were native and original impressions, should appear faireft and cleareft in those perfons in whom yet we find no footsteps of them: And it is, in my opinion, a ftrong prefumption that they are not innate, fince they are least known to thofe, in whom, if they were innate, they must needs exert themselves with most force and vigour. For children, idiots, favages, and illiterate people, being of all others the leaft corrupted by custom or borrowed opinions, learning and education having not caft their native thoughts into new moulds, nor by fuperinducing foreign and studied doctrines, confounded thofe fair characters nature had written there; one might reasonably imagine, that in their minds these innate notions fhould lie open fairly to every one's view, as it is certain the thoughts of children do. It might very well be expected, that these principles should be perfectly known to naturals; which being ftamped immediately on the foul (as these men fuppofe), can have no dependence on the conftitutions, or organs of the body, the only confeffed difference between them and others. One would think, according to these mens principles, that all these native beams of light (were there any fuch) fhould in those who have no referves, no arts of concealment, fhine out in their full luftre, and leave us in no more doubt of their being there, than we are of their love of pleasure, and abhorrence of pain. But alas! amongst children, idiots, favages, and the grofsly illiterate, what general maxims are to be found? What univerfal principles of knowledge? Their notions are few and narrow, borrowed only from thofe objects they have had most to do with, and which have made upon their fenfes the frequentest and strongest impreffions. A child knows his nurse and his cradle, and by degrees the playthings of a little more advanced age; and a young favage has, perhaps, his head filled with love and hunting, according to the fashion of his tribe: But he that from a child untaught, or a wild inhabitant of the woods, will expect these abstract maxims and reputed principles of fciences, will, I fear, find himself mistaken. Such kind of ge

neral propofitions are seldom mentioned in the huts of Indians, much lefs are they to be found in the thoughts of children, or any impreffions of them on the minds of naturals. They are the language and business of the schools and academies of learned nations, accustomed to that fort of converfation or learning, where difputes are frequent; thefe maxims being fuited to artificial argumentation, and ufeful for conviction, but not much conducing to the discovery of truth, or advancement of knowledge. But of their 'fmall ufe for the improvement of knowledge, I fhall have occafion to fpeak more at large, 1. 4. c. 7.

$28. Recapitulation.

I KNOW not how abfurd this may feem to the masters of demonstration; and probably it will hardly down with any body at first hearing. I must therefore beg a little truce with prejudice, and the forbearance of cenfure, till I have been heard out in the fequel of this discourse, being very willing to fubmit to better judgments. And fince I impartially fearch after truth, I fhall not be forry to be convinced that I have been too fond of my own notions; which I confefs we are all apt to be, when application and study have warmed eur heads with them.

Upon the whole matter, I cannot fee any ground to think these two famed fpeculative maxims innate, fince they are not univerfally aflented to; and the affent they fo generally find, is no other than what feveral propofitions, not allowed to be innate, equally partake in with them; and fince the affent that is given them is produced another way, and comes not from natural infcription, as I doubt not but to make appear in the following discourse. And if these first principles of knowledge and science are found not to be innate, no other Speculative maxims can (1 fuppofe) with better right pretend to be fo..

IF

CHAP. III.

NO INNATE PRACTICAL PRINCIPLES.

1. No moral Principles fo clear and fo generally received, as the forementioned fpeculative Maxims.

F thofe fpeculative maxims, whereof we difcourfed in the foregoing chapter, have not an actual univerfal affent from all mankind, as we there proved, it is much more vifible concerning practical principles, that they come fort of an univerfal reception: And I think it will be hard to instance any one moral rule, which can pretend to fo general and ready an affent, as, What is, is; or to be fo manifest a truth as this, That it is impoffible for the fame thing to be, and not to be. Whereby it is evident, that they are farther removed from a title. to be innate; and the doubt of their being native impreffions on the mind, is ftronger against thefe moral principles than the other. Not that it brings their truth at all in queftion; they are equally true, though not equally evident. Thofe fpeculative maxims carry their own evidence with them: But moral principles require reafoning and discourse, and fome exercise of the mind, to discover the certainty of their truth. They lie not open as natural characters engraven on the mind; which, if any fuch were, they must needs be visible by themselves, and by their own light be certain and known to every body. But this is no derogation to their truth and certainty, no more than it is to the truth or certainty of the three angles of a triangle being equal to two right ones; because it is not fo evident, as, The whole is bigger than a part, nor fo apt to be affented to at first hearing. It may fuffice, that these moral rules are capable of demonstration; and therefore it is our own fault, if we come not to a certain knowledge of them. But the ignorance wherein many men are of them, and the flowness of affent wherewith others receive them, are manifeft proofs that they are not innate, and fuch as offer themselves to their view without fearching.

§ 2. Faith and Justice not owned as Principles by all Men.

I

WHETHER there be any fuch moral principles, wherein all men do agree, I appeal to any who have been but moderately converfant in the history of mankind, and looked abroad beyond the smoke of their own chimneys. Where is that practical truth, that is universally received without doubt or question, as it must be if innate? Justice, and keeping of contracts, is that which moft men feem to agree in. This is a principle which is thought to extend itself to the dens of thieves, and the confederacies of the greatest villains; and they who have gone fartheft towards the putting off of humanity itself, keep faith and rules of juftice one with another. grant that outlaws themselves do this one amongst another, but it is without receiving these as the innate laws of nature; they practise them as rules of convenience within their own communities; but it is impoffible to conceive, that he embraces justice as a practical principle, who acts fairly with his fellow-highwaymen, and at the fame time plunders or kills the next honest man he meets with. Juftice and truth are the common ties of fociety; and therefore even outlaws and robbers, who break with all the world befides, muft keep faith and rules of equity amongst themselves, or else they cannot hold together. But will any one fay, that thofe that live by fraud and rapine, have innate principles of truth and justice, which they allow and affent to?

3. Object. Though Men deny them in their Practice, yet they admit them in their Thoughts, anfwered.

PERHAPS it will be urged, That the tacit affent of their minds agrees to what their practice contradicts. I anfwer, first, I have always thought the actions of men the best interpreters of their thoughts. But fince it is certain that most mens practice, and fome mens open profeffions, have either questioned or denied these principles, it is impoffible to eftablish an univerfal confent (though we should look for it only amongst grown men),

without which it is impoffible to conclude them innate. Secondly, It is very ftrange and unreasonable, to fuppofe innate practical principles, that terminate only in contemplation. Practical principles derived from nature, are there for operation, and must produce conformity of action, not barely fpeculative affent to their truth, or else they are in vain diftinguished from fpeculative maxims. Nature, I confefs, has put into man a defire of happiness, and an averfion to mifery: Thefe indeed are innate practical principles, which (as practical principles ought) do continue conftantly to operate, and influence all our actions, without ceafing. These may be observed, in all perfons and all ages, fteady and univerfal; but these are inclinations of the appetite to good, not impreffions of truth on the underftanding. I deny not, that there are natural tendencies imprinted on the minds of men; and that, from the very first inftances of fenfe and perception, there are fome things that are grateful, and others unwelcome to them; fome things that they incline to, and others that they fly: But this makes nothing for innate characters on the mind, which are to be the principles of knowledge, regulating our practice. Such natural impreffions on the understanding are fo far from being confirmed hereby, that this is an argument against them; fince, if there were certain characters imprinted by nature on the understanding, as the principles of knowledge, we could not but perceive them constantly operate in us, and influence our knowledge, as we do those others on the will and appetite, which never cease to be the constant fprings and motives of all our actions, to which we perpetually feel them ftrongly impelling us.

§ 4. Moral Rules need a Proof, ergo not Innate. ANOTHER reason that makes me doubt of any innate practical principles is, That I think there cannot any one moral rule be propofed, whereof a man may not justly demand a reafon: Which would be perfectly ridiculous and abfurd, if they were innate, or fo much as felf-evident, which every innate principle muft needs be, and not need any proof to ascertain its truth, nor want. any rea