SUPPLEMENTARY READING I. SOURCE *MILTON, JOHN. Tractate of Education. II. AUTHORITIES *ADAMSON, J. W. Pioneers of Modern Education. Chap. VII. BARNARD, H. American Journal of Education. Vol. II, pp. 61-76. BARNARD, H. English Pedagogy. Pp. 145-190. BROOKS, P. Milton as an Educator (in Essays and Addresses, pp. 300-319). BROWNING, O. History of Educational Theories. Chap. VI. *BROWNING, O. Milton's Tractate of Education. *LAURIE, S. S. XII. Educational Opinion since the Renaissance. Chap. LAURIE, S. S. Essays and Addresses. Chap. IX. Introduction. *It is suggested that the general reader begin with the references marked with an asterisk. They are not necessarily the most valuable, but they are usually available and interesting. 'Sense real ism' was a reflection of the scientific in the six teenth and seventeenth centuries. It led to new principles, content, method, and texts in edu cation. CHAPTER II FRANCIS BACON AND THE INDUCTIVE METHOD MILTON and other innovators represented realism in its early 'humanistic' and 'social' phases. But the development realistic awakening did not cease with reviving the idea represented by the word or with the endeavor to bring the pupil in touch with the life he was to lead. The earlier or humanistic realism simply represents a stage in the process of transition from the narrow and formal humanism to the movement of sense realism. This later form of realism was a reflection of the great scientific development of the latter part of the sixteenth and the first half of the seventeenth centuries, with its variety of discoveries and inventions. The first great step in this movement was taken by Copernicus. Not until 1543 was his hypothesis of a solar system published, but as early as 1496 there had been a dissatisfaction with the existing Ptolemaic interpretation, and a groping after a more satisfactory explanation of the universe. After Copernicus, other great discoverers rapidly arose in Italy, France, Holland, and England, and the spirit of the new movement was felt in philosophy and education. Many ΙΟ new discoveries in science and inventions were made, and philosophy began to base itself upon reason and the senses. Kepler made it possible to search the heavens, Galileo reorganized the science of physics, and an air pump was invented by Guericke. This scientific progress was accompanied on the philosophic side by the rationalism of Descartes and the empiricism of Locke. The educational theorists, as a result, began to introduce science and a knowledge of real things into the curriculum. It was felt that humanism gave a knowledge only of words, books, and opinions, and did not even at its best lead to a study of real things. Hence new methods and new books were produced, to shorten and improve the study of the classical languages, and new content was imported into the courses of study. The movement would even seem to include some attempt at a formulation of scientific principles in education. Bacon's New Method The new tendency, however, did not appear in education until after the time of Francis Bacon (1561-1626). The use of the scientific method by the various discoverers was largely unconscious, and it remained for Bacon to formulate what he called the method of 'induction,' and, by advocating its use, to point the way to its development as a scientific theory of education. He is, there fore, ordinarily known as the first sense realist. Accord men might attain complete knowledge and truth. ing to Dr. Rawley, his biographer, Bacon, while still at the University of Cambridge, conceived a disgust for Aristotle's philosophy as it was then taught. At any rate, it is known that even during the busiest part of his public career he undertook in sporadic works to combat the Aristotelian method, and to form a new procedure on the basis of the scientific discoveries of the day. Not until 1620, however, did he publish his great treatise on inductive reasoning called Novum Organum ('new instrument') in opposition to Aristotle's work on deduction. In behalf of his treatise Bacon argues that, as the hand is helpless without the right tool to aid it, so the human intellect is inefficient when it does not possess its proper instrument or method, and, in his opinion, all men are practically equal in attaining complete knowledge and truth, if they will but use the mode of procedure that he describes. This new method of seeking knowledge he contrasts with that in vogue, as follows: "There are and can be only two ways of searching into and discovering truth. The one flies from the senses and particulars to the most general axioms, and from these principles, the truth of which it takes for settled and immovable, proceeds to judgment and the discovery of middle axioms. And this way is now in fashion. The other derives axioms from the senses and particulars, rising by a gradual and unbroken ascent, so that it arrives at the most general axioms last of all. This is the true way, but as yet untried." ever, one Hence, Bacon would begin with particulars, rather than use the a priori reasoning of the syllogism, as advocated by the schoolmen under the impression that this was the method of Aristotle. Before, however, one's observa- First, howtions can be accurately made, Bacon felt it would be must divest necessary to divest oneself of certain false and ill-defined himself of notions to which humanity is liable. The preconcep- preconceptions of which it is necessary to be rid are his famous 'idols.' 'idols.' These he declares to be of four classes: - "Idols of the Tribe, which have their foundation in human nature itself; Idols of the Cave, for every one, besides the faults he shares with his race, has a cave or den of his own; Idols of the Market-place, formed by the intercourse and association of men with each other; and Idols of the Theatre, which have immigrated into men's minds from the various dogmas of philosophies and also from wrong laws of demonstration." certain tions, or must not stop with particu Nor should the new method end with a mere collection And one of particulars. This proceeding Bacon believes to be useless and fully as dangerous for science as to generalize lars. a priori, and holds that these two polar errors together account very largely for the ill success of science in the past. He declares: "Those who have handled sciences have been either men of experiment or men of dogmas. The men of experiment are like the ant; they only collect and use: the reasoners resemble spiders; who make cobwebs out of their substance. But the bee takes a middle course; it gathers its material from the flowers of the |