good; the freedom of the Almighty hinders not his being determined by what is beft.

$50. A conftant Determination to a purfuit of Happinefs, no Abridgment of Liberty.

BUT to give a right view of this mistaken part of liberty, let me afk, would any one be a changeling, because he is lefs determined by wife confiderations than a wife man? Is it worth the name of freedom, to be at liberty to play the fool, and draw fhame and misery upon a man's felf? If to break loofe from the conduct of reafon, and to want that reftraint of examination and judgment, which keeps us from choofing or doing the worse, be liberty, true liberty, madmen and fools are the only free men; but yet, I think, nobody would choose to be mad for the fake of fuch liberty, but he that is mad already. The constant defire of happiness, and the conftraint it puts upon us to act for it, nobody, I think, accounts an abridgment of liberty, or at least an abridgment of liberty to be complained of. God Almighty himself is under the neceflity of being happy; and the more any intelligent being is fo, the nearer is its approach to infinite perfection and happiness. That in this ftate of ignorance we short-fighted creatures might not mistake true felicity, we are endowed with a power to fufpend any particular defire, and keep it from determining the will, and engaging us in action. This is Standing Still, where we are not fufficiently affured of the way; examination is confulting a guide; the determi nation of the will, upon inquiry, is following the di rection of that guide; and he that has a power to act or not to act, according as fuch determination directs, is a free agent; fuch determination abridges not that power wherein liberty confifts. He that has his chains knocked off, and the prison-doors fet open to him, is perfectly at liberty, because he may either go or stay, as he best likes, though his preference be determined to ftay, by the darkness of the night, or illness of the weather, or want of other lodging: He ceafes not to be free, though the defire of fome convenience to be had there ablo

lutely determines his preference, and makes him stay in his prifon.

$51. The Neceffity of pursuing Happiness, the Foundation of Liberty.

As, therefore, the higheft perfection of intellectual nature lies in a careful and conftant pursuit of true and folid happiness, so the care of ourselves, that we miftake not imaginary for real happiness, is the neceffary foundation of our liberty. The ftronger ties we have to an unalterable pursuit of happiness in general, which is our greatest good, and which, as fuch, our defires ale. ways follow, the more are we free from any neceffary determination of our will to any particular action, and from a neceflary compliance with our defire, fet upon any particular, and then appearing preferable good, till we have duly examined, whether it has a tendency to, or be inconfiftent with our real happiness; and therefore, till we are as much informed upon this inquiry, as the weight of the matter, and the nature of the cafe demands, we are, by the neceffity of preferring and pursuing true happinefs as our greatest good, obliged to fufpend the fatisfaction of our defire in parti

cular cafes..

$52. The Reafon of it.

THIS is the hinge on which turns the liberty of intellectual beings, in their conftant endeavours after, and steady profecution of true felicity, that they can fufpend this prosecution in particular cafes, till they have looked before them, and informed themfelves whether that particular thing, which is then propofed or defized, lie in the way to their main end, and make a real part of that which is their greatest good; for the inclination and tendency of their nature to happiness, is an obligation and motive to them, to take care not to mistake or mifs it; and fo neceffarily puts them upon caution, deliberation, and wariness, in the direction of their particular actions, which are the means to obtain it. Whatever neceffity: determines to the pursuit of real blifs, the fame neceffity with the fame force establishes fufpenfe, deliberation, and scrutiny of each fucceffive defire, whether the fa

tisfaction of it does not interfere with our true happiness, and miflead us from it. This, as feems to me, is the great privilege of finite intellectual beings; and I defire it may be well confidered, whether the great inlet and exercise of all the liberty men have, are capable of, or can be ufeful to them, and that whereon depends the turn of their actions, does not lie in this, that they can fufpend their defires, and stop them from determining their wills to any action, till they have duly and fairly examined the good and evil of it, as far forth as the weight of the thing requires. This we are able to do; and when we have done it, we have done our duty, and all that is in our power, and indeed all that needs: For fince the will fuppofes knowledge to guide its choice, all that we can do, is to hold our wills undetermined, till we have examined the good and evil of what we defire. What follows after that, follows in a chain of confequences linked one to another, all depending on the last determination of the judgment, which, whether it shall be upon a hafty and precipitate view, or upon a due and mature examination, is in our power; experience fhowing us, that in most cafes we are able to suspend the prefent fatisfaction of any defire.

$53. Government of our Paffions, the right Improvement of Liberty.

BUT if any extreme difturbance (as fometimes it happens) poffeffes our whole mind, as when the pain of the rack, an impetuous uneafinefs, as of love, anger, or any other violent paffion running away with us, allows us not the liberty of thought, and we are not masters enough of our own minds to confider thoroughly and examine fairly, God, who knows our frailty, pities our weakness, and requires of us no more than we are able to do, and fees what was and what was not in our power, will judge as a kind and merciful Father. But the forbearance of a too hafty compliance with our defires, the moderation and restraint of our paffions, fo that our understandings may be free to examine, and reafon unbiaffed give its judgment, being that whereon a right direction of our conduct to true happiness de

pends, it is in this we should employ our chief care and endeavours: In this we should take pains to fuit the relish of our minds to the true intrinfic good or ill that is in things, and not permit an allowed or fuppofed poffible great and weighty good to flip out of our thoughts, without leaving any relish, any defire of itself there, till, by a due confideration of its true worth, we have formed appetites in our minds fuitable to it, and made ourfelves uneafy in the want of it, or in the fear of lofing it. And how much this is in every one's power, by making refolutions to himself, such as he may keep, is eafy for every one to try. Nor let any one fay, he cannot govern his paffions, nor hinder them from breaking out, and carrying him into action; for what he can do before a prince, or a great man, he can do alone, or in the presence of God, if he will.

$54. How Men come to purfue different Courses. FROM what has been faid, it is eafy to give account how it comes to pafs, that though all men defire happiness, yet their wills carry them fo contrarily, and confequently fome of them to what is evil. And to this fay, that the various and contrary choices that men make in the world, do not argue that they do not all purfue good, but that the fame thing is not good to every man alike. This variety of pursuits fhows, that every one does not place his happiness in the fame thing, or choose the fame way to it. Were all the concerns. of man terminated in this life, why one followed study and knowledge, and another hawking and hunting; why one chofe luxury and debauchery, and another fobriety and riches; would not be, because every one of these did not aim at his own happiness, but because their happiness was placed in different things; and therefore it was a right anfwer of the physician to his patient that had fore eyes, If you have more pleasure in the taste of wine than in the ufe of your fight, wine is good for you; but if the pleasure of feeing be greater to you. than that of drinking, wine is naught.

$55:

THE mind has a different relish, as well as the palate;

Book II. and you will as fruitlessly endeavour to delight all men with riches or glory (which yet some men place their happiness in), as you would to fatisfy all mens hunger with cheefe or lobfters; which, though very agreeable and delicious fare to fome, are to others extremely naufeous and offenfive; and many people would with reafon prefer the griping of an hungry belly to thofe dishes which are a feaft to others. Hence it was, I think, that the philofophers of old did in vain inquire, whether fummum bonum confifted in riches, or bodily delights, or virtue, or contemplation. And they might have as reafonably difputed, whether the beft relifh were to be found in apples, plums, or nuts; and have divided. themselves into fects upon it: For as pleasant taftes depend not on the things themselves, but their agreeableness to this or that particular palate, wherein there is great variety; fo the greatest happiness confifts in the having thofe things which produce the greatest pleasure, and in the abfence of thofe which caufe any disturb ance, any pain. Now these to different men, are very different things. If, therefore, men in this life only have hope, if in this life they can only enjoy, it is not ftrange nor unreafonable, that they fhould feek their happiness by avoiding all things that disease them here, and by pursuing all that delight them, wherein it will be no wonder to find variety and difference: For if there be no profpect beyond the grave, the inference is certainly right, Let us eat and drink, let us enjoy what we delight in, for to-morrow we fhall die. This, I think, may ferve to fhow us the reafon, why, though all mens defires tend to happiness, yet they are not moved by the fame object. Men may choose different things, and yet all choose right; fuppofing them only like a company of poor infects, whereof fome are bees, delighted with flowers and their fweetnefs; others beetles, delighted with other kinds of viands; which having enjoyed for a feafon, they fhould ceafe to be, and exift no more for ever.

§ 56. How men come to choose Ill.

THESE things duly weighed, will give us, as I think, a