prove, we believe that men have power to do or not to do. 7. The natural faculties, whereby we distinguish truth from error, are not fallacious. 8. Our fellow-men with whom we converse are possessed of life and intelligence. 9. Certain features of the countenance, sounds of the voice, and gestures of the body, indicate certain thoughts and dispositions of mind. The signification of those things we do not learn by experience, but by a kind of natural perception. Children, almost as soon as they are born, may be frightened by an angry or threatening tone of voice. 10. There is a certain regard due to human testimony in matters of fact, and even to human authority in matters of opinion. 11. There are many events depending on the will of man, possessing a self-evident probability, greater or less, according to circumstances; as in men of sound mind we expect a certain degree of regularity in their conduct. 12. In the phenomena of nature, what is to be will probably be like what has been in similar circumstances. Hume has shown that this principle is not grounded on reason, and has not the intuitive evidence of mathematical axioms.

(B.) Principles of Necessary Truths. Regarding those Reid deemed it enough to divide them into classes, and to mention some of each class.

2

I. Grammatical Principles:-1. Every adjective in a sentence must belong to some substantive expressed or understood. Every complete sentence must have a verb.

II. Logical Principles:-1. Any contexture of words that does not make a proposition is neither true nor false. 2. Every proposition is either true or false. 3. No proposition can be both true and false at the same time. 4. Reasoning in a circle proves nothing. 5. Whatever may be truly affirmed of a genus may be truly affirmed of all its species, and of all the individuals belonging to that species. III. The Mathematical Axioms.

IV. The Principles of Taste:-1. The fundamental rules of poetry, music, eloquence, and dramatic action; and 2, those of painting have always been the same, and will be so to the end of the world.

V. First Principles in Morals:-1. An unjust action has more demerit than an ungenerous one. 2. A generous action has more merit than a merely just one. 3. No man ought to be blamed for what it was not in his power to hinder.

VL Metaphysical Principles:-1. The qualities that we perceive

by our senses must have a subject, which we call body, and the thoughts we are conscious of must have a subject, which we call mind. The distinction between sensible qualities and the substance to which they belong is not the invention of philosophers, but is found in the structure of all languages. 2. Whatever begins to exist must have a cause. 3. Design and intelligence in the cause may be inferred with certainty, from marks or signs of them in the effect.

Reid has sometimes been severely handled for his multiplication of first principles; and it must be admitted that his scheme is crude, lacking in discrimination, in logical consistency, and in precision of statement; that it includes various truths as first principles which have no real claim to such a character; still it embodies, in a plain form, a considerable quantity of important truths.

He concludes his exposition of the intellectual powers with an essay on Taste. He notices the force of custom, of fancy, and of casual associations, in modifying taste; and observes that men differ more in their standard of taste than their judgments in matters of truth and error.

His treatment of the active powers of the mind occupies five essays. In the first, he treats of active powers in general; in the second, of the will; in the third, of the principles of action, which he distinguishes as already stated; in the fourth, he discusses the liberty of moral agents; and the fifth and last essay deals with morals.

Touching the sense of duty, he recognises and insists that we have an original moral faculty, which we call conscience. We have the conceptions of right and wrong in human conduct, of merit and demerit, of duty and moral obligation; and by this faculty we perceive some things to be right in human conduct and others to be wrong; that the first principles of morals are the dictates of the same faculty, and that we have the same reason to rely upon those dictates as upon the determinations of our senses, or our other natural faculties.

Reid contends earnestly for the freedom of the will, and discusses the counter doctrine of necessity at length, and with much vigour. 13 In the concluding essay, he attacks the utilitarian theory of morals as

13 In 1793, An Essay on Philosophical Necessity appeared, by Alexr. Crombie, A.M., and in which the views of Dr. Reid on the freedom of the will are adversely discussed and criticised, with much acuteness and ingenuity.

propounded by Hume, and his objections to several points of it were well and effectively directed. He showed that this theory did not recognise or take account of moral rules as established and enforced among men by the dictation of authority, which does not leave to individuals the power of reference to ultimate ends, and that it failed to distinguish between obligatory and non-obligatory useful acts.

To sum up, though Reid's writings are in many points imperfect, yet they have much psychological merit and interest. His intellect was active and vigorous, but not of the highest and widest order; his analytic and critical powers were limited; but he was painstaking and patient in investigation. In truth, the natural bent of his mind drew him more to the concrete and practical side of philosophy than to speculation in the higher region of thought; subjectively, he was not strong. Still his thinking power in certain directions, his native sagacity and force of character, his candour and fairness, and the favourable circumstances in which he was placed, enabled him to found a school, in which some of his disciples have outvied their master in analytic power and speculative thought.

SECTION II.

Adam Ferguson.

Adam Ferguson is the author of a work on moral and political philosophy, and also of some historical books, which will be noticed elsewhere.14 He was appointed to the chair of moral philosophy in

14 He was a son of the minister of Logierait, and was born in 1723. Having passed through the arts classes at St. Andrews, he came to Edinburgh to study for the Church in 1742. Thus he became one of the literary coterie consisting of Robertson, Blair, Home, Carlyle, Hume, and others, who were then students in the University, or living in Edinburgh. In 1745, he was offered a chaplaincy to the 42nd Regiment-"The Black Watch," and though only twenty-two years of age, and having only completed two sessions of the divinity course, he obtained ordination from the General Assembly on account of his high testimonials. He accompanied this regiment to the battle of Fontenoy, and was with difficulty prevented from rushing into action with a broadsword. He remained with his regiment till 1754, and obtained much influence over the Highland soldiers; he took a keen interest in military matters, and gained a know

the University of Edinburgh in 1764, an office which he held, with some intervals of absence, till the year 1785. In 1766, he published an outline of his lectures for the use of his class, and from these heads and notes he explained his system orally to the students, always keeping his mind open for the reception of whatever new light might dawn upon it. After his retirement from the professorship, he rearranged his lectures into a systematic form, and published them in 1792, under the title of Principles of Moral and Political Science. In his preface he says:-"Many, no doubt, may be conscious, that in a continued pursuit of the same subject for so long a time, they themselves could have done better; but in this, it is to be regretted, that they have not done so: For in this field there is room for many labourers; and the subject, though never new, is always interesting. It is so in the specimen of every particular life; in the history of every particular age or nation, and even in the lucubrations of every faithful transcriber of what nature suggests.

"Although, therefore, an author may have been preceded by men of distinguished ability in former or in present times, it implies no

ledge of them which was afterwards of use to him as a historian. He gave up the idea of becoming a minister, as he felt that he had not the requisite qualities for a popular preacher.

Having returned to Edinburgh, he was appointed to succeed Hume as Librarian of the Advocates' Library in 1757; but after a few years, he resigned this post, and became tutor to the sons of Lord Bute. In July, 1759, he was appointed to the chair of natural philosophy in the University of Edinburgh, and by the month of October he was ready to meet his class, which drew from Hume the remark, that "Ferguson had more genius than any of them, as he had made himself so much master of a difficult science-viz., natural philosophy-which he had never studied but when at college, in three months as to be able to teach it." He occupied this chair for five years, and it is recorded that he gave universal satisfaction, by rendering his subject attractive and popular. He published a short summary of his course for the use of his class. -Sir A. Grant's Story of the University of Edinburgh, Vol. II., pp. 349, 350.

A contemporary and friend of Ferguson's says of him :-" "He was the son of a Highland clergyman, and had the pride and spirit of his countrymen. He had the manners of a man of the world, and the demeanour of a high-bred gentleman, insomuch that his company was much sought after; for though he conversed with ease, it was with a dignified reserve. . . He had another talent, unknown to any but his intimates, which was a boundless vein of humour, which he indulged when there was none others present, and which flowed from his pen in every familiar letter he wrote."-Autobiography of the Rev. Dr. Alexr. Carlyle, pp. 281-283. 1860.

degree of arrogance to follow even such reapers, in gleaning materials from this inexhaustible field of reflection, on which mankind have been employed from the beginning, and on which they will continue to be employed to the end of time."

This work consists of two parts. The first treats of the most general phenomena in the nature and state of man, and extends to three chapters, which consecutively explain Man's place in the scale of Being; Mind, or the characteristics of Intelligence; and Man's Progressive Nature. Each of these chapters is divided into a number of sections, in which many important questions and interesting subjects are examined and discussed with rare candour and ability. The third chapter is especially attractive, as it explains the gradual progress and organisation of human society, the influence of habit, the progress of political and commercial arts, the pursuits and attainments of science, the fine arts, and the progress of moral apprehension.

The second part contains six chapters, which, under the following headings of a moral and political character, expound the Specific Good incident to Human Nature; the Fundamental Law of Morality, and its immediate Application and Sanctions; Jurisprudence, or Compulsory Law; Touching the Defences of Men; Moral Action, and the characteristics of a virtuous and happy Life; and, finally, Politics. Of these chapters, the first, the second, and the fourth are the most interesting, and present a body of well-digested information and reflection.

Ferguson was a well-informed man, and fairly equipped with a knowledge of the science of his time, as his method and conceptions clearly manifest. His moral ideas were distinct and comprehensive; his conception of human progress was accurate; and he approached nearer to the modern idea of a gradual development of human society and political institutions than any of his predecessors. Although, in some points, he was a follower of Hutcheson and Reid, in others he rose above them, especially in his admission of the idea of perfection in morality, and generally in his grasp of reality and of principles.

The

For instance, he says: "Mind, we have reason to believe, predominates in nature; so that, in a comprehensive survey of all that exists, whatever is not mind, would be as nothing. essence of Almighty God we must conceive as most simple, being that which necessarily exists from eternity. Of His supreme in