ed both, the End of it being no other than [that we might know the things that are freely given to us of God.]

Further, these Matters when once revealed, and come to our Knowledge, as we propofe not to others with artificial Sophiftry and Rhetorick, fo we judge not of the Truth of them by pure Arguments of Natural Reason and Logical Inferences, [which things also we speak not in the words which man's wisdom teacheth, . 13.] But as we teach them with that Plainnefs and Simplicity which God directeth, and confirm the Truth of them with those Miracles which he effecteth; fo we judge of the Truth of them, no otherwife than by comparing the Nature of the Things revealed, with the general Motives of Chriftian Faith, as it followeth: [But with the wisdom which the Holy Ghoft teacheth, comparing Spiritual things with fpiritual.] Now the neceffity of this Method in our Enquiry herein, the Apostle demonstrates in the 14th Verfe, [But the natural man.] He who judgeth thefe Revelations only according to his precon ceived Notions taken up from natural Reafon, and refuseth to believe any thing which he receiveth not from them, who weigheth not the external Motives of Credibility reinforcing thefe Revelations, [He receiveth not the things of the Spirit of God,] believeth not thefe revealed Truths, which furmount the reach of naked Reason. For

which reafon alfo, [They are foolishness unto him,] because he confiders only the Difficulty of them, and regardeth not the external Arguments of Revelation, by which they are recommended. So that while he acteth in this irrational Method [he cannot know them;] it is impoffible to be convinced of them, [because they are fpiritually difcerned,] not to be found out by the fole. Light of Reason, but to be received only upon the account of Divine Revelation. Whereas he who understandeth well the Motives of Christian Faith, and compareth the Weight of them with the Difficulty of the things revealed, [he that is spiritual, . 15. judgeth all things,] may fafely, and without Error, pronounce of this matter. And in doing fo, he is not justly to be overruled with the Objections of thofe, who confider the thing abfolutely in it felf, and not compared with its Motives of Credibility, [yet he himself is judged of no man.] Since plain Reafon directeth, that if the Motives be found weightier than the Difficulties, he should declare in favour of the thing revealed, and not be startled at the Difficulties, as concerning a Subject exceeding the natural Understanding of Man, and to be known no otherwife than by the Revelation of God, who beft knew the Truth of it; which Revelation we have, as it follows in the laft Verfe. [For who hath known

the

.

the mind of the Lord, that he may inftruct him? But we have the mind of Chrift.]

From all that hath been laid down by the Apostle in the Context thus explained, we may form these two Confiderations, whereby to determine the Truth of this matter.

I. That we ought not to reject any Articles of Revelation, nor be offended at them, merely because we cannot fully conceive the manner of them.

II. That in judging of the Truth of these Matters, we must not confider their internal Probability, fo much as their external Motives of Credibility.

First then, We ought not to reject any Articles of Faith, nor be fcandalized at. them, because we cannot fully conceive the Nature or Manner of them. For this we cannot rationally do, unlefs we were affured that we fully knew all things, and were able to conceive the Nature of all Objects. Which that we are not, we may be convinced, if we confider either the Imperfection of our own Understanding, or the Excellency of many Objects exceeding the Capacity of it.

1. The Imperfection of our Understanding appears, both from the Confideration of our Nature, and from manifold Experience. The Nature of the Soul of Man is finite, and fo muft the Faculties of it also

be.

One of thefe is the Understanding. which if it were infinite, could be no Part of a finite Soul. It hath its Bounds and Sphere of Activity fixed to it, which if it exceeds, it cannot judge without danger of Error and Illufion. If we defire to extend our Knowledge to all Things and Objects, the Defire is unreasonable; if we pretend to it, the Pretence is foolish. The Limitation of our Nature hath excluded all fuch Hopes, which can be obtained no other-wife, than by altering our Nature, and raifing us from the condition of Finite, to Infinite Beings. It becomes us to receive with grateful Acknowledgments thofe Perfections which God hath beftowed on us; not to repine that he gave us not better, much less be angry that they are not infinite; fince it is impoffible that any Creature fhould have an infinite Understanding.

Further, the Imperfection of our Knowledge is manifeft from Experience. The greatest Part of Mankind are detained in miferable Ignorance, even of plain and fenfible Matters. A barbarous Indian could never be perfuaded of the Truth of many things, which by their Frequency are not in the least admir'd by us. The Fabrick of a Watch, or the mutual Communication of Thoughts by Writing, is no less inconceibable to him, than the Mysteries of the Trinity are to us. And yet we should by no means allow his Conclufion, if he should perem

peremptorily deny the Existence of fuch things, because he cannot conceive them.

Among us, Men, who have not improved their Reafon by Thought and Study, are far more unable to conceive those things which are certainly known by more Learn. ed Men, than the latter are to conceive the greatest Mysteries of the Deity. And even in these the fame Imperfection of Underftanding may be discovered. For however they may flatter themselves with knowing the Nature of Finite Beings, and Causes of vifible Effects, which indeed are the proper and fuitable Objects of human Understanding; yet they must acknowledge their Ignorance in many other things of the fame kind; and what they do pretend to know in Natural Philofophy, others oft-times no lefs Learned will deny; and if themfelves now fancy that they know the Truth, yet they must confess that they once knew it not, or perhaps had different Conceptions of it. And then that very Improvement of their Knowledge is an undeniable Argument of the Imperfection of it. So that if Men fhould always deny the Truth of what they cannot conceive, even all natural Knowledge would be destroy'd, and things most certain would be denied to exift. And then furely we cannot but allow a greater Diftance to be between the infinite Knowledge of God, and that of the most learned Man, which how far foever improved, yet ftill

con