memory, or in the mind, whenever it is fuggefted by the memory, appears not to be new, but the mind finds it in itself, and knows it was there before. By this it may be tried, whether there be any innate ideas in the mind, before impreffion from fenfation or reflection. I would fain meet with the man, who, when he came to the use of reafon, or at any other time, remembered any of them; and to whom, after he was born, they were never new. If any one will fay, there are ideas in the mind that are not in the memory, I defire him to explain himself, and make what he fays intelligible.

$21. Principles not Innate, because of little Ufe or little Certainty.

BESIDES what I have already faid, there is another reason why I doubt, that neither thefe, nor any other principles, are innate. I that am fully perfuaded, that the infinitely wife God made all things in perfect wifdom, cannot fatisfy myself why he should be supposed to print upon the minds of men fome univerfal principles, whereof those that are pretended innate, and concern fpeculation, are of no great use; and thofe that concern practice not self-evident, and neither of them diftin guishable from fome other truths, not allowed to be innate. For to what purpose fhould characters be graven on the mind by the finger of God, which are not clearer there than thofe which are afterwards introduced, or cannot be distinguished from them? If any one thinks there are fuch innate ideas and propofitions, which, by their clearness and usefulness, are distinguishable from all that is adventitious in the mind and acquired, it will not be a hard matter for him to tell us which they are, and then every one will be a fit judge, whether they be fo or no, fince, if there be fuch innate ideas and impreffions, plainly different from all other perceptions and knowledge, every one will find it true in himself. Of the evidence of these supposed innate maxims, I have spoken already; of their usefulness, I fhall have occasion to speak more hereafter.

22. Difference of Mens Difcoveries depends upon the different application of their Faculties.

To conclude; fome ideas forwardly offer themselves to all mens understandings; fome forts of truths refult from any ideas, as foon as the mind puts them into propofitions; other truths require a train of ideas placed in order, a due comparing of them, and deductions made with attention before they can be discovered and affented to. Some of the first fort, because of their general and easy reception, have been mistaken for innate; but the truth is, ideas and notions are no more born with us than arts and fciences, though fome of them indeed offer themselves to our faculties more readily than others, and therefore are more generally received, though that too be according as the organs of our bodies and powers of our minds happen to be employed; God having fitted men with faculties and means to difcover, receive and retain truths, according as they are employed. The great difference that is to be found in the notions of mankind, is from the different use they put their faculties to, whilit fome (and thofe the moft) taking things upon trust, mifemploy their power of asfent, by lazily enflaving their minds to the dictates and dominion of others, in doctrines which it is their duty carefully to examine, and not blindly, with an implicit faith, to swallow. Others, employing their thoughts only about fome few things, grow acquainted fufficiently with them, attain great degrees of knowledge in them, and are ignorant of all other, having never let their thoughts loose in the search of other inquiries. Thus, that the three angles of a triangle are equal to two right ones, is a truth as certain as any thing can be, and I think more evident than many of those propositions that go for principles; and yet there are millions, however expert in other things, who know not this at all, because they never fet their thoughts on work about fuch angles; and he that certainly knows this propofition, may yet be utterly ignorant of the truth of other propofitions, in mathematics itfelf, which are as clear and evident as this, because in his fearch of those ma

thematical truths, he ftopped his thoughts fhort, and went not so far. The fame may happen concerning the notions we have of the being of a Deity; for though there be no truth which a man may more evidently make out to himself than the existence of a God, yet he that shall content himself with things, as he finds them in this world, as they minifter to his pleasures and paffions, and not make inquiry a little farther into their caufes, ends, and admirable contrivances, and pursue the thoughts thereof with diligence and attention, may live long without any notion of fuch a Being. And if any person hath by talk put fuch a notion into his head, he may perhaps believe it; but if he hath never examined it, his knowledge of it will be no perfecter than his, who having been told that the three angles of a triangle are equal to two right ones, takes it upon truft, without examining the demonstration, and may yield his affent as a probable opinion, but hath no knowledge of the truth of it, which yet his faculties, if carefully employed, were able to make clear and evident to him. But this only by the by, to fhow how much our knowledge depends upon the right ufe of those powers nature hath bestowed upon us, and how little upon fuch innate principles, as are in vain supposed to be in all mankind for their direction, which all men could not but know if they were there, or else they would be there to no purpofe; and which, fince all men do not know, nor can diftinguifh from other adventitious truths, we may well conclude there are no fuch.

$23. Men must think and know for themselves. WHAT cenfure, doubting thus of innate principles, may deferve from men who will be apt to call it pulling up the old foundations of knowledge and certainty, I cannot tell; I perfuade myself at leaft, that the way I have pursued, being conformable to truth, lays thofe foundations furer. This I am certain, I have not made it my businefs either to quit or follow any authority in the enfuing discourse; truth has been my only aim, and wherever that has appeared to lead, my thoughts have impartially followed, without minding whether the

footsteps of any other lay that way or no. Not that I want a due refpect to other mens opinions; but, after all, the greatest reverence is due to truth; and I hope it will not be thought arrogance to fay, that perhaps we fhould make greater progress in the discovery of rational and contemplative knowledge, if we fought it in the fountain, in the confideration of things themselves, and made use rather of our own thoughts than other mens, to find it; for I think we may as rationally hope to see with other mens eyes, as to know by other mens understandings. So much as we ourselves confider and comprehend of truth and reason, so much we poffefs of real and true knowledge. The floating of other mens opinions in our brains, makes us not one jot the more knowing, though they happen to be true. What in them was science, is in us but opiniatry; whilst we give up our affent only to reverend names, and do not, as they did, employ our own reason to understand those truths which gave them reputation. Ariftotle was certainly a knowing man, but nobody ever thought him fo, because he blindly embraced, and confidently vented the opinions of another. And if the taking up of another's principles, without examining them, made not him a philofopher, I fuppofe it will hardly make any body elfe fo. In the fciences every one has fo much as he really knows and comprehends; what he believes only, and takes upon truft, are but shreds, which, however, will in the whole piece make no considerable addition to his ftock who gathers them. Such borrowed wealth, like fairy-money, though it were gold in the hand from which he received it, will be but leaves and duft when it comes to ufe.

24. Whence the Opinion of Innate Principles. WHEN men have found fome general propofitions, that could not be doubted of as foon as understood, it was, I know, a fhort and eafy way to conclude them innate. This being once received, it eased the lazy from the pains of search, and stopped the inquiry of the doubtful concerning all that was once ftyled innate. And it was of no fmall advantage to those who affected to be maf

ters and teachers, to make this the principle of principles, that principles muft not be queftioned; for having once established this tenet, that there are innate principles, it put their followers upon a neceffity of receiving fome doctrines as fuch, which was to take them off from the use of their own reason and judgment, and put them on believing and taking them upon truft, without farther examination; in which posture of blind credulity, they might be more eafily governed by, and made useful to fome fort of men, who had the fkill and office to principle and guide them. Nor is it a fmall power it gives one man over another, to have the authority to be the dictator of principles, and teacher of unquestionable truths, and to make a man fwallow that for an innate principle, which may serve to his purpose who teaches them; whereas, had they examined the ways whereby men came to the knowledge of many univerfal truths, they would have found them to result in the minds of men from the being of things themselves, when duly confidered, and that they were difcovered by the application of thofe faculties that were fitted by nature to receive and judge of them, when duly employed about them.

$25. Conclufion.

Tofhow how the understanding proceeds herein, is the deSign of the following difcourfe, which I fhall proceed to, when I have firft premifed, that hitherto, to clear my way to thofe foundations which I conceive are the only true ones whereon to establish those notions we can have of our own knowledge, it hath been neceffary for me to give an account of the reafons I had to doubt of innate principles. And fince the arguments which are against them do fome of them rife from common received opinions, I have been forced to take several things for granted, which is hardly avoidable to any one whofe talk it is to fhow the falfehood or improbability of any tenet; it happening in controverfial discourses, as it does in the affaulting of towns, where, if the ground be but firm whereon the batteries are erected, there is no far