§ 15. What is pofitive, what negative in our Idea of Infinite. THE idea of infinite has, I confefs, fomething of pofitive in all those things we apply to it. When we would think of infinite space or duration, we at first step ufually make fome very large idea, as perhaps of millions of ages or miles, which poffibly we double and multiply feveral times. All that we thus amafs together in our thoughts is pofitive, and the affemblage of a great number of pofitive ideas of fpace or duration; but what ftill remains beyond this, we have no more a pofitive diftinct notion of, than a mariner has of the depth of the fea, where having let down a large portion of his founding-line, he reaches no bottom, whereby he knows the depth to be fo many fathoms, and more, but how much that more is he hath no diftinct notion at all; and could he always fupply new line, and find the plummet always fink without ever ftopping, he would be something in the posture of the mind reaching after a complete and pofitive idea of infinity; in which cafe, let this line be 10 or 10,000 fathoms long, it equally difcovers what is beyond it, and gives only. this confufed and comparative idea, that this is not all, but one may yet go farther. So much as the mind comprehends of any fpace, it has a pofitive idea of; but in endeavouring to make it infinite, it being always enlarging, always advancing, the idea is ftill imperfect and incomplete. So much space as the mind takes a view of in its contemplation of greatnefs, is a clear picture and pofitive in the underftanding; but infinite is ftill greater. 1. Then, the idea of fo much is pofitive and clear. 2. The idea of greater is also clear, but it is but a comparative idea. 3. The idea of fo much greater as cannot be comprehended; and this is plain negative, not pofitive; for he has no pofitive clear idea of the largenefs of any extenfion (which is that fought for in the idea of infinite), that has not a comprehenfive idea of the dimenfions of it; and fuch nobody, I think, pretends to in what is infinite; for to fay a man has a pofitive clear idea of any quantity, without knowing po how great it is, is as reasonable as to fay he has the fitive clear idea of the number of the fands on the feafhore, who knows not how many there be, but only that they are more than twenty; for just such a perfect and pofitive idea has he of an infinite space or duration, who fays it is larger than the extent or duration of 10, 100, 1000, or any other number of miles or years, whereof he has or can have a pofitive idea; which is all the idea I think we have of infinite; fo that what lies beyond our positive idea towards infinity lies in obfcurity, and has the indeterminate confufion of a negative idea, wherein I know I neither do nor can comprehend all I would, it being too large for a finite and narrow capacity: And that cannot but be very far from a pofitive complete idea, wherein the greatest part of what I would comprehend is left out, under the undeterminate intimation of being ftill greater: For to fay, that having in any quantity measured fo much, or gone fo far, you are not yet at the end, is only to fay that the quantity is greater; fo that the negation of an end in any quantity is, in other words, only to fay that it is bigger; and a total negation of an end is but the carrying this bigger ftill with you, in all the progreffions your thoughts thall make in quantity, and adding this idea of still greater to all the ideas you have, or can be fuppofed to have of quantity. Now, whether fuch an idea as that be pofitive, I leave any one to confider. § 16. We have no pofitive Idea of an infinite Duration. I ASK those who fay they have a positive idea of eternity, whether their idea of duration includes in it fucceffion or not? If it does not, they ought to fhow the difference of their notion of duration, when applied to an eternal being and to a finite, fince perhaps there may be others, as well as I, who will own to them their weakness of understanding in this point, and acknowledge, that the notion they have of duration forces them to conceive, that whatever has duration, is of a longer continuance to-day than it was yesterday. If to avoid fucceffion in eternal exiftence, they recur to the punc tum fans of the schools, I fuppofe they will thereby very little mend the matter, or help us to a more clear and pofitive idea of infinite duration, there being_nothing more inconceivable to me than duration without fucceffion; befides, the punctum ftans, if it fignify any thing, being not quantum, finite or infinite cannot belong to it. But if our weak apprehenfions cannot separate fucceffion from any duration whatsoever, our idea of eternity can be nothing but of infinite fucceffion of moments of duration, wherein any thing does exift; and whether any one has, or can have a positive idea of an actual infinite number, I leave him to confi der, till his infinite number be fo great that he himself can add no more to it; and as long as he can increase it, I doubt he himself will think the idea he hath of it a little too fcanty for pofitive infinity. § 17. I THINK it unavoidable for every confidering rational creature, that will but examine his own or any other existence, to have the notion of an eternal wife Being, who had no beginning; and fuch an idea of infinite duration I am fure I have: But this negation of a beginning being but the negation of a pofitive thing, fcarce gives me a pofitive idea of infinity, which, whenever I endeavour to extend my thoughts to, I confefs myself at a loss, and find I cannot attain any clear comprehen fion of it. § 18. No pofitive Idea of infinite Space. HE that thinks he has a pofitive idea of infinite fpace, will, when he confiders it, find that he can no more have a pofitive idea of the greatest than he has of the leaft fpace; for in this latter, which feems the eafier of the two, and more within our comprehenfior, we are capable only of a comparative idea of fmallnefs, which will always be lefs than any one whereof we have the pofitive idea. All our pofitive ideas of any quantity, whether great or little, have always bounds, though our comparative idea, whereby we can always add to the one and take from the other, hath no bounds; for that which remains, either great or little, not being comprehended in that pofitive idea which we have, lies in obfcurity, and we have no other idea of it but of the power of enlarging the one and diminishing the other without ceafing. A peftle and mortar will as foon bring any particle of matter to indivifibility as the acuteft thought of a mathematician; and a furveyor may as foon with his chain meafure out infinite fpace as a philofopher by the quickest flight of mind reach it, or by thinking comprehend it; which is to have a pofitive idea of it. He that thinks on a cube of an inch diameter, has a clear and pofitive idea of it in his mind,. and fo can frame one of 1, 4, 4, and so on, till he has the idea in his thoughts of fomething very little, but yet reaches not the idea of that incomprehenfible littlenefs which division can produce: What remains `of fmallness is as far from his thoughts as when he first began, and therefore he never comes at all to have a elear and pofitive idea of that smallness which is confequent to infinite divifibility. ŷ 19. What is pofitive, what negative in our Idea of Infinite. EVERY one that looks towards infinity, does, as I have faid, at first glance, make fome very large idea of that which he applies it to, let it be fpace or duration, and poffibly he wearies his thoughts by multiplying in his mind that firft large idea; but yet by that he comes no nearer to the having a pofitive clear idea of what remains to make up a pofitive infinite, than the country fellow had of the water, which was yet to come and. país the channel of the river where he stood.. Rufticus expectat dum tranfeat amnis, at ille § 20. Some think they have a pofitive Idea of Eternity, and not of infinite Space. THERE are fome I have met with that put fo much difference between infinite duration and infinite space, that they perfuade themfelves that they have a pofitive idea of eternity, but that they have not, nor can have any idea of infinite space; the reafon of which mistake I fuppofe to be this, that finding, by a due contemplation of caufes and effects, that it is neceffary to admit fome eternal being, and fo to confider the real existence of that being as taking up and commenfurate to their idea of eternity; but, on the other fide, not finding it neceffary, but, on the contrary, apparently abfurd, that body should be infinite, they forwardly conclude they can have no idea of infinite fpace, because they can have no idea of infinite matter; which confequence, I conceive, is very ill collected, because the exiftence of matter is no ways neceffary to the existence of space, no more than the existence of motion, or the fun, is neceffary to duration, though duration ufes to be meafured by it; and I doubt not but a man may have the idea of 10,000 miles fquare, without any body so big, as well as the idea of 10,000 years, without any body fo old. It seems as eafy to me to have the idea of fpace empty of body, as to think of the capacity of a bufhel without corn, or the hollow of a nut-fhell without a kernel in it; it being more neceffary that there fhould be exifting a folid body infinitely extended, because we have an idea of the infinity of space, than it is neceffary that the world fhould be eternal, because we have an idea of infinite duration. And why should we think our idea of infinite space requires the real exiflence of matter to fupport it, when we find that we have as clear an idea of infinite duration to come as we have of infinite duration paft? though I fuppofe nobody thinks it conceivable that any thing does or has exifted in that futuré duration. Nor is it poffible to join our idea of future duration with prefent or aft exiftence, any more than it is poffible to make the ideas of yesterday, to-day, and to-morrow, to be the fame, or bring ages paft and future together, and make them contemporary. But if these men are of the mind that they have clearer ideas of infinite duration than of infinite fpace, because it is paft doubt that GOD has exifted from all eternity, but there is no real matter coextended with infinite fpace, yet thofe philofophers who are of opinion that infinite fpace is poffeffed by GOD's infinite omniprefence, as well as infinite dura |