as the uneafinefs is cured or allayed by that confideration. This might carry our thoughts farther, were it seasonable in this place.

§ 7. Joy.

for is a delight of the mind, from the confideration of the present or affured approaching poffeffion of a good; and we are then poffeffed of any good, when we have it fo in our power, that we can ufe it when we please. Thus a man almost starved has joy at the arrival of relief, even before he has the pleasure of ufing it: And a father, in whom the very wellbeing of his children caufes delight, is always, as long as his children are in fuch a ftate, in the poffeffion of that good; for he needs but to reflect on it, to have that pleasure.

§ 8. Sorrow.

SORROW is uneafinefs in the mind, upon the thought of a good loft which might have been enjoyed longer, or the fenfe of a prefent evil.

$9. Hope.

HOPE is that pleasure in the mind, which every one finds in himself, upon the thought of a profitable future enjoyment of a thing, which is apt to delight him. § 10. Fear.

FEAR is an uneafinefs of the mind, upon the thought of future evil likely to befal us.

§ 11. Despair.

DESPAIR is the thought of the unattainableness of any good which works differently in mens minds, fometimes producing uneafinefs or pain, fometimes reft and indolency.

§ 12. Anger.

ANGER is uneafinefs or difcompofure of the mind, upon the receipt of any injury, with a prefent purpose of revenge.

$ 13. Envy.

ENVY is an uneafinefs of mind, caufed by the confideration of a good we defire, obtained by one we think fhould not have had it before us.

§ 14. What Paffions all Men have.

THESE two laft, envy and anger, not being caused by pain and pleasure fimply in themselves, but having in them fome mixed confiderations of ourselves and others, are not therefore to be found in all men, because those other parts of valuing their merits, or intending revenge, is wanting in them; but all the rest terminated purely in pain and pleasure, are, I think, to be found in all men. For we love, defire, rejoice, and hope, only in respect of pleasure; we hate, fear, and grieve, only in respect of pain ultimately: In fine, all these paffions are moved by things, only as they appear to be the causes of pleasure and pain, or to have pleasure or pain fome way or other annexed to them. Thus we extend our hatred usually to the fubject (at least if a sensible or voluntary agent) which has produced pain in us, because the fear it leaves is a constant pain; but we do not fo constantly love what has done us good, because pleasure operates not fo ftrongly on us as pain, and because we are not fo ready to have hope it will do fo again. But this by the by.

§15. Pleafure and Pain, what.

By pleafure and pain, delight and uneafinefs, I muft all along be understood (as I have above intimated) to mean not only bodily pain and pleasure, but whatfoever delight or uneasiness is felt by us, whether arifing from any grateful or unacceptable fenfation or reflection.

$ 16.

Ir is farther to be confidered, that in reference to the paffions, the removal or leffening of a pain is confidered, and operates as a pleafure; and the lofs or diminishing of a pleasure, as a pain.

$ 17. Shame.

THE paffions, too, have most of them in most perfons operations on the body, and caufe various changes in it, which, not being always fenfible, do not make a neceffary part of the idea of each paffion; for, shame, which is an uneafinefs of the mind upon the thought of having done fomething which is indecent, or will

leffen the valued esteem which others have for us, has not always blushing accompanying it.

18. Thefe Inftances do fhow how our Ideas of the Paffions are got from Senfation and Reflection.

I WOULD not be mistaken here, as if I meant this as a difcourfe of the paffions; they are many more than thofe I have here named: And those I have taken notice of would each of them require a much larger and more accurate discourse. I have only mentioned these here as fo many inftances of modes of pleasure and pain refulting in our minds from various confiderations of good and evil. I might perhaps have instanced in other modes of pleasure and pain more fimple than these, as the pain of hunger and thirst, and the pleasure of eating and drinking to remove them; the pain of tender eyes, and the pleasure, of mufic; pain from captious uninftructive wrangling, and the pleasure of rational conversation with a friend, or of well-directed study in the search and discovery of truth. But the paffions being of much more concernment to us, I rather made choice to inftance in them, and fhow how the ideas we have of them are derived from fenfation and reflection.

CHAP. XXI.

TH

HE mind being every day informed, by the fenfes, of the alteration of those simple ideas it obferves in things without, and taking notice how one comes to an end, and ceases to be, and another begins to exist which was not before; reflecting also on what' paffes within itself, and obferving a conftant change of its ideas, fometimes by the impreffion of outward objects on the fenfes, and fometimes by the determination of its own choice; and concluding, from what it has fo constantly observed to have been, that the like changes

will for the future be made in the fame things by like agents, and by the like ways; confiders in one thing the poffibility of having any of its fimple ideas changed, and in another the poffibility of making that change; and fo comes by that idea which we call power. Thus we fay, fire has a power to melt gold, i. e. to deftroy the confiftency of its infenfible parts, and confequently its hardness, and make it fluid; and gold has a power to be melted: That the fun has a power to blanch wax, and wax a power to be blanched by the fun, whereby the yellownefs is deftroyed, and whitenefs made to exift in its room. In which, and the like cafes, the power we confider is in reference to the change of perceivable ideas; for we cannot observe any alteration to be made in, or operation upon any thing, but by the obfervable change of its fenfible ideas; nor conceive any alteration to be made, but by conceiving a change of fome of its ideas.

2. Power active and paffive.

POWER, thus confidered, is twofold, viz. as able to make, or able to receive any change: The one may be called active, and the other paffive power. Whether matter be not wholly deftitute of active power, as its author GOD is truly above all paffive power; and whether the intermediate ftate of created fpirits be not that alone which is capable of both active and paffive power, may be worth confideration. I fhall not now enter into that inquiry; my present bufinefs being, not to fearch into the original of power, but how we come by the idea of it. But fince active powers make fo great a part of our complex ideas of natural fubftances (as we shall see hereafter), and I mention them as fuch according to common apprehenfion; yet they being not perhaps fo truly active powers, as our hafty thoughts are apt to reprefent them, I judge it not amifs, by this, intimation, to direct our minds to the confideration of GOD and spirits, for the cleareft idea of active powers.

3. Power includes Relation.

I CONFESS power includes in it fome kind of relation (a re

lation to action or change), as indeed which of our ideas, of what kind foever, when attentively confidered, does not? For our ideas of extenfion, duration, and number, do they not all contain in them a fecret relation of the parts? Figure and motion have something relative in them much more vifibly; and fenfible qualities, as colours and fmells, &c. what are they but the powers of different bodies in relation to our perception? &c.; and if confidered in the things themselves, do they not depend on the bulk, figure, texture, and motion of the parts? all which include fome kind of relation in them. Our idea, therefore, of power, I think, may well have a place amongst other fimple ideas, and be confidered as one of them, being one of those that make a principal ingredient in our complex ideas of fubftances, as we shall hereafter have occafion to obferve.

§ 4. The clearest Idea of active Power had from Spirit. WE are abundantly furnished with the idea of passive power by almost all forts of fenfible things. In molt of them we cannot avoid obferving their fenfible qualities, nay, their very fubftances to be in a continual flux; and

therefore with reason we look on them as liable ftill to the fame change. Nor have we of active power (which is the more proper fignification of the word power) fewer inftances, fince whatever change is obferved, the mind must collect a power fomewhere able to make that change, as well as a poffibility in the thing itself to receive it: But yet, if we will confider it attentively, bodies, by our senses, do not afford as so clear and distinct an idea of active power as we have from reflection on the operations of our minds; for all power relating to action, and there being but two forts of action whereof we have any idea, viz. thinking and motion, let us confider whence we have the clearest ideas of the powers which produce these actions. 1. Of thinking, body affords us no idea at all; it is only from reflection that we have that. 2. Neither have we from body any idea of the beginning of motion. A body at rest affords us no idea of any active power to move; and when it is fet