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ideas to be the fame, or different. But of this more hereafter.

§ 2. The Difference of Wit and Judgment. How much the imperfection of accurately difcriminating ideas one from another, lies either in the dullnefs or faults of the organs of fenfe, or want of acutenefs, exercise or attention in the understanding, or haftiness and precipitancy natural to fome tempers, I will not here examine: It fuffices to take notice, that this is one of the operations, that the mind may reflect on and obferve in itfelf. It is of that confequence to its other knowledge, that fo far as this faculty is in itfelf dull, or not rightly made ufe of for the diftinguishing one thing from another; so far our notions are confused, and our reafon and judgment disturbed or misled.. If in having our ideas in the memory ready at hand, confifts quicknefs of parts; in this of having them unconfused, and being able nicely to diftinguish one thing from another, where there is but the leaft difference, confifts, in a great measure, the exactness of judgment, and clearnefs of reafon, which is to be obferved in one man above another. And hence perhaps may be given fome reason of that common obfervation, that men, who have a great deal of wit, and prompt memories, have not always the cleareft judgment, or deepest reason; for wit lying moft in the affemblage of ideas, and putting those together with quickness and variety, wherein can be found any refemblance or congruity, thereby to make up pleasant pictures, and agreeable vifions in the fancy; judgment, on the contrary, lies quite on the other fide, in feparating carefully one from another, ideas wherein can be found the least difference, thereby to avoid being misled by fimilitude, and by affinity to take one thing for another. This is a way of proceeding quite contrary to metaphor and allufion, wherein for the most part lies that entertainment and pleafantry of wit, which ftrikes fo lively on the fancy, and therefore is fo acceptable to all people; because its beauty appears at first fight, and there is required no labour of thought to examine what truth or reason there

is in it. The mind, without looking any farther, refts fatisfied with the agreeableness of the picture, and the gaiety of the fancy; and it is a kind of an affront to go about to examine it by the fevere rules of truth and good reafon, whereby it appears that it confists in fomething that is not perfectly conformable to them.

$3. Clearnefs alone hinders Confufion.

To the well distinguishing our ideas, it chiefly contributes, they be clear and determinate; and when they are fo, it will not breed any confufion or mistake about them, though the fenfes fhould (as fometimes they do) convey them from the fame object differently, on different occafions, and fo feem to err: For though a man in a fever fhould from fugar have a bitter taste, which at another time would produce a fweet one; yet the idea of bitter in that man's mind would be as clear and distinct from the idea of sweet, as if he had tafted only gall. Nor does it make any more confufion between the two ideas of fweet and bitter, that the fame sort of body produces at one time one, and at another time another idea by the taste, than it makes a confusion in two ideas of white and fweet, or white and round, that the fame piece of fugar produces them both in the mind at the fame time. And the ideas of orange colour and azure, that are produced in the mind, by the fame parcel of the infufion of lignum nephriticum, are no lefs diftinct ideas, than thofe of the fame colours, taken from two very different bodies.

$4. Comparing.

THE COMPARING them one with another, in refpect of extent, degrees, time, place, or any other circumftances, is another operation of the mind about its ideas, and is that upon which depends all that large tribe of ideas, comprehended under relation; which of how vaft an extent it is, I fhall have occafion to confider hereafter.

§ 5. Brutes compare but imperfectly. How far brutes partake in this faculty, is not eafy to determine; I imagine they have it not in any great degree: For though they probably have feveral ideas diftinct

enough, yet it seems to me to be the prerogative of human understanding, when it has fufficiently diftinguished any ideas, fo as to perceive them to be perfectly different, and fo confequently two, to caft about and confider in what circumstances they are capable to be com- . pared; and therefore, I think beasts compare not their ideas farther than fome fenfible circumftances annexed to the objects themselves. The other power of comparing, which may be obferved in men, belonging to general ideas, and useful only to abftract reasonings, we may probably conjecture beasts have not.

§ 6. Compounding.

THE next operation we may observe in the mind about its ideas, is COMPOSITION; whereby it puts together feveral of thofe fimple ones it has received from fensation and reflection, and combines them into complex ones. Under this of compofition may be reckoned alfo that of ENLARGING; wherein though the compofition does not fo much appear as in more complex ones, yet it is nevertheless a putting feveral ideas together, though of the fame kind. Thus, by adding feveral units together, we make the idea of a dozen i and putting together the repeated ideas of feveral perches, we frame that of a furlong.

$7. Brutes compound but little.

IN this alfo, I fuppofe, brutes come far fhort of men ; for though they take in, and retain together feveral combinations of fimple ideas; as, poffibly the shape, fmell, and voice of his mafter, make up the complex idea a dog has of him, or rather are fo many diftin&t marks whereby he knows him; yet I do not think they do of themselves ever compound them, and make complex ideas; and, perhaps, even where we think they have complex ideas, it is only one fimple one that directs them in the knowledge of several things, which poffibly they diftinguish lefs by their fight than we imagine; for I have been credibly informed, that a bitch will nurfe, play with, and be fond of young foxes, as much as, and in place of her puppies, if you can but get them once to fuck her fo long, that her milk may

go through them. And those animals, which have a numerous brood of young ones at once, appear not to have any knowledge of their number; for though they are mightily concerned for any of their young that are taken from them whilst they are in fight or hearing; yet if one or two of them be ftolen from them in their absence, or without noife, they appear not to miss them, or to have any fenfe that their number is leffened.

§ 8. Naming.

WHEN children have, by repeated fenfations, got ideas fixed in their memories, they begin, by degrees, to learn the use of figus. And when they have got the fkill to apply the organs of speech to the framing of articulate founds, they begin to make ufe of words, to fignify their ideas to others. Thefe verbal figns they fometimes borrow from others, and fometimes make themfelves, as one may obferve among the new and unusual names children often give to things in their first use of language.

§. 9. Abstracting;

THE ufe of words then being to stand as outward marks of our internal ideas, and thofe ideas being taken from particular things, if every particular idea that we take in fhould have a distinct name, names must be endless.. To prevent this, the mind makes the particular ideas, received from particular objects, to become general, which is done by confidering them as they are in the mind fuch appearances, feparate from all other existences, and the circumftances of real existence, as time, place, or any other concomitant ideas. This is called: ABSTRACTION, whereby ideas, taken from particu-lar beings, become general reprefentatives of all of the fame kind, and their names general names, applicableto whatever exifts conformable to fuch abstract ideas.. Such precife naked appearances in the mind, without confidering how, whence, or with what others they came there, the understanding lays up (with names commonly annexed to them), as the ftandards to rank. real existences into forts, as they agree with these parterns, and to denominate them accordingly.. Thus the

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fame colour being obferved to-day in chalk or fnow, which the mind yesterday received from milk, it confiders that appearance alone makes it a reprefentative of all of that kind; and having given it the name whiteness, it by that found fignifies the fame quality, wherefoever to be imagined or met with; and thus univerfals, whether ideas or terms, fe made.

§ 10. Brutes abftract not.

If it may be doubted, whether beafts compound and enlarge their ideas that way to any degree; this I think I may be pofitive in, that the power of abstracting is not at all in them; and that the having of general ideas, is that which puts a perfect diftinction betwixt man and brutes, and is an excellency which the faculty of brutes do by no means attain to: For it is evident we obferve no footsteps in them, of making ufe of general figns for univerfal ideas; from which we have reafon to imagine that they have not the faculty of abstracting, or making general ideas, fince they have no ufe of words, or any other general figns.

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NOR can it be imputed to their want of fit organs to frame articulate founds, that they have no use or knowledge of general words, fince many of them, we find, can fashion such founds, and pronounce words distinctly enough, but never with any fuch application; and on the other fide, men who through fome defect in the organs want words, yet fail not to exprefs their univerfal ideas by figns, which ferve them inftead of general words; a faculty which we fee beafts come fhort in; and therefore I think we may fuppofe, that it is in this that the fpecies of brutes are difcriminated from man; and it is that proper difference wherein they are wholly feparated, and which at laft widens to fo vaft a diftance; for if they have any ideas at all, and are not bare machines (as fome would have them), we cannot deny them to have fome reason. It seems as evident to me, that they do fome of them in certain inftances reafon, as that they have fenfe; but it is only in particular ideas, juft as they received them from their fenfes.

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