Billeder på siden
PDF
ePub

between man and man, the misery of the individual man is ever to be relieved, and aid that shall do this under the above rules and limitations, never to be refused.

CHAPTER III.
APTER

Habit; Active and Passive.-Passage from Butler quoted, and practically applied.-Affectation.-Sentimentalism.-Unreality, or Romance.-Daydreaming.-Remedies for these diseases of the Moral Nature.

In our last chapter we treated upon "Sympathy," because we look upon it as the first of the Affections, and as the one which must go with all the rest in reference to our own moral improvement and our neighbour's; a peculiar moral element, that is capable of union with all the others, and therefore to be considered as antecedent to them all. There are some other powers of the same kind, which, if we consider them now as capable of being united with many of the affections, we shall thereby have clear ideas of them; if we leave them to be considered in their complication with other Affections, we shall be liable to great confusion and indistinctness.

And the first of these considerations is this: "Upon the Affections, what is the power and influence of Habit?" There is an "emotion," for instance, of "Compassion;" there is an act of "Compassion;" there is a habit of "Compassion." What is the moral value and the moral difference of these three modes of the one Affection? Wherein is the Habit more than the Emotion or the Act?

Upon this subject of Habit we shall enter in this chapter, and we clearly tell our readers that the chapter shall be little more than the remarks of Bishop Butler upon the point, with comments of our own, pointing out and illustrating the most important sentiments in the passage which we quote from him.

If this book be used in teaching Ethics, we advise the teacher, having himself practically realized, (which is to a teacher of Ethics the most valuable process of Ethical knowledge,) the influ

ence upon morals of these principles of Butler, to turn the attention of his class upon them, and line by line, and word by word, for we count them more precious than gold, to illustrate, enforce, explain, by all the means in his power, until each one feels the principles and their value in relation to his own life; and to think no time wasted that will bring about this result.

And if, on the other hand, our reader be a student of Ethics, whose object is as a man to know his own Heart and Nature, and so to use and apply its powers that he may reach the height that his Nature and Position enable him to attain, we ask of him to think, and think again, over this passage.

And warning him to expect no brilliancy of expression, no eloquence, no striking point or antithesis; for as one who was a good writer but no thinker* remarks, "for one who was so wonderful a thinker as Butler there hardly ever was so bad a writer;" I again express the opinion that the passage contains for him who is in pursuit of Ethical truth and Ethical progress, principles more precious than gold.

These principles are applicable to all the moral powers as well as to the "Heart," but upon it the bearings of them are of the deepest importance. Here, therefore, I introduce the passage, at the same time avowing that it tells upon the whole moral life of Man. Having thus premised, we shall now quote the passage.

"There are habits of Perception, and habits of Action. An instance of the former is our constant and even involuntary readiness in correcting the impressions of our sight concerning magnitudes and distances, so as to substitute judgment in the room of sensation, imperceptibly to ourselves. And it seems as if all other associations of ideas not naturally connected, might be called passive habits, as properly as our readiness in understanding languages upon sight or hearing of words. And our readiness in speaking and writing them is an instance of the latter, of active habits."

"For distinctness, we may consider habits as belonging to the body or the mind, and the latter will be explained by tho former. Under the former are comprehended all bodily activities or motions, whether graceful or unbecoming, which are owing to use:

* Sir James Mackintosh;-a very eloquent composer of beautiful essays that have nothing in them, a man in his day much overpraised.

under the latter, general habits of life and conduct, such as obedience and submission to authority as to any particular; those of veracity, justice and charity; those of attention, industry, selfgovernment, revenge. And habits of this latter kind seem produced by repeated acts as well as the former. And in like manner, as habits belonging to the body are produced by external acts, so habits of the mind are produced by the exertions of inward practical purposes; i. e., by carrying them into act, or acting upon them, the principles of obedience, of veracity, justice, and charity."

"Nor can those habits be formed by an external cause of action otherwise than as it proceeds from these principles; because it is only those inward principles exerted which are strictly acts of obedience, of veracity, of justice, and of charity. So likewise habits of attention, industry, self-government, are in the same manner acquired by exercise; and habits of envy and revenge by indulgence, whether in outward act or in thought and intention; i. e., inward act, for such intention is an act. Resolutions also to do well are properly acts; and endeavouring to force upon our own minds a practical sense of virtue, or to beget in others that practical sense of it which a man really has himself, is a virtuous act. All these, therefore, may and will contribute towards forming good habits."

"But going over the theory of virtue in one's thoughts, talking well, and drawing fine pictures of it, this is so far from necessarily or certainly conducing to form a habit of it in him who thus employs himself, that it may harden the mind in a contrary course, and render it gradually more insensible; i. e., form a habit of insensibility to all moral considerations. For from our very faculties of habit, passive impressions by being repeated grow weaker. Thoughts, by often passing through the mind, are felt less sensibly; being accustomed to danger begets intrepidity, i. e., lessens fear; to distress, lessens the passion of pity; to instances of other's mortality, lessens the sensible apprehension of our own."

"And from these two observations together, that practical habits are formed and strengthened by repeated acts, and that passive impressions grow weaker by being repeated upon us, it must follow that active habits may be gradually forming and strengthening, by a course of acting upon such and such motives and excitements, whilst these motives and excitements themselves, are by proportionable degrees growing less sensible; i. e., are con

tinually less and less sensibly felt, even as the active habits strengthen."

"And experience confirms this; for active principles at the very time that they are less lively in perception than they were, are found to be, somehow, wrought more thoroughly into the temper and character; and become more effectual in influencing our practice."

"The three things just mentioned may afford instances of it. Perception of danger is a natural excitement of passive fear and active caution, and by being inured to danger, habits of the latter are gradually wrought at the same time that the former gradually lessens. Perception of distress in others is a natural excitement, passively to pity and actively to relieve it; but let a man set himself to attend to, inquire out, and relieve distressed persons, and he cannot but grow less and less sensibly affected with the various miseries of life with which he must become acquainted, when yet at the same time, benevolence, considered not as a passion but as a practical principle of action, will strengthen; and whilst he passively compassionates the distressed less, he will acquire a greater aptitude actively to assist and befriend them. So also at the same time that the daily instances of mens dying around us, give us daily a less sensible passive feeling, or apprehension of our own mortality, such instances greatly contribute to the strengthening a practical regard to it in serious men; i. e., to forming an habit of action with a constant view to it."

"And this seems again further to show, that passive impressions made upon our minds by admonition, experience, example, though they may have a remote efficacy and a very great one towards forming active habits, yet can have this efficacy no otherwise than by inducing us to such a course of action; and that it is, not being affected so and so, but acting which forms those habits; only it must be always remembered that real endeavours to enforce good impressions upon ourselves are a species of virtuous action. Nor do we know how far it is possible, in the nature of things, that effects should be wrought in us at once, equivalent to habits; i. e., what is wrought by use and exercise."

"However, the thing insisted upon is, not what may be possible, but what is in fact the appointment of nature; which is, that active habits are to be formed by exercise. Their progress may be so gradual as to be imperceptible in its steps; it may be hard to

4

explain the faculty by which we are capable of habits throughout its several parts, and to trace it up to its original, so as to distinguish it from all others in our mind; and it seems as if contrary effects were to be ascribed to it. But the thing in general, that our nature is formed to yield, in some such manner as this, to use and exercise, is matter of certain experience."

"Thus, by accustoming ourselves to any course of action, we get an aptness to go on, a facility, readiness, and often pleasure in it. The inclinations which rendered us averse to it grow weaker; the difficulties in it, not only the imaginary but the real ones, lessen; the reasons for it, offer themselves of course to our thoughts upon all occasions, and the least glimpse of them is sufficient to make us go on in a course of action to which we have been accustomed."*

"And practical principles appear to grow stronger absolutely in themselves by exercise, as well as relatively with regard to contrary principles,† which by being accustomed to submit, do so habitually and of course; and thus, a new character in several respects may be formed, and many habitudes of life, not given by nature but which nature directs us to acquire."

We have taken the liberty, in reference to the truth of these observations from Butler, for the sake of greater distinctness of impression upon the students of this book, first, to divide the extract into paragraphs, and secondly, to mark with italics the passages which we wish them to reflect upon more attentively; and having made these observations, we shall proceed to consider it in the way of comment and remark.

Now with regard to the affections, our readers will have seen that there are three modes of their action; the first is the feeling, or emotion; the second, the action; and the third, the habit; and with regard to these, it is manifestly a thing deserving of consideration, to examine wherein does Virtue as regards the Affections consist.

And first, with regard to the Emotion, when we consider what has been said in the last chapter, we shall see that in respect to any affection of the Heart, the Emotion considered by itself may exist along with a great degree of viciousness of heart and life, even as regards that very virtue it was intended to promote.

*I would wish my reader to weigh this well in reference to Conscience. And this also is most important in regard to all the moral powers.

« ForrigeFortsæt »