in motion itself, that motion is rather a paffion than an action in it: For when the ball obeys the ftroke of a billiard-stick, it is not any action of the ball, but bare paffion; alfo when by impulfe it fets another ball in motion that lay in its way, it only communicates the motion it had received from another, and lofes in itself fo much as the other received; which gives us but a very obfcure idea of an active power of moving in body, whilft we obferve it only to transfer, but not produce any motion; for it is but a very obfcure idea of power which reaches not the production of the action, but the continuation of the paffion; for fo is motion in a body impelled by another, the continuation of the alteration made in it from reft to motion being little more an action than the continuation of the alteration of its figure by the fame blow is an action. The idea of the beginning of motion we have only from reflection on what paffes in ourselves, where we find by experience, that barely by willing it, barely by a thought of the mind, we can move the parts of our bodies which were before at reft. So that it feems to me we have from the obfervation of the operation of bodies by our fenses but a very imperfect obfcure idea of active power, fince they afford us not any idea in themfelves of the power to begin any action, either motion or thought. But if, from the impulfe bodies are obferved to make one upon another, any one thinks he has a clear idea of power, it ferves as well to my purpose, fenfution being one of those ways whereby the mind comes by its ideas only I thought it worth while to confider here by the way, whether the mind doth not receive its idea of active power clearer from reflection on its own operations than it doth from any external fenfation.

§5. Will and Underflanding two Powers.

THIS at least I think evident, that we find in ourselves a power to begin or forbear, continue or end feveral actions of our minds and motions of our bodies, barely by a thought or preference of the mind ordering, or, as it were, commanding the doing or not doing fuch or fuch a particular action. This power which the mind

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219 has thus to order the confideration of any idea, or the forbearing to confider it, or to prefer the motion of any part of the body to its reft, and vice verfa in any particular inftance, is that which we call the will; the actual exercife of that power, by directing any particular action, or its forbearance, is that which we call volition, or willing; the forbearance of that action, confequent to fuch order or command of the mind, is called voluntary; and whatfoever action is performed without fuch a thought of the mind, is called involuntary; the power of perception is that which we call the underStanding. Perception, which we make the act of the understanding, is of three forts: 1. The perception of ideas in our mind. 2. The perception of the fignification of figns. 3. The perception of the connection or repugnancy, agreement or difagreement, that there is between ary of our ideas. All these are attributed to the understanding, or perceptive power, though it be the two latter only that use allows us to fay we underftand.

$6. Faculties.

THESE powers of the mind, viz. of perceiving and of preferring, are ufually called by another name; and the ordinary way of speaking is, that the underflanding and will are two faculties of the mind; a word proper enough, if it be used as all words fhould be, so as not to breed any confufion in mens thoughts, by being fuppofed (as I fufpect it has been) to ftand for fome real beings in the foul, that performed thofe actions of understanding and volition. For when we fay the will is the commanding and fuperior faculty of the foul, that it is or is not free, that it determines the inferior faculties, that it follows the dictates of the understanding, &c. though these, and the like expreffions, by thofe that carefully attend to their own ideas, and conduct their thoughts more by the evidence of things than the found of words, may be understood in a clear and diftinct fenfe; yet I fufpect, I fay, that this way of fpeaking of faculties, has mifled many into a confused notion of fo many diftinct agents in us, which had

their feveral provinces and authorities, and did command, obey, and perform feveral actions, as fo many diftinct beings, which has been no fmall occafion of wrangling, obfcurity, and uncertainty, in questions relating to them.

§7. Whence the Ideas of Liberty and Neceffity. EVERY one, I think, finds in himfeif a power to begin or forbear, continue or put an end to several actions in himfelf. From the confideration of the extent of this power of the mind over the actions of the man, which every one finds in himself, arise the ideas of liberty and neceffity.

8. Liberty, what.

ALL the actions that we have an idea of, reducing themfelves, as has been faid, to these two, viz. thinking and motion, so far ás a man has a power to think or not to think, to move or not to move, according to the preference or direction of his own mind, fo far is a man free. Wherever any performance or forbearance are not equally in a man's power, wherever doing or not doing will not equally follow upon the preference of his mind directing it, there he is not free, though perhaps the action may be voluntary; fo that the idea of liberty is the idea of a power in any agent to do or forbear any particular action, according to the determination or thought of the mind, whereby either of them is preferred to the other; where either of them is not in the power of the agent to be produced by him according to his volition, there he is not at liberty, that agent is under neceffity; so that liberty cannot be where there is no thought, no volition, no will; but there may be thought, there may be will, there may be volition, where there is no liberty. A little confideration of an obvious inftance or two may make this clear.

$9. Suppofes the Understanding and Will. A TENNIS-BALL, whether in motion by the ftroke of a racket, or lying ftill at reft, is not by any one taken to be a free agent. If we inquire into the reason, we shall find it is because we conceive not a tennis-ball to think, and confequently not to have any volition or preference

of motion to reft, or vice versa, and therefore has not liberty, is not a free agent; but all its both motion and reft come under our idea of neceffary, and are fo called. Likewise a man falling into the water (a bridge breaking under him) has not herein liberty, is not a free agent; for though he has volition, though he prefers his not falling to falling, yet the forbearance of that motion. not being in his power, the ftop or ceffation of that motion follows not upon his volition, and therefore therein he is not free. So a man ftriking himself or his friend by a convulfive motion of his arm, which it is not in his power, by volition or the direction of his mind, to stop or forbear, nobody thinks he has in this liberty; every one pities him, as acting by neceffity and constraint.

$10. Belongs not to Volition.

AGAIN, fuppofe a man be carried, whilft faft afleep, into a room, where is a perfon he longs to fee and speak with, and be there locked faft in, beyond his power to get out; he awakes, and is glad to find himself in fo defirable company, which he stays willingly in, i. e. prefers his stay to going away; I afk, Is not this stay voluntary? I think nobody will doubt it; and yet, being locked fast in, it is evident he is not at liberty not to ftay, he has not freedom to be gone; fo that liberty is not an idea belonging to volition, or preferring, but to the perfon having the power of doing or forbearing to do, according as the mind fhall choose or direct. Our idea of liberty reaches as far as that power, and no farther; for wherever reftraint comes to check that power, or compulfion takes away that indifferency of ability on either fide to act or to forbear acting, there liberty and our notion of it presently ceafes.

§ 11. Voluntary oppofed to Involuntary, not to Necef

fary.

WE have inftances enough, and often more than enough, in our own bodies. A man's heart beats, and the blood circulates, which it is not in his power by any thought or volition to ftop; and therefore, in respect of thefe motions, where reft depends not on his choice,

nor would follow the determination of his mind, if it fhould prefer it, he is not a free agent. Convulfive motions agitate his legs, fo that though he wills it ever fo much, he cannot by any power of his mind ftop their motion (as in that odd difeafe called chorea fancti viti), but he is perpetually dancing: He is not at liberty in this action, but under as much neceffity of moving as a ftone that falls, or a tennis-ball ftruck with a racket. On the other fide, a palfy, or the ftocks, hinder his legs from obeying the determination of his mind, if it would thereby transfer his body to another place. In all these there is want of freedom; though the fitting ftill even of a paralytic, whilft he prefers it to a removal, is truly voluntary. Voluntary, then, is not opposed to neceffary, but to involuntary; for a man may prefer what he can do to what he cannot do, the state he is in to its abfence or change, though neceffity has made it in itself unalterable.

$12. Liberty, what.

As it is in the motions of the body, fo it is in the thoughts of our minds; where any one is fuch that we have power to take it up or lay it by, according to the preference of the mind, there we are at liberty. A waking man being under the neceffity of having some ideas conftantly in his mind, is not at liberty to think or not to think, no more than he is at liberty whether his body fhall touch any other or no: But whether he will remove his contemplation from one idea to another, is many times in his choice, and then he is, in respect of his ideas, as much at liberty as he is in respect of bodies he refts on; he can at pleasure remove himself from one to another: But yet fome ideas to the mind, like fome motions to the body, are fuch as in certain circumstances it cannot avoid, nor obtain their absence by the utmost effort it can use.* A man on the rack is not at liberty to lay by the idea of pain, and divert himself with other contemplations; and fometimes a boisterous paffion hurries our thoughts as a hurricane does our bodies, without leaving us the liberty of thinking on other things which we would rather choofe; but as