wrong judgment which every man himself must confefs to be fo.

$63. In comparing prefent and future.

I. THEREFORE, as to prefent pleasure and pain, the mind, as has been faid, never mistakes that which is really good or evil; that which is the greater pleasure or the greater pain is really just as it appears. But though prefent pleasure and pain fhow their difference and degrees fo plainly as not to leave room for mistake, yet when we compare prefent pleasure or pain with future (which is ufually the cafe in the most important determinations of the will), we often make wrong judgments of them, taking our measures of them in different pofitions of distance. Objects near our view are apt to be thought greater than those of a larger fize that are more remote; and fo it is with pleafures and pains; the present is apt to carry it, and thofe at a distance have the disadvantage in the comparifon. Thus most men, like fpendthrift heirs, are apt to judge a little in hand better than a great deal to come, and fo for small matters in poffeffion part with great ones in reverfion. But that this is a wrong judgment, every one must allow, let his pleasure confift in whatever it will, fince that which is future will certainly come to be prefent, and then having the fame advantage of nearnefs, will show itfelf in its full dimenfions, and difcover his wilful miftake, who judged of it by unequal measures. Were the pleasure of drinking accompanied, the very moment a man takes off his glafs, with that fick ftomach and aching head which in fome men are fure to follow not many hours after, I think nobody, whatever pleasure he had in his cups, would, on these conditions, ever let wine touch his lips, which yet he daily fwallows, and the evil fide comes to be chofen only by the fallacy of a little difference in time. But if pleasure or pain can be fo leffened only by a few hours removal, how much more will it be fo by a farther diftance, to a man that will not by a right judgment do what time will, i, e. bring it home upon himself, and confider it as prefent, and there take its true dimenfions? This is the way we

ufually impofe on ourselves in respect of bare pleasure and pain, or the true degrees of happiness or misery; the future lofes its juft proportion, and what is prefent obtains the preference as the greater. I mention not here the wrong judgment whereby the abfent are not only leffened, but reduced to perfect nothing; when men enjoy what they can in prefent, and make fure of that, concluding amifs that no evil will thence follow; for that lies not in comparing the greatnefs of future good and evil, which is that we are here fpeaking of, but in another fort of wrong judgment, which is concerning good or evil, as it is confidered to be the cause and procurement of pleasure or pain that will follow from it.

$64. Caufes of this.

THE caufe of our judging amifs, when we compare our prefent pleasure or pain with future, feems to me to be the weak and narrow conftitution of our minds. We cannot well enjoy two pleasures at once, much lefs any pleasure almoft whilst pain poffeffes us. The prefent pleafure, if it be not very languid, and almost none at all, fills our narrow fouls, and fo takes up the whole mind, that it scarce leaves any thought of things abfent; or if among our pleafures there are fome which are not strong enough to exclude the confideration of things at a diftance, yet we have fo great an abhorrence of pain, that a little of it extinguithes all our pleasures; a little bitter mingled in our cup leaves no relifh of the fweet. Hence it comes, that at any rate we defire to be rid of the prefent evil, which we are apt to think nothing abfent can equal, because under the present pain we find not ourselves capable of any the least degree of happinefs. Mens daily complaints are a loud proof of this. The pain that any one actually feels is till of all others the worft; and it is with anguifh they cry out, Any rather than this; nothing can be fo intolerable as what I now fuffer; and therefore our whole endeavours and thoughts are intent to get rid of the prefent evil before all things, as the firft neceffary condition to our happinefs, let what will follow. Nothing,

as we paffionately think, can exceed, or almost equal, the uncafinefs that fits fo heavy upon us; and becaufe the abftinence from a prefent pleasure that offers itself is a pain, nay oftentimes a very great one, the defire being inflamed by a near and tempting object, it is no wonder that that operates after the fame manner pain docs, and leffens in our thoughts what is fucure, and fo forces us, as it were, blindfold into its embraces.

$ 65.

ADD to this, that abfent good, or, which is the fame thing, future pleasure, especially if of a fort we are unacquainted with, feldom is able to counterbalance any uneafinefs, either of pain or defire, which is prefent; for its greatnefs being no more than what shall be really tafted when enjoyed, men are apt enough to leffen that, to make it give place to any prefent defire, and conclude with themselves; that when it comes to trial, it may pofiibly not anfwer the report or opinion that generally paffes of it; they having often found, that not only what others have magnified, but even what they themselves have enjoyed with great pleasure and delight at one time, has proved infipid or naufeous at another; and therefore they fee nothing in it for which they fhould forego a prefent enjoyment. But that this is a falfe way of judging, when applied to the happiness of another life, they must confefs, unless they will fay, God cannot make thofe happy he defigns to be fo; for that being intended for a ftate of happinefs, it must certainly be agreeable to every one's with and defire. Could we fuppofe their relifhes as diferent there as they are here, yet the manna in heaven will fuit every one's palate. Thus much of the wrong judgment we make of present and future pleasure and pain when they are compared together, and fo the abfent confidered as future.

§ 66. In confidering confequences of Actions. 11. As to things good or bad in their confequences, and by the aptnefs in them to procure us good of evil in the future, we judge amifs feveral ways,

1. When we judge that fo much evil does not really depend on them as in truth there does.

2. When we judge, that though the confequence be of that moment, yet it is not of that certainty but that it may otherwise fall out, or elfe by fome means be avoided, as by induftry, addrefs, change, repentance, &c. That these are wrong ways of judging, were easy to fhow in every particular, if I would examine them at large fingly; but I shall only mention this in general, viz. that it is a very wrong and irrational way of proceeding, to venture a greater good for a lefs, upon uncertain gueffes, and before a due examination be made proportionable to the weightiness of the matter, and the concernment it is to us not to mistake. This, I think, every one must confefs, especially if he confiders the ufual causes of this wrong judgment, whereof thefe following are fome.

$67. Caufes of this.

I. IGNORANCE. He that judges without informing himself to the utmoft that he is capable, cannot acquit himself of judging amifs.

II. Inadvertency: when a man overlooks even that which he does know. This is an affected and prefent ignorance, which misleads our judgments as much as the other. Judging is, as it were, balancing an account, and determining on which fide the odds lie. If therefore either fide be huddled up in haste, and several of the fums that should have gone into the reckoning be overlooked and left out, this precipitancy caufes as wrong a judgment as if it were a perfect ignorance. That which most commonly caufes this, is the prevalency of fome prefent pleasure or pain, heightened by our feeble paflionate nature, moft ftrongly wrought on by what is prefent. To check this precipitancy, our understanding and reafon was given us, if we will make a right ufe of it, to fearch and fee, and then judge thereupon. Without liberty, the understanding would be to no purpofe; and without understanding, liberty (if it could be) would fignify nothing. If a man fees what would do him good or harm, what would

make him happy or miferable, without being able to move himself one ftep towards or from it, what is he the better for feeing? And he that is at liberty to ramble in perfect darkness, what is his liberty better than if he were driven up and down as a bubble by the force of the wind? The being acted by a blind impulfe from without or from within is little odds. The first, therefore, and great ufe of liberty, is to hinder blind precipitancy; the principal exercife of freedom is to ftand ftill, open the eyes, look about, and take a view of the confequence of what we are going to do, as much as the weight of the matter requires. How much floth and negligence, heat and paffion, the prevalency of fashion or acquired indifpofitions, do feverally contribute on occafion to thefe wrong judgments, I fhall not here farther inquire; I fhall only add one other falfe judgment, which I think neceflary to mention, because perhaps it is little taken notice of, though of great influence.

$68. Wrong Judgment of what is necessary to our Happiness.

ALL men defire happiness, that is past doubt; but, as has been already obferved, when they are rid of pain, they are apt to take up with any pleasure at hand, or that custom has endeared to them, to reft fatisfied in that; and fo being happy, till fome new defire, by making them uneafy, disturbs that happiness, and fhows them that they are not fo, they look no farther; nor is the will determined to any action in pursuit of any other known or apparent good; for fince we find that we cannot enjoy all forts of good, but one excludes another, we do not fix our defires on every apparent greater good, unless it be judged to be neceffary to our happiness; if we think we can be happy without it, it moves us not. This is another occafion to men of judging wrong, when they take not that to be neceffary to their happinefs which really is fo. This mistake mifleads us both in the choice of the good we aim at, and very often in the means to it, when it is a remote good. But which way ever it be, either by placing it