effence, fince they, who so use the names, know not, their ideas of fubftances must be all inadequate in that refpect, as not containing in them that real effence which the mind intends they fhould.

ftances, as collections of

their qualities, are all inadequate.

§. 8. Secondly, thofe who neglecting that ufelefs fuppofition of unknown real ef- Ideas of fubfences, whereby they are diftinguished, endeavour to copy the fubitances that exist in the world, by putting together the ideas of thofe fenfible qualities which are found coexisting in them, though they come much nearer a likeness of them, than thofe who imagine they know not what real specific effences; yet they arrive not at perfectly adequate ideas of thofe fubftances they would thus copy into their minds; nor do thofe copies exactly and fully contain all that is to be found in their archetypes. Because those qualities, and powers of fubftances, whereof we make their complex ideas, are fo many and various, that no man's complex idea contains them all. That our abftract ideas of fubftances. do not contain in them all the fimple ideas that are united in the things themfelves, it is evident, in that Dd 2

men

men do rarely put into their complex idea of any substance, all the fimple ideas they do know to exist in it. Because endeavouring to make the fignification of their names as clear, and as little cumbersome as they can, they make their specific ideas of the forts of fubftance, for the most part, of a few of thofe fimple ideas which are to be found in them: but thefe having no original precedency, or right to be put in, and make the specific idea, more than others that are left out, it is plain that both these ways our ideas of subftances are deficient and inadequate. The fimple ideas, whereof we make our complex ones of fubftances, are all of them (bating only the figure and bulk of fome forts) powers, which being relations to other substances, we can never be fure that we know all the powers that are in any one body, till we have tried what changes it is fitted to give to, or receive from other fubftances, in their feveral ways of application: which being impoffible to be tried upon any one body, much lefs upon all, it is impoffible we fhould have adequate ideas of any substance, made up of a collection of all its properties.

§. 9. Whosoever firft lighted on a parcel of that fort of fubftance we denote by the word gold, could not rationally take the bulk and figure he obferved in that lump to depend on its real effence or internal conftitution. Therefore those never went into his idea of that fpecies of body; but its peculiar colour, perhaps, and weight, were the first he abftracted from it, to make the complex idea of that fpecies. Which both are but powers; the one to affect our eyes after fuch a manner, and to produce in us that idea we call yellow; and the other to force upwards any other body of equal bulk; they being put into a pair of equal fcales, one against another. Another perhaps added to these the ideas of fufibility and fixednefs, two other paffive powers, in relation to the operation of fire upon it; another, its ductility and folubility in aq. regia, two other powers relating to the operation of other bodies, in changing its outward figure, or feparation of it into infenfible parts. Thefe, or part of thefe, put toge

ther,