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§ 8. They belong to all Beings.

WHERE and when, are queftions belonging to all finite existences, and are by us always reckoned from fome known parts of this fenfible world, and from fome certain epochs marked out to us by the motions obfervable in it. Without fome fuch fixed parts or periods, the order of things would be loft to our finite understandings, in the boundless invariable oceans of duration and expanfion, which comprehend in them all finite beings, and in their full extent belong only to the Deity; and therefore we are apt not to wonder that we comprehend them not, and do fo often find our thoughts at a lofs, when we would confider them either abstractly in themselves, or as any way attributed to the first incomprehenfible Being. But when applied to any particular finite beings, the extenfion of any body is fo much of that infinite space, as the bulk of that body takes up. And place is the pofition of any body, when confidered at a certain diftance from fome other. the idea of the particular duration of any thing is an idea of that portion of infinite duration which paffes during the existence of that thing; fo the time when the thing exifted is the idea of that space of duration which passed between fome known and fixed period of duration and the being of that thing. One shows the diftance of the extremities of the bulk or existence of the fame thing, as that it is a foot fquare, or lafted two years; the other fhows the distance of it in place, or exiftence, from other fixed points of fpace or duration, as that it was in the middle of Lincolns-Inn-Fields, or the firft degree of Taurus, and in the year of our Lord 1671, or the 1000th year of the Julian period; all which distances we measure by preconceived ideas of certain lengths of fpace and duration, as inches, feet, miles, and degrees; and in the other minutes, days, and years, &c.,

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$9. All the Parts of Extenfion, are Extenfion; and all the Parts of Duration, are Duration. THERE is one thing more wherein space and duration have a great conformity; and that is, though they are

justly reckoned amongst our fimple ideas, yet none of the diftinct ideas we have of either is without all manner of compofition *; it is the very nature of both of them to confift of parts; but their parts being all of the fame kind, and without the mixture of any other idea, hinder them not from having a place amongst fimple ideas. Could the mind, as in number, come to so small a part of extension or duration as excluded divifibility, that would be, as it were, the indivisible unit, or idea, by repetition of which, it would make its more enlarged ideas of extenfion and duration. But fince the mind is not able to frame an idea of any space without parts, instead thereof it makes ufe of the common measures, which, by familiar use in each country, have imprinted themselves on the memory (as inches and feet; or cubits and parafangs; and fo feconds, minutes, hours, days, and years in duration): The mind makes

*It has been objected to Mr. Locke, that if fpace confifts of parts, as it is confeffed in this place, he should not have reckoned it in the number of fimple ideas; because it seems to be inconfiftent with what he fays elsewhere, that a fimple idea is uncompounded, and contains in it nothing but one uniform appearance or conception of the mind, and is not diftinguifbable into different ideas. It is farther objected, that Mr. Locke has not given in the 11th chapter of the 2d book, where he begins to fpeak of fumple ideas, an exact definition of what he understands by the word. fimple ideas. To thefe difficulties Mr. Locke answers thus: To begin with the laft, he declares, that he has not treated his fubject in an order perfectly fcholaftic, having not had much familiarity with thofe fort of books during the writing of his, and not remembering at all the method in which they are written; and therefore his readers ought not to expect definitions regularly placed at the beginning of each new fubject. Mr. Locke contents himfelf to employ the principal terms that he ufes; fo that, from his ufe of them, the reader may cafily comprehend what he means by them. But with refpect to the term fimple idea, he has had the good luck to define that in the place cited in the objection; and therefore there is no reafon to fupply that defect. The queftion then is to know, whether the idea of extenfion agrees with this. definition? Which will effectually agree to it, if it be understood in the fenfe which Mr. Locke had principally in his view; for that compofition which he defigned to exclude in that definition, was a compofition of different ideas in the mind, and not a compofition of the fame kind in a thing whofe effence confifts in having parts of the fame kind, where you can never come to a part entirely exempted from this compofition. So that if the idea of extenfion confifts in having partes extra partes (as the fchools fpeak), it is always, in the fenfe of Mr. Locke, a

ufe, I fay, of fuch ideas as thefe, as fimple ones; and these are the component parts of larger ideas, which the mind, upon occafion, makes by the addition of fuch known lengths which it is acquainted with. On the other fide, the ordinary fmalleft measure we have of either, is looked on as an unit in number, when the mind by divifion would reduce them into lefs fractions; though on both fides, both in addition and divifion, either of space or duration, when the idea under confideration becomes very big or very small, its precise bulk becomes very obfcure and confused; and it is the number of its repeated additions or divifions, that alone remains clear and diftinct, as will eafily appear to any one who will let his thoughts loose in the vaft expanfion of space, or divifibility of matter. Every part of duration, is duration too; and every part of extenfion, is extenfion, both of them capable of addition or divifion in infinitum. But the leaft portions of either of

fimple idea; because the idea of having partes extra partes, cannot be refolved into two other ideas. For the remainder of the objection made to Mr. Locke, with refpect to the nature of extenfion, Mr. Locke was aware of it, as may be feen in § 9. chap. 15. of the 2d book, where, he fays, that the leaft portion of space or extenfion, whereof we have a clear and diftinct idea, may perhaps be the fittest to be confidered by us as a fimple idea of that kind, out of which our complex modes of fpace and extenfion are made up. So that, according to Mr. Locke, it may very fly be called a fimple idea, fince it is the leaft idea of space that the mind can form to itself, and that cannot be divided by the mind into any lefs, whereof it has in itself any determined perception. From whence it follows, that it is to the mind one fimple idea, and that is fufficient to take away this objection; for it is not the defign of Mr. Locke, in this place, to difcourfe of any thing but concerning the ideas of the mind. But if this is not fufficient to clear the difficulty, Mr. Locke hath nothing more to. add, but that if the idea of extenfion is fo peculiar, that it cannot exactly agree with the definition that he has given of thofe fimple ideas, fo that it differs in fome manner from all others of that kind, he thinks it is better to leave it there expofed to this difficulty, than to make a new divifion in his favour. It is enough for Mr. Locke, that his meaning can be underflood. It is very common to obferve intelligible difcourfes fpoiled by too much fubtilty in nice divifions: We ought to put things together as well as we can, doctrinæ caufâ; but after all, feveral things will not be bundled up together under our terms, and ways of speaking.

them, whereof we have clear and diftinct ideas, may perhaps be fittest to be confidered by us as the fimple ideas of that kind out of which our complex modes of space, extenfion, and duration, are made up, and into which they can again be diftinctly refolved. Such a fmall part in duration may be called a moment, and is the time of one idea in our minds in the train of their ordinary fucceffion there; the other, wanting a proper name, I know not whether I may be allowed to call a fenfible point, meaning thereby the leaft particle of matter or space we can difcern, which is ordinarily about a minute, and to the fharpeft eyes feldom lefs than thirty feconds of a circle, whereof the eye is the

centre.

10. Their Parts infeparable.

EXPANSION and duration have this farther agreement, that though they are both confidered by us as having parts, yet their parts are not feparable one from another, no, not even in thought; though the parts of bodies from whence we take our measure of the one, and the parts of motion, or rather the fucceffion of ideas in our minds, from whence we take the measure of the other, may be interrupted and feparated, as the one is often by reft, and the other is by fleep, which we call reft

too.

§ 11. Duration is as a Line, Expansion as a Solid. BUT yet there is this manifeft difference between them, that the ideas of length which we have of expansion are turned every way, and fo make figure, and breadth, and thickness; but duration is but as it were the length of one ftraight line extended in infinitum, not capable of multiplicity, variation, or figure, but is one common measure of all existence whatsoever, wherein all things, whilft they exift, equally partake; for this prefent moment is common to all things that are now in being, and equally comprehends that part of their existence as much as if they were all but one fingle being; and we may truly fay they all exift in the fame moment of time. Whether angels and spirits have any analogy to this, in refpect of expanfion, is beyond my comprehen

fion; and perhaps for us, who have understandings and comprehenfions fuited to our own prefervation and the ends of our own being, but not to the reality and extent of all other beings, it is near as hard to conceive any existence, or to have an idea of any real being, with a perfect negation of all manner of expanfion, as it is to have the idea of any real existence, with a perfect negation of all manner of duration; and therefore what spirits have to do with space, or how they communicate in it, we know not; all that we know is, that bodies do each fingly poffefs its proper portion of it according to the extent of its folid parts, and thereby exclude all other bodies from having any fhare in that particular portion of fpace whilft it reinains there.

§ 12. Duration has never two Parts together, Expanfion all together.

DURATION, and time which is a part of it, is the idea we have of perishing distance, of which no two parts exist together, but follow each other in fucceflion, as expanfion is the idea of lafting diftance, all whofe parts exift together, and are not capable of fucceffion; and therefore, though we cannot conceive any duration without fucceffion, nor can put it together in our thoughts that any being does now exift to-morrow, or poffefs at once more than the prefent moment of duration, yet we can conceive the eternal duration of the Almighty far different from that of man or any other finite being, because man comprehends not in his knowledge or power all past and future things; his thoughts are but of yesterday, and he knows not what to-morrow will bring forth; what is once past he can never recal, and what is yet to come he can never make prefent. What I fay of man, I fay of all finite beings, who, though they may far exceed man in knowledge and power, yet are no more than the meanest creature in comparison with God himself. Finite of any magnitude holds not any proportion to infinite. God's infinite duration being accompanied with infinite knowledge and infinite: power, he fees all things paft and to come; and they

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