bus dum vivunt, magnos exhibent honores; mortuis verò vel templa vel monumenta extruunt ampliffima, eofque contingere ac fepelire maxime fortune ducunt loco, Audivimus hæc dicta 3 dicenda per interpretem à Mucrelo noftro. Infuper fan&tum illum, quem eo loco vidimus, pablicitus apprimè commendari, eum effe bominem fanétum, divinum ac integritate præcipuum; eo quod, nec fœminarum unquam effet, nec puerorum, fed tantummodo afellarum concubitor atque mularum. Peregr. Baumgarten, 1. 2. c. 1. p. 73. More of the fame kind, concerning thefe precious faints amongst the Turks, may be feen in Pietro della Valle, in his letter of the 25th of January, 1616. Where then are thofe innate principles of justice, piety, gratitude, equity, chastity? Or, where is that univerfal confent, that affures us there are such inbred rules? Murders in duels, when fashion has made them honourable, are committed without remorse of confcience, nay, in many places, innocence in this cafe is the greatest ignominy. And if we look abroad, to take a view of men, as they are, we fhall find, that they have remorse in one place, for doing or omitting that, which others, in another place, think they merit by.

Men have contrary practical principles.

§. 10. He that will carefully perufe the history of mankind, and look abroad into the feveral tribes of men, and with indifferency furvey their actions, will be able to fatisfy himself, that there is fcarce that principle of morality to be named, or rule of virtue to be thought on (thofe only excepted that are abfolutely neceffary to hold fociety together, which commonly, too, are neglected betwixt diftinct focieties) which is not, fomewhere or other, flighted and condemned by the general fashion of whole focieties of men, governed by practical opinions and rules of living, quite oppofite to others.

Whole nations reject feveral moral

rules.

§. 11. Here, perhaps, it will be objected, that it is no argument that the rule is not known, because it is broken. I grant the objection good, where men, though they tranfgrefs, yet difown not the law; where fear of fhame, cenfure, or punifhment, carries the mark of fome awe it has upon them. But it is impoffible to conceive, that a whole nation of

men

men fhould all publickly reject and renounce what every one of them, certainly and infallibly, knew to be a law: for fo they muft, who have it naturally imprinted on their minds. It is poffible men may fometimes own rules of morality, which, in their private thoughts, they do not believe to be true, only to keep themselves in reputation and efteem amongst thofe, who are persuaded of their obligation. But it is not to be imagined, that a whole fociety of men fhould publickly and profeffedly difown, and caft off a rule, which they could not, in their own minds, but be infallibly certain was a law; nor be ignorant, that all men they fhould have to do with, knew it to be fuch: and therefore must every one of them apprehend from others, all the contempt and abhorrence due to one, who profeffes himself void of humanity; and one, who, confounding the known and natural measures of right and wrong, cannot but be looked on as the profeffed enemy of their peace and happiness. Whatever practical principle is innate, cannot but be known to every one to be juft and good. It is therefore little less than a contradiction to fuppofe, that whole nations of men fhould, both in their profeffions and practice, unanimously and univerfally give the lie to what, by the most invincible evidence, every one of them knew to be true, right, and good. This is enough to fatisfy us, that no practical rule, which is any where univerfally, and with publick approbation or allowance, tranfgreffed, can be fuppofed innate. But I have fomething farther to add, in anfwer to this objection.

§. 12. The breaking of a rule, fay you, is no argument that it is unknown. I grant it: but the generally allowed breach of it any where, I fay, is a proof that it is not innate. For example: let us take any of these rules, which being the most obvious deductions of human reafon, and conformable to the natural inclination of the greateft part of men, fewest people have had the impudence to deny, or inconfideration to doubt of. If any can be thought to be naturally imprinted, none, I think, can have a fairer pretence to be innate than this; " parents, preserve and cherish your children." When therefore you fay, that

this is an innate rule, what do you mean? Either, that it is an innate principle, which upon all occafions excites and directs the actions of all men: or else, that it is a truth, which all men have imprinted on their minds, and which therefore they know and affent to. But in neither of thefe fenfes is it innate. Firft that it is not a principle which influences all men's actions, is what I have proved by the examples before cited: nor need we feek fo far as Mingrelia or Peru, to find inftances of fuch as neglect, abuse, nay and deftroy their children; or look on it only as the more than brutality of some favage and barbarous nations, when we remember, that it was a familiar and uncondemned practice amongst the Greeks and Romans, to expofe, without pity or remorfe, their innocent infants. Secondly, that it is an innate truth, known to all men, is alfo falfe. For, " parents, preferve your children," is fo far from an innate truth, that it is no truth at all; it being a command, and not a propofition, and fo not capable of truth or falfhood. To make it capable of being affented to as true, it must be reduced to fome fuch propofition as this: "it is the duty of parents to preferve their children." But what duty is, cannot be understood without a law; nor a law be known, or fuppofed, without a law-maker, or without reward and punishment: fo that it is impoffible, that this, or any other practical principle fhould be innate; i. e. be imprinted on the mind as a duty, without fuppofing the ideas of God, of law, of obligation, of punifhment, of a life after this, innate: For that punishment follows not, in this life, the breach of this rule; and confequently, that it has not the force of a law in countries, where the generally allowed practice runs counter to it, is in itfelf evident. But thefe ideas (which must be all of them innate, if any thing as a duty be fo) are fo far from being innate, that it is not every ftudious or thinking man, much lefs every one that is born, in whom they are to be found clear and distinct : and that one of them, which of all others feems most likely to be innate, is not fo, (I mean the idea of God) I think, in the next chapter, will appear very evident to any confidering man.

§. 13.

§. 13. From what has been faid, I think we may fafely conclude, that whatever practical rule is, in any place, generally and with allowance broken, cannot be fuppofed innate; it being impoffible that men fhould, without fhame or fear, confidently and ferenely break a rule, which they could not but evidently know, that God had fet up, and would certainly punish the breach of (which they muft, if it were innate) to a degree, to make it a very ill bargain to the tranfgreffor. Without fuch a knowledge as this, a man can never be certain that any thing is his duty. Ignorance, or doubt of the law, hopes to escape the knowledge or power of the law-maker, or the like, may make men give way to a prefent appetite: but let any one fee the fault, and the rod by it, and with the tranfgreffion, a fire ready to punish it; a pleasure tempting, and the hand of the Almighty vifibly held up, and prepared to take vengeance (for this must be the cafe, where any duty is imprinted on the mind) and then tell me, whether it be poffible for people, with such a profpect, fuch a certain knowledge as this, wantonly, and without fcruple, to offend against a law, which they carry about them in indelible characters, and that ftares them in the face whilst they are breaking it? whether men, at the fame time that they feel in themselves the imprinted edicts of an omnipotent law-maker, can with affurance and gaiety flight and trample under foot his most facred injunctions? and laftly, whether it be poffible, that whilst a man thus openly bids defiance to this innate law and fupreme law-giver, all the by-ftanders, yea, even the governors and rulers of the people, full of the fame fense both of the law and law-maker, fhould filently connive, without teftifying their diflike, or laying the leaft blame on it? Principles of actions indeed there are lodged in men's appetites, but these are so far from being innate moral principles, that if they were left to their full fwing, they would carry men to the overturning of all morality. Moral laws are fet as a curb and reftraint to these exorbitant defires, which they cannot be but by rewards and punishments, that will overbalance the fatisfaction any one shall propose to himself

in

in the breach of the law. If therefore any thing be imprinted on the minds of all men as a law, all men must have a certain and unavoidable knowledge, that certain and unavoidable punishment will attend the breach of it. For, if men can be ignorant or doubtful of what is innate, innate principles are infifted on, and urged to no purpofe; truth and certainty (the things pretended) are not at all fecured by them but men are in the fame uncertain, floating eftate with, as without them. An evident indubitable knowledge of unavoidable punishment, great enough to make the tranfgreffion very uneligible, muft accompany an innate law; unless, with an innate law, they can fuppofe an innate gospel too. I would not here be miftaken, as if, becaufe I deny an innate law, I thought there were none but pofitive laws. There is a great deal of difference between an innate law, and a law of nature; between fomething imprinted on our minds in their very original, and fomething that we being ignorant of may attain to the knowledge of, by the use and due application of our natural faculties. And I think they equally for fake the truth, who, running into contrary extremes, either affirm an innate law, or deny that there is a law knowable by the light of nature, i. e. without the help of pofitive revelation.

Those who maintain in

nate practical principles, tell us not what they

are.

§. 14. The difference there is amongst men in their practical principles, is fo evident, that, I think, I need fay no more to evince, that it will be impoffible to find any innate moral rules by this mark of general affent and it is enough to make one fufpect, that the fuppofition of fuch innate principles is but an opinion taken up at pleasure; fince thofe who talk fo confidently of them, are so fparing to tell us which they are. This might with juftice be expected from thofe men who lay ftrefs upon this opinion and it gives occafion to diftruft either their knowledge or charity, who declaring, that God has imprinted on the minds of men the foundations of knowledge, and the rules of living, are yet fo little favourable to the information of their neighbours, or the quiet of mankind,