to the other, produce either words or filence, I am at liberty to fpeak or hold my peace; and as far as this power reaches, of acting or not acting, by the determination of his own thought preferring either, fo far is a man free; for how can we think any one freer than to have the power to do what he will? And fo far as any one can, by preferring any action to its not being, or reft to any action, produce that action or reft, fo far can he do what he will; for such a preferring of action to its abfence, is the willing of it; and we can scarce tell how to imagine any being freer than to be able to do what he wills; fo that in refpect of actions within the reach of fuch a power in him, a man feems as free as it is poflible for freedom to make him.

§ 22. In respect of willing, a Man is not free. BUT the inquifitive mind of man, willing to fhift_off from himself as far as he can all thoughts of guilt, though it be by putting himfelf into a worfe ftate than that of fatal neceffity, is not content with this; freedom, unless it reaches farther than this, will not serve the turn; and it paffes for a good plea, that a man is not free at all, if he be not as free to will as he is to act what he wills. Concerning a man's liberty, there yet therefore is raised this farther queftion, Whether a man be free to will? which I think is what is meant when it is difputed whether the will be free. And as to that I imagine,

·$23.

2. THAT willing, or volition, being an action, and freedom confifting in a power of acting or not acting, a man, in respect of willing, or the act of volition, when any action in his power is once proposed to his thoughts as prefently to be done, cannot be free; the reafon whereof is very manifeft; for it being unavoidable that the action depending on his will fhould exift or not exist, and its existence or not existence following perfectly the determination and preference of his will, he cannot avoid willing the existence or not existence of that action; it is abfolutely neceflary that he will the one or the other, i. e. prefer the one to the other, fince one of

them muft neceffarily follow; and that which does follow, follows by the choice and determination of his mind, that is, by his willing it; for if he did not will it, it would not be. So that in refpect of the act of willing, a man in fuch a cafe is not free; liberty confifting in a power to act or not to act, which, in regard of volition, a man, upon fuch a propofal, has not; for it is unavoidably neceffary to prefer the doing or forbearance of an action in a man's power, which is once fo propofed to his thoughts; a man muft neceffarily will the one or the other of them, upon which preference or volition, the action or its forbearance certainly follows, and is truly voluntary. But the act of volition, or preferring one of the two, being that which he cannot avoid, a man in refpect of that act of willing, is under a neceffity, and fo cannot be free, unless neceffity and freedom can confift together, and a man can be free and bound at once.

§ 24.

THIS, then, is evident, that in all proposals of present action, a man is not at liberty to will or not to will, because he can forbear willing; liberty confifting in a power to act or to forbear acting, and in that only; for a man hat fits ftill, is faid yet to be at liberty, because he can walk if he wills it. But if a man fitting ftill has not a power to remove himself, he is not at liberty; fo likewife a man falling down a precipice, though in motion, is not at liberty, because he cannot ftop that motion if he would. This being so, it is plain that a man that is walking, to whom it is propofed to give off walking, is not at liberty whether he will determine himself to walk, or give off walking or no; he must neceffarily prefer one or the other of them, walking or not walking; and fo it is in regard of all other actions in our power fo propofed, which are the far greater number: For confidering the vast number of voluntary actions that fucceed one another every moment that we are awake in the course of our lives, there are but few of them that are thought on or propofed to the will, till the time they are to be done;

and in all fuch actions, as I have fhown, the mind, in refpect of willing, has not a power to act or not to act, wherein confifts liberty. The mind in that cafe has not a mind to forbear willing; it cannot avoid fome determination concerning them; let the confideration be as fhort, the thought as quick as it will, it ei ther leaves the man in the ftate he was before thinking, or changes it, continues the action, or puts an end to it; whereby it is manifeft, that it orders and directs one, in preference to or with neglect of the other, and thereby either the continuation or change becomes unavoidably voluntary.

§ 25. The Will determined by fomething without it. SINCE, then, it is plain, that in most cases a man is not at liberty, whether he will or no; the next thing demanded is, Whether a man be at liberty to will which of the two he pleafes, motion or reft? This question carries the abfurdity of it fo manifeftly in itself, that one might thereby fufficiently be convinced that liberty concerns not the will: For to afk, whether a man be at liberty to will either motion or reft, fpeaking or filence, which he pleafes, is to afk, Whether a man can will what he wills, or be pleafed with what he is pleased with a queftion which, I think, needs no answer; and they who can make a queftion of it, must fuppofe one will to determine the acts of another, and another to determine that; and fo on in infinitum.

$26.

To avoid thefe and the like abfurdities, nothing can be of greater ufe, than to establish in our minds determined ideas of the things under confideration. If the ideas of liberty and volition were well fixed in our underftandings, and carried along with us in our minds, as they ought, through all the queftions that are raised about them, I fuppofe a great part of the difficulties that perplex mens thoughts, and entangle their underftandings, would be much easier refolved; and we fhould perceive where the confufed fignification of terms, or where the nature of the thing caufed the obfcurity.

$27. Freedom.

FIRST, then, It is carefully to be remembered, that freedom confifts in the dependence of the exifience or not exiftence of any action upon our volition of it; and not in the dependence of any action, or its contrary, on our preference. A man ftanding on a cliff, is at liberty to leap twenty yards downwards into the fea, not because he has a power to do the contrary action, which is to leap twen ty yards upwards, for that he cannot do; but he is therefore free, because he has a power to leap or not to leap; but if a greater force than his either holds him faft or tumbles him down, he is no longer free in that cafe, because the doing or forbearance of that particular action is no longer in his power. He that is a close prisoner in a room twenty feet fquare, being at the north fide of his chamber, is at liberty to walk twenty feet fouthward, because he can walk or not walk it; but is not, at the fame time, at liberty to do the contrary, i. e. to walk twenty feet northward.

In this, then, confifts freedom, viz. in our being able to act or not to act, according as we shall choose or will.

$28. Volition, what.

SECONDLY, We must remember, that volition or willing, is an act of the mind directing its thought to the production of any action, and thereby exerting its power to produce it. To avoid multiplying of words, I would crave leave here, under the word action, to comprehend the forbearance too of any action propofed. Sitting ftill, or holding one's peace, when walking or speaking are proposed, though mere forbearances, requiring as much the determination of the will, and being often as weighty in their confequences as the contrary actions, may, on that confideration, well enough pafs for actions too. But this I fay, that I may not be mistaken, if for brevity fake I fpeak thus.

$29. What determines the Will. THIRDLY, The will being nothing but a power in the mind to direct the operative faculties of a man to motion or reft, as far as they depend on such direction ;

to the queftion, What is it determines the will? the true and proper anfwer is, the mind: For that which determines the general power of directing to this or that particular direction, is nothing but the agent itself exercifing the power it has that particular way. If this anfwer fatisfies not, it is plain the meaning of the queftion, What determines the will? is this, What moves the mind, in every particular inftance, to determine its general power of directing to this or that particular motion or reft? And to this I answer, The motive for continuing in the fame ftate or action, is only the prefent fatisfaction in it; the motive to change, is always fome uneasiness; nothing fetting us upon the change of ftate, or upon any new action, but fome uncafinefs. This is the great motive that works on the mind to put it upon action, which for fhortness fake we will call determining of the will; which I fhall more at large explain.

$30. Will and Defire must not be confounded. BUT in the way to it, it will be neceffary to premise, that though I have above endeavoured to exprefs the act of volition by choosing, preferring, and the like terms, that fignify defire as well as volition, for want of other words to mark that act of the mind, whofe proper name is willing or volition; yet it being a very simple act, whofoever defires to understand what it is, will better find it by reflecting on his own mind, and obferving what it does when it wills, than by any variety of articulate founds whatsoever. This caution of being careful not to be, mifled by expreffions that do not enough keep up the difference between the will and feveral acts of the mind that are quite diftinct from it, I think the more neceffary, because I find the will often confounded with feveral of the affections, especially defire, and one put for the other, and that by men who would not willingly be thought not to have had very diftinct notions of things, and not to have writ very clearly about them. This, I imagine, has been no fmall occafion of obfcurity and mistake in this matter; and therefore is, as much as may be, to be