the distinction intended to be taken will be understood.

It must further be observed, that it is not, as an insulated question, that the admissibility of extrinsic evidence in aid of the exposition of wills, can properly be considered. The subject is part only—and that a subordinate one-of a general system of rules which Courts of law have established for the correct interpretation of wills; and the true nature and bearings of this particular question can be properly understood only when viewed in connection with the entire system of which it forms a part.

The SEVEN PROPOSITIONS following, applicable to the exposition of wills, and embodying (in its proper place) the particular subject of the present investigation, are submitted to the consideration of the reader, as the results both of principle and authority.

I. A testator is always presumed to use the words in which he expresses himself according to their strict and primary acceptation, unless from the context of the will it appear that he has used them in a different sense; in which case the sense in which he thus appears to have used them will be the sense in which they are to be construed (a).

II. Where there is nothing in the context of a will, from which it is apparent that a testator has used the words in which he has expressed himself in any other than their strict and primary sense, and where his words so interpreted are sensible with reference to extrinsic circumstances, it is an inflexible rule of construction, that the words of the will shall be interpreted in their strict and primary sense, and in no other, although they may be capable of some popular or secondary interpretation, and although the most conclusive evidence of intention to use them in such popular or secondary sense be tendered.

III. Where there is nothing in the context of

(a) Upon this and every other point connected with the interpretation of wills, the reader will find the fullest information in Mr. Jarman's valuable edition of Powell on Devises.

a will, from which it is apparent that a testator has used the words in which he has expressed himself in any other than their strict and primary sense, but his words, so interpreted, are insensible with reference to extrinsic circumstances, a Court of law may look into the extrinsic circumstances of the case, to see whether the meaning of the words be sensible in any popular or secondary sense, of which, with reference to these circumstances, they are capable.

IV. Where the characters in which a will is written are difficult to be decyphered, or the language of the will is not understood by the Court, the evidence of persons skilled in decyphering writing, or who understand the language in which the will is written, is admissible to declare what the characters are, or to inform the Court of the proper meaning of the words.

V. For the purpose of determining the object of a testator's bounty, or the subject of disposition, or the quantity of interest intended to be given by his will, a Court may inquire into every material (a) fact relating to the person who claims to be interested under the will, and to the property which is claimed as the subject of disposi

(a) See infra, p. 60.

tion, and to the circumstances of the testator and of his family and affairs; for the purpose of enabling the Court to identify the person or thing intended by the testator, or to determine the quantity of interest he has given by his will.

The same (it is conceived) is true of every other disputed point, respecting which it can be shewn that a knowledge of extrinsic facts can, in any way, be made ancillary to the right interpretation of a testator's words.

VI. Where the words of a will, aided by evidence of the material facts of the case, are in sufficient to determine the testator's meaning, no evidence will be admissible to prove what the testator intended, and the will (except in certain special cases-see Proposition VII.) will be void for uncertainty.

VII. Notwithstanding the rule of law, which makes a will void for uncertainty, where the words, aided by evidence of the material facts of the case, are insufficient to determine the testator's meaning-Courts of law, in certain special admit extrinsic evidence of intention to make certain the person or thing intended, where the description in the will is insufficient for the purpose.

cases,

These cases may be thus defined: where the object of a testator's bounty, or the subject of dis

position (i. e. the person or thing intended), is described in terms which are applicable indifferently to more than one person or thing, evidence is admissible to prove which of the persons or things so described was intended by the testator.

A separate examination of each of these sitions will now be gone into.

propo