Book II. able joys of heaven, which they acknowledge both poffible and probable too, who yet would be content to take up with their happiness here? And fo the prevailing uneasiness of their defires, let loose after the enjoyments of this life, take their turns in the determining their wills; and all that while they take not one step, are not one jot moved towards the good things of another life, confidered as ever fo great.

$38. Because all who allow the Joys of Heaven poffible, purfue them not.

WERE the will determined by the views of good, as it appears in contemplation greater or lefs to the underftanding, which is the ftate of all abfent good, and that which in the received opinion the will is fuppofed to move to, and to be moved by, I do not fee how it could ever get loofe from the infinite eternal joys of heaven, once propofed and confidered as poffible: For all abfent good, by which alone, barely propofed and coming in view, the will is thought to be determined, and fo to fet us on action, being only poffible, but not infallibly certain, it is unavoidable that the infinitely greater poffible good fhould regularly and conflantly determine the will in all the fucceffive actions it directs; and then we fhould keep conftantly and steadily in our courfe towards heaven, without ever standing ftill, or directing our actions to any other end; the eternal condition of a future ftate infinitely outweighing the expectation of riches, or honour, or any worldly pleasure which we can propofe to ourselves, though we fhould grant thefe the more probable to be attained; for nothing future is yet in poffeffion, and fo the expectation even of these may deceive us. If it were fo, that the greater good in view determines the will, fo great a good once propofed could not but seize the will, and hold it faft to the pursuit of this infinitely greatest good, without ever letting it go again; for the will having a power over, and directing the thoughts as well as other actions, would, if it were fo, hold the contemplation of the mind fixed to that good.

other

But any great Uneafinefs is never neglected. THIS would be the ftate of the mind, and regular tendency of the will in all its determinations, were it determined by that which is confidered and in view the greater good; but that it is not fo, is visible in experience, the infinitely greatest confeffed good being often neglected, to fatisfy the fucceffive uneasiness of our defires pursuing trifles. But though the greatest allowed, even everlasting unfpeakable good, which has fometimes moved and affected the mind, does not stedfaftly hold the will, yet we fee any very great and prevailing uneasiness, having once laid hold on the will, lets it not go; by which we may be convinced what it is that determines the will. Thus any vehement pain of the body, the ungovernable paffion of a man violently in love, or the impatient defire of revenge, keeps the will steady and intent; and the will thus determined never lets the understanding lay by the object, but all the thoughts of the mind, and powers of the body, are uninterruptedly employed that way, by the determinations of the will, influenced by that topping uneafinefs as long as it lafts; whereby it feems to me evident, that the will or power of fetting us upon one action in preference to all other, is determined in us by uneasiness. And whether this be not fo, I defire every one to obferve in himself.

$39. Defire accompanies all Uneafines.

I HAVE hitherto chiefly inítanced in the uneafinefs of defire, as that which determines the will, because that is the chief and most fenfible, and the will feldom orders any action, nor is there any voluntary action performed, without fome defire accompanying it, which I think is the reason why the will and defire are so often confounded. But yet we are not to look upon the uneasiness which makes up, or at least accompanies moft of the other paffions, as wholly excluded in the cafe. Averfion, fear, anger, envy, flame, &c. have each their u eafinefs too, and thereby influence the will. These paffions are fcarce any of them in life and practice fimple and alone, and wholly unmixed with others, though

ufually in difcourfe and contemplation, that carries the name which operates ftrongeft, and appears most in the present state of the mind: nay, there is, I think, scarce any of the paflions to be found without defire joined with it. I am fure, wherever there is uneasiness, there is defire; for we conftantly defire happiness; and whatever we feel of uneasiness, so much it is certain we want of happiness, even in our own opinion, let our ftate and condition otherwife be what it will. Befides, the prefent moment not being our eternity, whatever our enjoyment be, we look beyond the prefent, and defire goes with our forefight, and that ftill carries the will with it; fo that even in joy itself, that which keeps up the action, whereon the enjoyment depends, is the defire to continue it, and fear to lose it; and whenever a greater uneasiness than that takes place in the mind, the will presently is by that determined to fome new action, and the prefent delight neglected.

§ 40. The most preffing Uneafinefs naturally determines

the Will.

Bur we being in this world befet with fundry uneafineffes, diftracted with different defires, the next inquiry naturally will be, which of them has the precedency in determining the will to the next action? And to that the anfwer is, That ordinarily which is the moft preffing of thofe that are judged capable of being then removed : For the will, being the power of directing our operate faculties to fome action, for fome end, cannot at any time be moved towards what is judged at that time unattainable; that would be to fuppofe an intelligent being defignedly to act for an end, only to lofe its labour, for fo it is to act for what is judged not attainable; and therefore very great uneafineffes move not the will, when they are judged not capable of a cure; they, in that cafe, put us not upon endeavours. But thefe fet apart, the most important and urgent uneafinefs we at that time feel, is that which ordinarily determines the will fucceffively, in that train of voluntary actions which makes up our lives. The greatest prefent uneafinefs is the fpur to action, that is constantly felt, and for most part de

termines the will in its choice of the next action: For this we must carry along with us, that the proper and only object of the will is fome action of ours, and nothing else; for we producing nothing by our willing it, but fome action in our power, it is there the will terminates, and reaches no farther.

$ 41. All defire Happiness.

If it be farther asked what it is moves defire? I answer, Happiness, and that alone. Happiness and mifery are the names of two extremes, the utmost bounds whereof we know not; it is what eye hath not seen, ear hath not heard, nor hath it entered into the heart of man to conceive. But of fome degrees of both we have very lively impreflions, made by several inftances of delight and joy on the one fide, and torment and forrow on the other; which, for fhortnefs fake, I shall comprehend under the names of pleasure and pain, there being pleasure and pain of the mind as well as the body; With him is fullness of joy, and pleasure for evermore. Or, to speak truly, they are all of the mind, though fome have their rife in the mind from thought, others in the body from certain modifications of motion.

$42. Happiness, what.

HAPPINESS, then, in its full extent, is the utmost pleafure we are capable of, and mifery the utmost pain; and the lowest degree of what can be called happiness, is so much ease from all pain, and fo much prefent pleasure, as without which any one cannot be content. Now, because pleasure and pain are produced in us by the operation of certain objects, either on our minds or our bodies, and in different degrees; therefore what has an aptnefs to produce pleasure in us, is that we call good; and what is apt to produce pain in us we call evil, for no other reafon, but for its aptnefs to produce pleasure and pain in us, wherein confits our happiness and mifery. Farther, though what is apt to produce any degree of pleasure, be in itself good; and what is apt to produce any degree of pain, be evil; yet it often happens, that we do not call it fo, when it comes in competition with a greater of its fort, because when

they come in competition, the degrees also of pleasure and pain have juftly a preference; fo that if we will rightly eftimate what we call good and evil, we shall find it lies much in comparifon; for the cause of every lefs degree of pain, as well as every greater degree of pleafure, has the nature of good, and vice versa.

§ 43. What Good is defired, what not. THOUGH this be that which is called good and evil, and all good be the proper object of defire in general, yet all good, even feen, and confeffed to be fo, does not neceffarily move every particular man's defire, but only that part, or fo much of it as is confidered and taken to make a neceffary part of his happiness. All other good, however great in reality or appearance, excites not a man's defires, who looks not on it to make a part of that happinefs, wherewith he, in his prefent thoughts, can satisfy himself. Happiness, under this view, every one conftantly pursues, and defires what makes any part of it; other things, acknowledged to be good, he can look upon without defire, pafs by, and be content without. There is nobody, I think, so senseless as to deny, that there is pleasure in knowledge; and for the pleasures of fenfe, they have too many followers to let it be queftioned, whether men are taken with them or no. Now, let one man place his fatisfaction in fenfual pleasures, another in the delight of knowledge; though each of them cannot but confefs there is great pleasure in what the other pursues, yet neither of them making the other's delight a part of his happiness, their defires are not moved, but each is fatisfied without what the other enjoys, and fo his will is not determined to the pursuit of it But yet as foon as the ftudious man's hunger and thirst makes him uneafy, he whofe will was never determined to any purfuit of good cheer, poignant fauces, delicious wine, by the pleasant taste he has found in them, is, by the uneafinefs of hunger and thirst, prefently determined to eating and drinking, though possibly with great indifferency, what wholefome food comes in his way. And, on the other fide, the epicure buckles to study, when fhame, or the defire to recommend him