where really it is not, or by neglecting the means as not neceffary to it, when a man miffes his great end, happiness, he will acknowledge he judged not right. That which contributes to this mistake is the real or fuppofed unpleasantnefs of the actions which are the way to this end, it seeming fo prepofterous a thing to men to make themselves unhappy in order to happinefs, that they do not eafily bring themselves to it.

§ 69. We can change the Agreeableness or Difagreeablenefs in Things.

THE laft inquiry, therefore, concerning this matter, is, Whether it be in a man's power to change the pleafantnefs and unpleasantnefs that accompanies any fort of action? And to that it is plain in many cafes he can. Men may and fhould correct their palates, and give a relish to what either has, or they fuppofe has none. The relish of the mind is as various as that of the body, and like that too may be altered; and it is a mistake to think that men cannot change the displeasingnefs or indifferency that is in actions into pleasure and defire, if they will do but what is in their power. A due confideration will do it in fome cafes, and practice, application, and cuftom, in moft. Bread or tobacco may be neglected, where they are shown to be useful to health, because of an indifferency or difrelish to them; reafon and confideration at first recommends, and begins their trial, and use finds, or custom makes them pleasant. That this is fo in virtue too is very certain. Actions are pleafing or difpleafing, either in themselves, or confidered as a means to a greater and more defirable end. The eating of a well-feasoned dish, fuited to a man's palate, may move the mind by the delight itself that accompanies the eating, without reference to any other end; to which the confideration of the pleasure there is in health and ftrength (to which that meat is fubfervient) may add a new gufto, able to make us fwallow an ill-relifhed potion. In the latter of these, any action is rendered more or less pleafing only by the contemplation of the end, and the being more or lefs perfuaded of its tendency to it,

Book II. or neceffary connection with it; but the pleasure of the action itself is beft acquired or increafed by use and practice. Trials often reconcile us to that which at a diftance we looked on with averfion, and by repetitions wear us into a liking of what poffibly in the first effay displeased us. Habits have powerful charms, and put fo ftrong attractions of eafiness and pleasure into what we accuftom ourselves to, that we cannot forbear to do, or at least be eafy in the omiffion of actions which habitual practice has faited, and thereby recommends to us. Though this be very visible, and every one's experience fhows him he can do, yet it is a part in the conduct of men towards their happiness, neglected to a degree that it will be poffibly entertained as a paradox, if it be faid that men can make things or actions more or lefs pleafing to themfelves, and thereby remedy that to which one may justly impute a great deal of their wandering. Fashion and the common opinion having fettled wrong notions, and education and custom ill habits, the juft values of things are mifplaced, and the palates of men corrupted. Pains fhould be taken to rectify thefe; and contrary habits change our pleasures, and give a relith to that which is neceflary or conducive to our happinefs. This every one must confefs he can do; and when happiness is loft, and mifery overtakes him, he will confefs he did amifs in neglecting it, and condemn himself for it: And I afk every one, Whether he has not often done fo?

$70. Preference of Vice to Virtue, a manifeft wrong Judgment.

I SHALL not now enlarge any farther on the wrong judgments, and neglect of what is in their power, whereby men mislead themfelves. This would make a volume, and is not my bulinefs. But whatever falfe notions and fhameful neglect of what is in their power may put men cut of their way to happiness, and distract them, as we fee, into fo different courfes of life, this yet is certain, that morality, eftablished upon its true foundations, cannot but determine the choice in any one

that will but confider; and he that will not be fo far a rational creature as to reflect feriously upon infinite! happiness and mifery, muft needs condemn himfelf, as not making that ufe of his understanding he fhouldy The rewards and 'punishments of another life, which the Almighty has established as the enforcements of hist law, are of weight enough to determine the choice, d gainst whatever pleafure or pain this life can show, when the eternal ftate is confidered but in its bare pof! fibility, which nobody can make any doubt of He that will allow exquifite and endless happiness to be but the poffible confequence of a good life here, and the 'contrary ftate the poffible reward of a bad one, multi own himself to judge very much amifs, if he does not conclude, that a virtuous life, with the certain expecta tion of everlasting blifs which may come, is to be preferred to a vicious one, with the fear of that dreadful ftate of mifery, which it is very poffible may overtake the guilty; or, at beft, the terrible uncertain hope of annihilation. This is evidently fo, though the vir tuous life here had nothing but pain, and the vicious continual pleasure, which yet is, for the most part, quite otherwise, and wicked men have not much the odds to brag of, even in their prefent poffeffion, nay, all things rightly confidered, have, I think, even the worst part here. But when infinite happiness is put in one scale, against infinite mifery in the other; if the worst that comes to the pious man, if he mistakes, be the best that the wicked can attain to, if he be in the right, who can, without madness, run the venture ? Who in his wits would choose to come within a poffibi lity of infinite mifery, which if he mifs, there is yet. nothing to be got by that hazard? Whereas, on the other fide, the fober man ventures nothing against infinite happiness to be got, if his expectation comes to pafs. If the good man be in the right, he is eternally happy; if he mistakes, he is not miferable, he feels nothing. On the other fide, if the wicked be in the right, he is not happy; if he mistakes, he is infinitely VOL, I

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miferable. Muft it not be a most manifeft wrong judgment, that does not presently fee to which fide, in this cafe, the preference is to be given? I have forborne. to mention any thing of the certainty or probability of a future ftate, defigning here to fhow the wrong judgment that any one must allow he makes upon his own principles, laid how he pleases, who prefers the fhort pleafures of a vicious life upon any confideration, whilft he knows, and cannot but be certain, that a future life is at leaft poffible.

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$71. Recapitulation.

To conclude this inquiry into human liberty, which as it stood before, I myself from the beginning fearing, and a very judicious friend of mine, fince the publication, fufpecting to have some mistake in it, though he could not particularly fhow it me, I was put upon a ftricter review of this chapter; wherein lighting upon a very eafy and fcarce obfervable flip I have made, in putting one feemingly indifferent word for another, that difcovery opened to me this prefent view, which here, in this fecond edition, I fubmit to the learned world, and which in fhort is this: Liberty is a power to act or not to act, according as the mind directs. A power to direct, the operative faculties to motion or reft, in partiqular inftances, is that which we call the will. That which, in the train of our voluntary actions, determines the will to any change of operation, is fome prefent uneafinefs; which is, or at leaft is always accompanied with that of defire. Defire is always moved by evil, to fly it because a total freedom from pain always makes a neceffary part of our happinefs; but every good, nay every greater good, does not conftantly move defires because it may not make, or may not be taken to make, any necessary part of our happiness: For all that we defire, is only to be happy. But though this general defire of happiness operates conftantly and invariably, yet the fatisfaction of any particular defire can be fufpended from determining the will to any fubfervient action, till we have maturely examined, whether the particular apparent good, which we then defire, makes

a part of our real happiness, or be confiftent or inconfiftent with it. The refult of our judgment upon that examination is what ultimately determines the man, who could not be free if his will were determined by any thing but his own defire, guided by his own judgment. I know that liberty by fome is placed in an indifferency of the man, antecedent to the determination of his will. I wish they who lay so much stress on fuch an antecedent indifferency, as they call it, had told us plainly, whether this luppoled indifferency be antecedent to the thought and judgment of the understanding, as well as to the decree of the will; for it is pretty hard to ftate it between them; i. e. immediately after the judgment of the understanding, and before the determination of the quill, because the determination of the will immediately follows the judgment of the understanding; and to place liberty in an indifferency antecedent to the thought and judgment of the understanding, feems to me to place liberty in a ftate of darkness, wherein we can neither fee nor fay any thing of it; at least it places it in a fubject incapable of it, no agent being allowed capable of liberty but in confequence of thought and judgment. I am not nice about phrafes, and therefore confent to fay with those that love to fpeak fo, that liberty is placed in indifferency, but it is in an indifferency which remains after the judgment of the underltanding, yea, even after the determination of the will; and that is an indifferency, not of the man (for after he has once judged which is beft, viz. to do or forbear, he is no longer indifferent), but an indifferency of the operative powers of the man, which remaining equally able to operate, or to forbear operating after, as before the decree of the will, are in a ftate which, if one pleafes, may be called indifferency; and as far as this indifferency reaches, a man is free, and no farther; v. g. I have the ability to move my hand, or to let it reft; that operative power is indifferent to move or not to move my hand; I am then in that refpect perfectly free. My will determines that operative power to reft; I am yet free, becaufe the indifferency of that my operative power to act

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