his own workmanship, to mind man of his dependance and duty; and that herein fhould appear the first inflances of human knowledge. But how late is it before any fuch notion is difcoverable in children? And when we find it there, how much more does it refemble the opinion and notion of the teacher, than reprefent the true God? He that fhall obferve in children the progrefs whereby their minds attain the knowledge they have, will think that the objects they do first and most familiarly converfe with, are thofe that make the first impreffions on their understandings: nor will he find the leaft footsteps of any other. It is easy to take notice, how their thoughts enlarge themselves, only as they come to be acquainted with a greater variety of fenfible objects, to retain the ideas of them in their memories ; and to get the skill to compound and enlarge them, and feveral ways put them together. How by thefe means they come to frame in their minds an idea men have of a deity, I fhall hereafter fhow.

§. 14. Can it be thought, that the ideas men have of God are the characters and marks of himself, engraven on their minds by his own finger; when we fee that in the fame country, under one and the fame name, men have far different, nay, often contrary and inconsistent ideas and conceptions of him? Their agreeing in a name, or found, will fcarce prove an innate notion of him.

§. 15. What true or tolerable notion of a deity could they have, who acknowledged and worshipped hundreds? Every deity that they owned above one was afi infallible evidence of their ignorance of him, and a proof that they had no true notion of God, where unity, infinity, and 'eternity were excluded. To which if we add their grofs conceptions of corporcity, expreffed in their images and reprefentations of their deities; the amours, marriages, copulations, lufts, quarrels, and other mean qualities attributed by them to their gods; we shall have little reason to think, that the heathen world, i. e. the greatest part of mankind, had fuch ideas of God in their minds, as he himself, out of care that they should not be mistaken about him, was author VOL. 1.

F

of!

Book 1. of. And this univerfality of confent, fo much argued, if it prove any native impreffions, it will be only this, that God imprinted on the minds of all men, fpeaking the fame language, a name for himself, but not any idea; fince thofe people, who agreed in the name, had at the fame time far different apprehenfions about the thing fignified. If they fay, that the variety of deities, worshipped by the heathen world, were but figurative ways of expreffing the feveral attributes of that incomprehenfible being, or feveral parts of his providence: I anfwer, what they might be in the original, I will not here inquire; but that they were fo in the thoughts of the vulgar, I think no-body will affirm. And he that will confult the voyage of the bishop of Beryte, c. 13. (not to mention other teftimonies) will find, that the theology of the Siamites profeffedly owns a plurality of Gods: or, as the abbe de Choify more judiciously remarks, in his Journal du voiage de Siam, 197, it confifts properly in acknowledging no God at all.

If it be faid, That wife men of all nations came to have true conceptions of the unity and infinity of the deity, I grant it. But then this,

First, Excludes univerfality of confent in any thing but the name; for thofe wife men being very few, perhaps one of a thoufand, this univerfality is very

narrow.

Secondly, It feems to me plainly to prove, that the trueft and beft notions men had of God were not imprinted, but acquired by thought and meditation, and a right ufe of their faculties; fince the wife and confiderate men of the world, by a right and careful employment of their thoughts and reafon, attained true notions in this as well as other things; whilft the lazy and inconfiderate part of men, making far the greater number, took up their notions by chance, from common tradition and vulgar conceptions, without much beating their heads about them. And if it be a reason to think the notion of God innate, becaufe all wife men had it, virtue too must be thought innate, for that also wife men have always had.

§. 16. This

§. 16. This was evidently the cafe of all Gentilism; nor hath even amongst Jews, Chriftians, and Mahometans, who acknowledge but one God, this doctrine, and the care taken in thofe nations to teach men to have true notions of a God, prevailed fo far, as to make men to have the fame, and the true ideas of him. How many, even amongst us, will be found, upon inquiry, to fancy him in the fhape of a man fitting in heaven, and to have many other abfurd and unfit conceptions of him? Chriftians, as well as Turks, have had whole fects owning and contending earneftly for it, and that the deity was corporeal, and of human fhape: and though we find few among us who profefs themselves Anthropomorphites, (though fome I have met with that own it) yet, I believe, he that will make it his bufinefs, may find, amongst the ignorant and uninftructed Chriftians, many of that opinion. Talk but with country people, almost of any age, or young people of almost any condition; and you fhall find, that though the name of God be frequently in their mouths, yet the notions they apply this name to are so odd, low and pitiful, that no-body can imagine they were taught by a rational man, much lefs that they were characters written by the finger of God himfelf. Nor do I fee how it derogates more from the goodness of God, that he has given us minds unfurnished with thefe ideas of himself, than that he hath fent us into the world with bodies unclothed, and that there is no art or skill born with us: for, being fitted with faculties to attain these, it is want of industry and confideration in us, and not of bounty in him, if we have them not. It is as certain that there is a God, as that the oppofite angles, made by the interfection of two ftraight lines, are equal. There was never any rational creature, that fet himself fincerely to examine the truth of these propofitions, that could fail to affent to them; though yet it be paft doubt that there are many men, who, having not applied their thoughts that way, are ignorant both of the one and the other. If any one think fit to call this (which is the utmoft of its extent) uni-. verfal confent, fuch an one I easily allow; but fuch an

F 2

univerfal

univerfal confent as this proves not the idea of God, any more than it does the idea of fuch angles, innate.

If the idea of God be not innate, no other can be

fuppofed in

nate.

§. 17. Since then, though the knowledge of a God be the most natural discovery of human reason, yet the idea of him is not innate, as, I think, is evident from what has been faid; I imagine there will scarce be any other idea found, that can pretend to it: fince if God hath sent any impreffion, any character on the understanding of men, it is moft reasonable to expect it fhould have been some clear and uniform idea of himfelf, as far as our weak capacities were capable to receive fo incomprehenfible and infinite an object. But our minds being at first void of that idea, which we are moft concerned to have, it is a ftrong prefumption against all other innate characters. I must own, as far as I can obferve, I can find none, and would be glad to be informed by any other. Idea of fub- §. 18. I confefs there is another idea, ftance not in which would be of general use for mankind to have, as it is of general talk, as if they had it; and that is the idea of fubftance, which we neither have, nor can have, by sensation or reflection. If nature took care to provide us any ideas, we might well expect they fhould be fuch, as by our own faculties we cannot procure to ourselves: but we fee, on the contrary, that fince by thofe ways, whereby our ideas are brought into our minds, this is not, we have no fuch clear idea at all, and therefore fignify nothing by the word fubftance, but only an uncertain fuppofition of we know not what, i. e. of fomething whereof we have no particular diftinct pofitive idea, which we take to be the fubftratum, or support, of those ideas. we know.

nate.

No propofitions can be

innate, fince

$. 19. Whatever then we talk of innate, either fpeculative or practical, principles, it may, with as much probability, be said, that a man hath 100l. fterling in his pocket, and yet denied, that he hath either penny, fhilling, crown, or other coin, out of which the fum is to be made up, as to think that certin propofitions

no ideas are innate.

are

are innate, when the ideas about which they are can by no means be fuppofed to be fo. The general reception and affent that is given doth not at all prove that the ideas expreffed in them are innate; for in many cafes, however the ideas came there, the affent to words expreffing the agreement or difagreement of fuch ideas, will neceffarily follow. Every one, that hath a true idea of God and worship, will affent to this propofition, "that God is to be worshipped," when expreffed in a language he understands: and every rational man, that hath not thought on it to-day, may be ready to affent to this propofition to-morrow; and yet millions of men may be well fuppofed to want one or both thofe ideas to-day. For if we will allow favages and most country people to have ideas of God and worship, (which converfation with them will not make one forward to believe) yet I think few children can be fuppofed to have those ideas, which therefore they must begin to have fome time or other; and then they will alfo begin to affent to that propofition; and make very little queftion of it ever after. But fuch an affent upon hearing no more proves the ideas to be innate, than it does that one born blind (with cataracts, which will be couched to-morrow) had the innate ideas of the fun, or light, or faffron, or yellow; because, when his fight is cleared, he will certainly affent to this propofition, "that the fun is lucid, or that faffron is yellow :" and therefore, if fuch an affent upon hearing cannot prove the ideas innate, it can much lefs the propofitions made up of those ideas. If they have any innate ideas, I would be glad to be told what, and how many they are.

No innate

ideas in the

memory.

§. 29. To which let me add: If there be any innate ideas, any ideas in the mind, which the mind does not actually think on, they must be lodged in the memory, and from thence must be brought into view by remembrance; i. e. must be known, when they are remembered, to have been perceptions in the mind before, unless remembrance can be without remembrance. For to remember is to perceive any thing with memory, or with a consciousness,

F3