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great variety of modifications, and from thence receives diftinct ideas. Thus the perception which actually accompanies, and is annexed to any impreffion on the body made by an external object, being diftinct from all other modifications of thinking, furnishes the mind with a distinct idea, which we call fenfation; which is, as it were, the actual entrance of any idea into the understanding by the fenfes. The fame idea, when it again recurs without the operation of the like object on the external fenfory, is remembrance; if it be fought after by the mind, and with pain and endeavour found, and brought again in view, it is recollection; if it be held there long under attentive confideration, it is contemplation; when ideas float in our mind, without any reflection or regard of the understanding, it is that which the French call reverie; our language has fcarce a name for it; when the ideas that offer themfelves (for, as I have obferved in another place, whilst we are awake, there will always be a train of ideas fucceeding one another in our minds) are taken notice of, and, as it were, registered in the memory, it is attention; when the mind with great earnestness, and of choice, fixes its view on any idea, confiders it on all fides, and will not be called off by the ordinary folicitation of other ideas, it is that we call intention or ftudy: Sleep, without dreaming, is reft from all thefe; and dreaming itfelf, is the having of ideas (whilft the outward fenfes are ftopped, fo that they receive not outward objects with their ufual quickness) in the mind, not fuggefted by any external objects, or known occafion, nor under any choice or conduct of the understanding at all. And whether that, which we call ecftacy, be not dreaming with the eyes open, I leave to be examined.

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THESE are fome few inftances of thofe various modes of thinking, which the mind may observe in itself, and fo have as diftinct ideas of, as it hath of white and red, a fquare or a circle. I do not pretend to enumerate

them all, nor to treat at large of this fet of ideas, which. are got from reflection; that would be to make a vo

lume. It fuffices to my prefent purpose, to have shown here, by fome few examples, of what fort these ideas are, and how the mind comes by them; especially fince I fhall have occafion hereafter to treat more at large of reafoning, judging, volition, and knowledge, which are fome of the molt confiderable operations of the mind, and modes of thinking.

§3. The various Attention of the Mind in Thinking. BUT perhaps it may not be an unpardonable digression, nor wholly impertinent to our present design, if we reflect here upon the different ftate of the mind in thinking, which those inftances of attention, reverie and dreaming, &c. before-mentioned, naturally enough fuggeft. That there are ideas, fome or other, always present in the mind of a waking man, every one's experience convinces him, though the mind employs itself about them with feveral degrees of attention. Sometimes the mind fixes itself with fo much earneftnefs on the contemplation of fome objects, that it turns their ideas on all fides, remarks their relations and circumftances, and views every part fo nicely, and with fuch intention, that it fhuts out all other thoughts, and takes no notice of the ordinary impreffions made then on the senses, which at another feafon would produce very fenfible perceptions; at other times it barely obferves the train of ideas that fucceed in the understanding, without directing and pursuing any of them; and at other times it lets them pafs almoft quite unregarded, as faint fhadows that make no impreffion.

$4. Hence it is probable that thinking is the Action, not Effence of the Soul.

THIS difference of intention, and remiffion of the mind in thinking, with a great variety of degrees between earneft ftudy, and very near minding nothing at all, every one, I think, has experimented in himself. Trace it a little farther, and you find the mind in fleep retired as it were from the fenfes, and out of the reach of thofe motions made on the organs of fenfe, which at other times produce very vivid and fenfible ideas. I need not for this inftance in thofe who fleep out whole

ftormy nights, without hearing the thunder, or seeing the lightning, or feeling the shaking of the house, which are fenfible enough to those who are waking; but in this retirement of the mind from the fenfes, it often retains a yet more loofe and incoherent manner of thinking, which we call dreaming; and last of all, found fleep clofes the fcene quite, and puts an end to all appearances. This, I think, almost every one has experience of in himself, and his own obfervation without difficulty leads him thus far. That which I would farther conclude from hence, is, that fince the mind can fenfibly put on, at several times, feveral degrees of thinking, and be sometimes even in a waking man fo remifs, as to have thoughts dim and obfcure to that degree, that they are very little removed from none at all, and at laft, in the dark retirements of found fleep, lofes the fight perfectly of all ideas whatsoever; fince, I fay, this is evidently fo in matter of fact, and conftant experience, I afk whether it be not probable that thinking is the action, and not the effence of the foul? fince the operations of agents will eafily admit of intention and remiffion, but the effences of things are not conceived capable of any fuch variation. But this by the by.

CHAP. XX.

A

OF MODES OF PLEASURE AND PAIN.

§1. Pleafure and Pain fimple Ideas.

MONGST the fimple ideas, which we receive both from fenfation and reflection, pain and pleafure are two very confiderable ones: For, as in the body there is fenfation barely in itself, or accompanied with pain or pleasure, fo the thought or perception of the mind is fimply fo, or else accompanied also with pleasure or pain, delight or trouble, call it how you pleafe. Thefe, like other fimple ideas, cannot be defcribed, nor their names defined; the way of knowing them is, as of the fimple ideas of the fenfes, only by

experience; for to define them by the prefence of good or evil, is no otherwife to make them known to us, than by making us reflect on what we feel in ourselves, upon the several and various operations of good and evil upon our minds, as they are differently applied to or confidered by us.

§2. Good and Evil, what.

THINGS then are good or evil, only in reference to pleasure or pain. That we call good, which is apt to caufe or increase pleasure, or diminish pain in us; or else to procure or preferve us the poffeffion of any other good, or abfence of any evil; and on the contrary, we name that evil, which is apt to produce or increase any pain, or diminifh any pleasure in us, or else to procure us any evil, or deprive us of any good. By pleasure and pain, I must be understood to mean of body or mind, as they are commonly distinguished, though in truth they be only different conftitutions of the mind, fometimes occafioned by disorder in the body, sometimes by thoughts of the mind.

§3. Our Paffions moved by Good and Evil. PLEASURE and pain, and that which causes them, good and evil, are the hinges on which our paffions turn; and if we reflect on ourselves, and obferve how thefe, under various confiderations, operate in us, what modifications or tempers of mind, what internal fenfations (if I may fo call them) they produce in us, we may thence form to ourselves the ideas of our paffions.

§ 4. Love.

THUS any one reflecting upon the thought he has of the delight which any present or absent thing is apt to produce in him, has the idea we call love: For when a man declares in autumn, when he is eating them, or in fpring, when there are none, that he loves grapes, it is no more but that the tafte of grapes delights him let an alteration of health or conftitution destroy the delight of their taste, and then he can be faid to love grapes no longer.

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§ 5. Hatred.

On the contrary, the thought of the pain, which any thing present or abfent is apt to produce in us, is what we call hatred. Were it my business here to inquire any farther than into the bare ideas of our paffions, as they depend on different modifications of pleasure and pain, I fhould remark, that our love and hatred of inanimate infenfible beings, is commonly founded on that pleasure and pain which we receive from their use and application any way to our fenfes, though with their deftruction; but hatred or love, to beings capable of happiness or mifery, is often the uneafinefs or delight which we find in ourselves, arifing from a confideration of their very being or happiness. Thus the being and welfare of a man's children or friends, producing conftant delight in him, he is faid conftantly to love them. But it fuffices to note, that our ideas of love and hatred are but the difpofitions of the mind, in refpect of pleasure and pain in general, however caused

in us.

$6. Defire.

THE uneafiness a man finds in himself upon the absence of any thing whofe prefent enjoyment carries the idea of delight with it, is that we call defire; which is greater or lefs, as that uneafiness is more or less vehement. Where, by the by, it may perhaps be of fome ufe to remark, that the chief, if not only spur to human industry and action, is uneafinefs: For whatever good is propofed, if its abfence carries no displeasure nor pain with it, if a man be eafy and content without it, there is no defire of it, nor endeavour after it; there is no more but a bare velleity, the term ufed to fignify the lowest degree of defire, and that which is next to none at all, when there is fo little uneafinefs in the abfence of any thing, that it carries a man no farther than fome faint wishes for it, without any more effectual or vigorous ufe of the means to attain it. Defire alfo is stopped or abated by the opinion of the impotli bility or unattainablenefs of the good propofed, as far

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