avoided For he that fhall turn his thoughts inwards upon what paffes in his mind when he wills, shall fee that the will, or power of volition, is converfant about nothing, but that particular determination of the mind, whereby barely by a thought the mind endeavours to give rife, continuation, or ftop to any action which it takes to be in its power. This well confidered, plainly fhows that the will is perfectly diftinguished from defire, which in the very fame action may have a quite contrary tendency from that which our will fets us upon. A man whom I cannot deny, may oblige me to ufe perfuafions to another, which, at the fame time I am fpeaking, I may wish may not prevail on him: In this cafe, it is plain the will and defire run counter. I will the action that tends one way, whilft my defire tends another, and that the direct contrary. who, by a violent fit of the gout in his limbs, finds a doziness in his head, or a want of appetite in his ftomach removed, defires to be eafed too of the pain of his feet or hands (for wherever there is pain, there is a defire to be rid of it), though yet, whilft he apprehends that the removal of the pain may tranflate the noxious humour to a more vital part, his will is never determined to any one action that may ferve to remove this pain; whence it is evident, that defiring and willing are two diflinct acts of the mind; and confequently that the will, which is but the power of volition, is much more diftinct from defire.

$31. Uneafinefs determines the Will.

A man

To return then to the inquiry, What is it that determines the will in regard to our actions? And that, upon fecond thoughts, I am apt to imagine is not, as is generally fuppofed, the greater good in view, but fome (and for the moft part the most preffing) uneasiness a man is at prefent under. This is that which fucceffively determines the will, and fets us upon thofe actions we perform. This uneasiness we may call, as it is, defire, which is an uneasiness of the mind for want of fome abfent good. All pain of the body, of what fort foever, and difquiet of the mind, is uneasiness; and

with this is always joined defire, equal to the pain or uneafinefs felt, and is scarce diftinguishable from it: For defire being nothing but an uneafinefs in the want of an abfent good, in reference to any pain felt, ease is that abfent good; and till that ease be attained, we may call it defire, nobody feeling pain that he wishes not to be eafed of, with a defire equal to that pain, and infeparable from it. Befides this defire of eafe from pain, there is another of absent positive good; and here also the defire and uneafinefs is equal... As much as we defire any abfent good, fo much are we in pain for it. But here all abfent good does not, according to the greatness it has, or is acknowledged to have, cause pain equal to that greatnefs; as all pain caufes defire equal to itfelf; because the abfence of good is not always a pain, as the prefence of pain is; and therefore, abfent good may be locked on and confidered without defire. But fo much as there is any where of defire, fo much there is of uneasiness.

$32. Defire is Uneafinefs.

THAT defire is a ftate of uneafinefs, every one who reflects on himfelf will quickly find. Who is there that has not felt in defire what the wife man fays of hope, (which is not much different from it) that it being deferred makes the heart fick ? and that ftill proportionable to the greatnefs of the defire, which fometimes raifes the uneafness to that pitch, that it makes people cry cut, Give me children, give me the thing defired, or I die? Life itself, and all its enjoyments, is a burden cannot be borne under the lafting and unremoved preffure of such an uneasiness.

$33. The Uncafinefs of Defire determines the Will. GooD and evil, pretent and abfent, it is true, work upon the mind; but that which immediately determines the will, from time to time, to every voluntary action, is the unealinefs of defire, fixed on fome abfent good; either negative, as indolence to one in pain, or pofitive, as enjoyment of pleasure. That it is this uneafnefs that determines the will to the fucceffive voluntary actions, whereof the greateft part of our lives is made

up, and by which we are conducted through different courfes to different ends, I fhall endeavour to show, both from experience and the reafon of the thing.

$34. This is the Spring of Action.

WHEN a man is perfectly content with the ftate he is. in, which is when he is perfectly without any uneafinefs, what induftry, what action, what will is there left, but to continue in it? Of this every man's obfervation will fatisfy him. And thus we see our all-wife Maker, fuitable to our conftitution and frame, and knowing what it is that determines the will, has put into man the uneasiness of hunger and thirst, and other natural defires, that return at their feasons, to move and determine their wills, for the prefervation of themselves, and the continuation of their species: For I think we may conclude, that if the bare contemplation of these good ends, to which we are carried by - these feveral uneafineffes, had been fufficient to determine the will, and fet us on work, we fhould have had none of these natural pains, and perhaps in this world little or no pain at all. It is better to marry than to burn, fays St. Paul; where we may fee what it is that chiefly drives men into the enjoyments of a conjugal life. A little burning felt, puhes us more powerfully, than greater pleafures in profpect draw or allure.

$35. The greatest pofitive Good determines not the Will, but Uneafinefs.

IT seems so established and fertled a maxim by the general confent of all mankind, that good, the greater good, determines the will, that I do not at all wonder, that when I first published my thoughts on this fubject, I took it for granted; and I imagine, that by a great many I fhall be thought more excufable, for having then done fo, than that now I have ventured to recede from fo received an opinion. But yet upon a stricter inquiry, I am forced to conclude, that good, the greater good, though apprehended and acknowledged to be fo, does not determine the will, until our defire, raised proportionably to it, makes us uneafy in the want of it. Convince a man ever fo much, that plenty has its ad

vantages over poverty; make him fee and own, that the handsome conveniencies of life are better than nasty penury; yet as long as he is content with the latter, and finds no uneafinefs in it, he moves not; his will never is determined to any action that shall bring him out of it. Let a man be ever so well perfuaded of the advantages of virtue, that it is as neceffary to a man who has any great aims in this world, or hopes in the next, as food to life; yet till he hungers and thirfts after righteoufnefs, till he feels an uneasiness in the want of it, his will will not to be determined to any action in pursuit of this confeffed greater good; but any other uneafineffes he feels in himself, fhall take place, and carry his will to other actions. On the other fide, let a drunkard fee that his health decays, his eftate waftes, difcredit and diseases, and the want of all things, even of his beloved drink, attends him in the courfe he follows; yet the returns of uneafinefs to mifs his companions, the habitual thirst after his cups, at the ufual time, drives him to the tavern, though he has in his view the lofs of health and plenty, and perhaps of the joys of another life; the least of which is no inconfiderable good, but fuch as he confeffes is far greater than the tickling of his palate with a glafs of wine, or the idle chat of a foaking club. It is not for want of viewing the greater good; for he fees and acknowledges it, and in the intervals of his drinking hours, will take refolutions to purfue the greater good; but when the uneafinefs to mifs his accustomed delight returns, the greater acknowledged good lofes its hold, and the present uneafnefs determines the will to the accustomed action; which thereby gets ftronger footing to prevail against the next occafion, though he at the fame time makes fecret promifes to himself, that he will do fo no more; this is the last time he will act against the attainment of those greater goods. And thus he is from time to time in the state of that unhappy complainer, Video meliora proboque, deteriora fequor: Which fentence, allowed for true, and made good by conftant experi

ence, may this, and poffibly no other way, be easily made intelligible.

§ 36. Because the Removal of Uneafness is the first Step to Happiness.

If we inquire into the reason of what experience makes fo evident in fact, and examine why it is uneasiness alone operates on the will, and determines it in its choice; we shall find, that we being capable but of one determination of the will to one action at once, the prefent uneasiness that we are under does naturally determine the will, in order to that happiness which we all aim at in all our actions; forafmuch as whilft we are under any uneasiness, we cannot apprehend ourfelves happy, or in the way to it; pain and uneasiness being by every one concluded and felt to be inconfiftent with happiness, spoiling the relish even of those good things which we have; a little pain ferving to mar all the pleasure we rejoiced in: And therefore, that which of course determines the choice of our will to the next action, will always be the removing of pain as long as we have any left, as the first and neceffary step towards happiness.

$37. Becaufe Uneafinefs alone is prefent. ANOTHER reason why it is uneafinefs alone determines the will, may be this; because that alone is present, and it is against the nature of things, that what is absent should operate where it is not. It may be faid, that abfent good may, by contemplation, be brought home to the mind, and made prefent. The idea of it indeed may be in the mind, and viewed as prefent there; but nothing will be in the mind as a present good, able to counterbalance the removal of any uneafinefs which we are under, till it raises our defire; and the uneasiness of that has the prevalency in determining the will. Till then the idea in the mind of whatever good, is there only like other ideas, the object of bare unactive fpeculation, but operates not on the will, nor fets us on work; the reafon whereof I shall show by and by. How many are to be found, that have had lively representations set before their minds of the unspeak