§ 5.

BUT whether this be fo or no I will not here determine, but appeal to every one's own experience, whether the fhadow of a man, though it corififts of nothing. but the abfence of light (and the more the absence of light is, the more difcernible is the fhadow), does not, when a man looks on it, caufe as clear and positive an idea in his mind as a man himself, though covered over with clear funfhine? And the picture of a fhadow is a pofitive thing. Indeed we have negative names, which ftand not directly for pofitive ideas, but for their abfence, fuch as infipid, filence, nihil, &c. which words denote pofitive ideas, v. g. tafte, found, being, with a fignification of their abfence.

§ 6. Pofitive Ideas from privative Causes. AND thus one may truly be faid to fee darkness; for, fuppofing a hole perfectly dark, from whence no light: is reflected, it is certain one may fee the figure of it, or it may be painted; or whether the ink I write with makes any other idea, is a queftion. The privative causes I have here affigned of pofitive ideas are according to the common opinion; but in truth it will be hard to determine whether there be really any ideas from a privative caufe, till it be determined, whether reft be any more a privation than motion.

§ 7. Ideas in the Mind, Qualities in Bodies.

To discover the nature of our ideas the better, and to difcourfe of them intelligibly, it will be convenient to diftinguish them as they are ideas or perceptions in our minds, and as they are modifications of matter in the bodies that cause fuch perceptions in us, that so we may not think (as perhaps ufually is done) that they are exactly the images and refemblances of fomething inherent in the fubject; most of those of sensation being in the mind no more the likenefs of fomething exifting without us, than the names that ftand for them are: the likeness of our ideas, which yet upon hearing they are apt to excite in us.

WHATSOEVER the mind perceives in itself, or is the im

mediate object of perception, thought, or understanding, that I call idea; and the power to produce any idea in our mind, I call quality of the fubject wherein that power is. Thus a fnow-ball having the power to produce in us the ideas of white, cold, and round, the powers to produce thofe ideas in us, as they are in the fnowball, I call qualities; and as they are fenfations or perceptions in our understandings, i call them ideas; which ideas, if 1 fpeak of fometimes as in the things themfelves, I would be understood to mean thofe qualities in the objects which produce them in us.

$9. Primary Qualities.

QUALITIES thus confidered in bodies are, firft, fuch as are utterly infeparable from the body, in what estate foever it be; fuch as, in all the alterations and changes it fuffers, all the force can be used upon it, it constantly keeps; and fuch as fenfe conftantly finds in every particle of matter which has bulk enough to be perceived, and the mind finds infeparable from every particle of matter, though less than to make itself fingly be perceived by our fenfes; v. g. Take a grain of wheat, divide it into two parts, each part has ftill folidity, extenfion, figure, and mobility; divide it again, and it retains ftill the fame qualities; and fo divide it on till the parts become infenfible, they must retain still each of them all thofe qualities; for divifion (which is all that a mill, or peftle, or any other body, does upon another, in reducing it to infenfible parts) can never take away either folidity, extenfion, figure, or mobility, from any body, but only makes two or more distinct feparate maffes of matter of that which was but one before; all which diftinct maffes, reckoned as fo many diftinct bodies, after divifion make a certain number. Thefe I call original or primary qualities of body, which I think we may obferve to produce fimple ideas in us, viz. folidity, extenfion, figure, motion, or reft, and number.

$ 10.

2dly, SUCH qualities which in truth are nothing in the objects themselves, but powers to produce various fen

fations in us by their primary qualities, i. e. by the bulk, figure, texture, and motion of their infenfible parts, as colours, founds, taftes, &c. thefe I call fecondary qualities. To thefe might be added a third fort, which are allowed to be barely powers, though they are as much real qualities in the fubject as thofe which I, to comply with the common way of fpeaking, call qualities, but, for diftinction, fecondary qualities; for the power in fire to produce a new colour or confiftency in wax. or clay by its primary qualities, is as much a quality in fire, as the power it has to produce in me a new idea or fenfation of warmth or burning, which I felt not before by the fame primary qualities, viz. the bulk, texture, and motion of its infenfible parts.

§ 11. How primary Qualities produce their Ideas. THE next thing to be confidered is, how bodies produce ideas in us; and that is manifeftly by impulfe, the only which we can conceive bodies operate in.

way

$12.

IF, then, external objects be not united to our minds when they produce ideas in it, and yet we perceive thefe original qualities in fuch of them as fingly fall under our fenfes, it is evident that fome motion must be thence continued by our nerves or animal fpirits, by fome parts of our bodies, to the brain, or the feat of fenfation, there to produce in our minds the particular ideas we have of them. And fince the extenfion, figure, number, and motion of bodies of an obfervable bignefs, may be perceived at a distance by the fight, it is evident fome fingly imperceptible bodies must come from them to the eyes, and thereby convey to the brain fome motion, which produces thefe ideas which we have of them in us.

13. How Secondary.

AFTER the fame manner that the ideas of thefe original qualities are produced in us, we may conceive, that the ideas of fecondary qualities are alfo produced, viz. by the operation of infenfible partieles on our fenfes. For it being manifeft that there are bodies, and good store of bodies, each whereof are so small that we cannot by any of our fenfes difcover either their bulk, figure, or mo

tion, as is evident in the particles of the air and water, and other extremely fmaller than those, perhaps as much smaller than the particles of air or water, as the particles of air or water are smaller than peafe or hailftones; let us fuppofe at prefent, that the different motions and figures, bulk and number, of fuch particles, affecting the feveral organs of our fenfes, produce in us thofe different fenfations which we have from the colours and fmells of bodies, v. g. that a violet, by the impulse of such infenfible particles of matter of peculiar figures and bulks, and in different degrees and modifications of their motions, caufes the ideas of the blue colour and fweet fcent of that flower to be produced in our minds, it being no more impoffible to conceive that God fhould annex fuch ideas to fuch motions, with which they have no fimilitude, than that he should annex the idea of pain to the motion of a piece of steel dividing our flesh, with which that idea hath no refemblance.

$ 14

WHAT I have faid concerning colours and fmells may be understood alfo of teftes and founds, and other the like fenfable qualities; which, whatever reality we by mistake attribute to them, are in truth nothing in the objects themselves, but powers to produce various fenfations in us, and depend on thofe primary qualities, viz. bulk, figure, texture, and motion of parts, as I have faid.

$15. Ideas of primary Qualities are Refemblances; of fecondary, not.

FROM whence I think it is eafy to draw this obfervation, that the ideas of primary qualities of bodies are refemblances of them, and their patterns do really exift in the bodies themfelves; but the ideas produced in us by these fecondary qualities have no refemblance of them at all. There is nothing like our ideas exifting in the bodies themselves; they are in the bodies; we denominate from them only a power to produce thofe fenfations in us; and what is fweet, blue, or warm in idea, is but the certain bulk, figure, and motion of the infenfible parts in the bodies themselves, which we call fo.

$ 16.

FLAME is denominated hot and light, fnow white and cold, and manna white and fweet, from the ideas they produce in us; which qualities are commonly thought to be the fame in those bodies that thofe ideas are in us, the one the perfect resemblance of the other, as they are in a mirror; and it would by most men be. judged very extravagant if one fhould fay otherwife; and yet he that will confider that the fame fire that at one diftance produces in us the fenfation of warmth, does at a nearer approach produce in us the far different fenfation of pain, ought to bethink himself what reafon he has to fay, that his idea of warmth, which was produced in him by the fire, is actually in the fire and his idea of pain, which the fame fire produced in him the fame way, is not in the fire. Why is whitenefs and coldness in fnow, and pain not, when it pro--duces the one and the other idea in us, and can do neither but by the bulk, figure, number, and motion of its folid parts?

$17.

THE particular bulk, number, figure, and motion of the parts of fire or fnow are really in them, whether any one's fenfes perceive them or no, and therefore they may be called real qualities, because they really exist in thofe bodies; but light, heat, whiteness or coldness, are no more really in them than fickness or pain is in manna. Take away the fenfation of them; let not the eyes fee: light or colours, nor the cars hear founds; let the palate not taste, nor the nose smell; and all colours, tastes,, odours, and founds, as they are fuch particular ideas,. vanish and cease, and are reduced to their caufes, i. e.. bulk, figure, and motion of parts.

$18.

A PIECE of manna, of a fenfible bulk, is able to pro-duce in us the idea of a round or fquare figure, and, by being removed from one place to another, the idea of motion. This idea of motion reprefents it as it really is in the manna moving. A circle or fquare are the fame,, whether in idea or exiftence, in the mind, or in the