cation of most value for guidance must at the same time be the education of most value for discipline." As evidence of this, he undertakes to show that science, like language, trains the memory, and in addition exercises the understanding; that it is superior to language in cultivating judgment; that, by fostering independence, perseverance, and sincerity, it furnishes a moral discipline; and even that science, "inasmuch as it generates a profound respect for, and an implicit faith in, those uniform laws which underlie all things," is the best discipline for religious culture. Hence, from the point of view of formal discipline and mental gymnastics, as well as of content and guidance, Spencer declares science, rather than language and literature, to be of most worth in education.

These educational conclusions of Spencer seem to involve a complete reversal of the Renaissance, and they certainly called for a loosening of the traditional hold of the classics upon England. Instead of Greek and Latin for 'culture' and 'discipline,' and an order of society where the few were educated for a life of elegant leisure, this English philosopher advocated the 'sciences' and a new scheme of life where every one should enjoy all advantages in the order of their relative value. We should, however, note the fallacy in his use of the word 'science.' With Spencer this term denotes the social, political, and moral sciences, as well as the physical and

biological, and he really includes much that would properly come under the head of 'humanities' rather than 'science.' He is, however, fairly consistent in desiring material in the curriculum that will be of more service than the classics. While such a complete destruction of educational traditions strongly suggests Rousseau, Spencer's Education at least brought Rousseau's doctrine down to earth. It seems more like a reversion to Bacon and Locke, from whom the SwissFrench reformer probably got his start, and a return to England by way of the continent of the old revolutionary doctrines. It clearly cannot be considered Rousselian to the extent of denying the value of all knowledge that comes down from the past. His complaint lies rather against the monopoly of the traditional subjects and methods. "The attitude of the universities toward natural science," he protests elsewhere,1 "has been that of contemptuous non-recognition. Collegiate authorities have long resisted, either actively or passively, the making of physiology, chemistry, geology, etc., subjects of examination."

His 'utilitarianism' in

Hence, Spencer cannot with propriety be stigmatized cludes moral for his 'utilitarianism,' as has so frequently been done.

as well as material,

values.

His 'preparation for complete living' includes more than merely making a living and the material side of life, and the 'utilitarianism' with which he is charged contains

1 Social Statics, p. 375.

the same underlying principle and may be equated with the 'practical' of Kant or the 'æsthetic' of Herbart. The 'science' with which he would replace the traditional humanistic studies contributes to moral values. It should elevate conduct, and make life pleasanter, nobler, and more effective.

His argu

ment for the

'disciplinary'

value of the sciences is,

traditional,

his 'economy

His argument for the superiority of the sciences in disciplinary value, however, is unfortunate. There was no need of his accepting that point of view at all; and, in doing so, he shows that he is not altogether emancipated however, from tradition, and that he has not fully grasped the dis- and ciplinary claims of language, which he bases entirely upon memory training. He likewise begs the question in stating that nature is bound, as a matter of economy, to make the training that is best for guidance also the best for discipline. As a matter of fact, nothing is more uneconomical than nature, which always produces a superabundance, on the principle that much will necessarily be wasted.

Essays upon 'Intellectual,' 'Moral,' and 'Physical

of nature' begs the

question.

Education'

In his Intel

lectual Edu

cation Spencer

The second essay in Spencer's work is entitled Intellectual Education, and deals largely with his ideas on method. In the first place, he insists, with Pestalozzi, CC 'that education must conform to the natural process of evolution." He criticizes the methods of the time, and ciples;

largely fol

lows Pestalozzi's prin

in his Moral Education he

undertakes to state his guiding principles in logical order as follows: "1. In education we should proceed from the simple to the complex. 2. Our lessons ought to start from the concrete and end in the abstract. 3. The education of the child must accord both in mode and arrangement with the education of man considered historically. 4. In each branch of instruction we should proceed from the empirical to the rational. 5. The process of self-development should be encouraged to the fullest extent. 6. There is always a method productive of interest, and this is the method proved by all other tests to be the right one." These principles, which he exemplifies by applying them to various studies, are strikingly similar to some already formulated by Pestalozzi, Herbart, and Froebel.

No greater originality is displayed in his essays upon Moral Education and Physical Education. In moral punishment training, he criticizes the existing control by impulse,

holds to Rousseau's

by 'natural

conse

quences'; and in his

tradition, and harshness, and insists upon inhibition, repression, and elimination of the natural 'evil impulses' 1 as the 'guiding principle of moral education.' But while he does not agree with Rousseau that the child is by nature good,1 he does indorse that writer's principle of punishing through 'natural consequences.' 2 In the

Physical Education he gives practical advice.

1 In fact, despite his rejection of the old 'natural depravity' theory of the theologians, he holds, like Locke, a most unfavorable view of childnature, and declares that "as the child's features resemble those of the savage, so, too, do his instincts." 2 See p. 89.

matter of physical training, he holds that the first requisite to success in life is to be a good animal. He insists upon the preservation of health as a duty, and discusses most sensibly the proper food, clothing, exercise, and play for the boy and girl. Excessive study, he declares, should be avoided as fatal to happiness, and he would make but little use of set exercise, on the ground that it is artificial.

Influence of Spencer

Obviously, except for his definition of the aim of education and his test of the relative value of studies, there is little that is really original in Spencer. Yet his way of combining Rousseau, Pestalozzi, and other reformers was new, and gave a basis of solidity, practicality, and common sense to these educators. Herbert Spencer was probably one of the greatest minds the world has ever known. He was without question the one great English philosopher of the nineteenth century and the only educational writer of that country to make much impression upon the times. His treatise has been translated into thirteen languages and has influenced all parts of the civilized world. It has ever since given the sciences a standing that has assured them of complete recognition in the curriculum, and it is one of the most important works ever written in English.

Spencer thus

worked out

the relative

value of studies and

made a sen

sible combi

nation of the

theoretical

reformers.

He was the

only English

educational

ist to make

much im

pression on

the nine

teenth cen

tury.