243 felf to his mistress, fhall make him uneafy in the want of any fort of knowledge. Thus, how much foever men are in earnest, and conftant in pursuit of happiness, yet they may have a clear view of good, great and confeffed good, without being concerned for it, or moved by it, if they think they can make up their happiness without it; though as to pain, that they are always concerned for; they can feel no uneasiness without being moved; and therefore, being uneafy in the want of whatever is judged neceffary to their happiness, as soon as any good appears to make a part of their proportion of happinefs, they begin to defire it.

§ 44. Why the greatest Good is not always defired. THIS, I think, any one may obferve in himself and others, that the greater vifible good does not always raise mens defires, in proportion to the greatness it appears, and is acknowledged to have, though every little trouble moves us, and fets us on work to get rid of it; the reafon whereof is evident from the nature of our happinefs and mifery itself. All prefent pain, whatever it be, makes a part of our present misery; but all abfent good does not at any time make a neceffary part of our prefent happiness, nor the absence of it make a part of our mifery. If it did, we fhould be constantly and infinitely miferable; there being infinite degrees of happiness, which are not in our poffeffion. All uneasiness, therefore, being removed, a moderate portion of good serves at present to content men; and fome few degrees of pleasure, in a fucceffion of ordinary enjoyments, make up a happiness wherein they can be fatisfied. If this were not fo, there could be no room for those indifferent and visibly trifling actions, to which our wilis are fo often determined, and wherein we voluntarily waste so much of our lives; which remiffaefs could by no means confift with a conftant determination of will or defire to the greatest apparent good. That this is fo, I think few people need go far from home to be convinc d; and indeed in this life there are not many whofe happiness reaches fo far as to afford them a conftant train of moderate mean pleasures, without any mixture of uneaf

nefs, and yet they could be content to stay here for ever, though they cannot deny, but that it is poffible there may be a state of eternal durable joys after this life, far surpaffing all the good that is to be found here. Nay, they cannot but fee, that it is more poffible than the attainment and continuation of that pittance of honour, riches, or pleasure, which they purfue, and for which they neglect that eternal flate; but yet, in full view of this difference, fatisfied of the poffibility of a perfect, secure, and lasting happiness in a future ftate, and under a clear conviction, that it is not to be had here, whilst they bound their happiness within fome little enjoyment, or aim of this life, and exclude the joys of heaven from making any neceffary part of it; their defires are not moved by this greater apparent good, nor their wills determined to any action, or endeavour for its attainment.

§ 45. Why not being defred, it moves not the Will. THE ordinary neceffities of our lives fill a great part of them with the uneafinefs of hunger, thirst, heat, cold, wearinefs with labour, and fleepiness, in their conftant returns, &c. To which, if befides accidental harms, we add the fantastical uneafinefs (as itch after honour, power, or riches, &c.), which acquired habits by fashion, example, and education, have fettled in us, and a thousand other irregular defires which cuftom has made natural to us, we shall find, that a very little part of our life is fo vacant from these uneafingfes, as to leave us free to the attraction of remoter abfent good. We are feldom at eafe, and free enough from the folicitation of our natural or adopted defires, but a conftant fucceffion of uneafineffes out of that ftock, which natural wants or acquired habits have heaped up, take the will in their turns; and no fooner is one action dispatched, which by fuch a determination of the will we are fet upon, but another uneafinefs is ready to fet us on work: For the removing of the pains we feel, and are at prefent preffed with, being the getting out of mifery, and confequently the first thing to be done in order to happinefs, abfent good, though thought on, confeffed, and

appearing to be good, not making any part of this unhappiness in its abfence, is juftled out to make way for the removal of those uneaknesses we feel, till due and repeated contemplation has brought it nearer to our mind, given fome relish of it, and raised in us fome defire, which then beginning to make a part of our prefent uneafinefs, ftands upon fair terms with the rest, to be fatiffied; and fo, according to its greatness and preffure, comes in its turn to determine the will.

§ 46. Due Confideration raises Defire. AND thus, by a due confideration, and examining any good propofed, it is in our power to raise our defires in a due proportion to the value of that good, whereby, in its turn and place, it may come to work upon the will, and be pursued: For good, though appearing, and allowed ever fo great, yet till it has raised defires in our minds, and thereby made us uneafy in its want, it reaches not our wills; we are not within the sphere of its activity, our wills being under the determination only of those uneafinesses which are prefent to us, which (whilft we have any) are always foliciting, and ready at hand to give the will its next determination; the balancing, when there is any in the mind, being only which defire fhall be next fatisfied, which uneafinefs first removed; whereby it comes to pafs, that as long as any uneasiness, any defire, remains in our mind, there is no room for good, barely as fuch, to come at the will, or at all to determine it, because, as has been said, the first step in our endeavours after happiness being to get wholly out of the confines of mifery, and to feel no part of it, the will can be at leisure for nothing else, till every uneasiness we feel be perfectly removed, which, in the multitude of wants and defires we are beset with in this imperfect state, we are not like to be ever freed from in this world.

847. The Power to fufpend the Profecution of any Defire, makes way for Confideration.

THERE being in us a great many uneafineffes always foliciting, and ready to determine the will, it is natural, as I have faid, that the greatest and most preffing fhould

determine the will to the next action; and so it does for the most part, but not always: For the mind having in moft cafes, as is evident in experience, a power to fufpend the execution and satisfaction of any of its defires, and fo all, one after another, is at liberty to confider the objects of them, examine them on all fides, and weigh them with others. In this lies the liberty man has; and from the not ufing of it right comes all that variety of mistakes, errors, and faults, which we run into in the conduct of our lives, and our endeavours after happiness, whilft we precipitate the determination of our wills, and engage too foon before due examination. To prevent this, we have a power to fufpend the profecution of this or that defire, as every one daily may experiment in himself. This seems to me the fource of all liberty; in this seems to confift that which is (as I think improperly) called free-will: For during this fufpenfion of any defire, before the will be determined to action, and the action (which follows that determination) done, we have opportunity to examine, view, and judge of the good or evil of what we are going to do; and when upon due examination, we have judged we have done bur duty, all that we can or ought to do in pursuit of our happiness; and it is not a fault, but a perfection of our nature, to defire, will, and act, according to the laft refult of a fair examination.

48. To be determined by our own Judgment, is no Refraint to Liberty.

THIS is fo far from being a reftraint or diminution of freedom, that it is the very improvement and benefit of it; it is not an abridgment, it is the end and use of our liberty; and the farther we are removed from such a determination, the nearer we are to misery and flavery. A perfect indifferency in the mind, not determinable by its last judgment of the good or evil that is thought to attend its choice, would be fo far from being an advantage, and excellency of an intellectual nature, that it would be as great an imperfection, as the want of indifferency to act, or not to act, till determined by the will, would be an imperfection on the other fide.

A

man is at liberty to lift up his hand to his head, or let it reft quiet; he is perfectly indifferent in either, and it would be an imperfection in him, if he wanted that power, if he were deprived of that indifferency. But it would be as great an imperfection if he had the fame indifferency, whether he would prefer the lifting up his hand, or its remaining in reft, when it would fave his head or eyes from a blow he fees coming; it is as much a perfection, that defire, or the power of preferring, fhould be determined by good, as that the power of acting fhould be determined by the will; and the certainer fuch determination is, the greater is the perfection. Nay, were we determined by any thing but the last refult of our own minds, judging of the good or evil of any action, we were not free; the very end of our freedom being, that we may attain the good we choose, and therefore every man is put under a neceffity by his conftitution, as an intelligent being, to be determined in willing by his own thought and judgment. what is best for him to do, elfe he would be under the determination of fome other than himself, which is want of liberty. And to deny that a man's will, in every determination, follows his own judgment, is to fay, that a man wills and acts for an end that he would not have, at the time that he wills and acts for it: For if he fers it in his prefent thoughts before any other, it is plain he then thinks better of it, and would have it before any other, unless he can have and not have it, will and not will it at the fame time; a contradiction too manifeft to be admitted!

§ 49. The freeft Agents are fo determined.

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If we look upon those fuperior beings above us, who enjoy perfect happiness, we fhall have reafon to judge that they are more fteadily determined in their choice of good than we, and yet we have no reason to think they are lefs happy or lefs free than we are. And if it were fit for fuch poor finite creatures as we are, to pronounce what Infinite Wifdom and Goodnefs could do, I think we might fay, that God himself cannot choofe what is not