continueth to be finite, than between the most perfect and most imperfect Underftandings of any two Men living.

Secondly, The Excellency of the Object may be fuch, that it can never be fully conceived by the Understanding of any created Being. And fuch is God; of whofe Exiftence although we be most certain, yet we have no other than an imperfect Idea of his Effence. We conceive him indeed to be a most perfect Being, but his Perfections we cannot comprehend in one fingle Idea; we are forced to confider them apart; and even then obtain the Knowledge of them rather by removing all Imperfections from him, than by conceiving the Nature of the Perfections themselves. And after all, many Attributes of God, which none deny to be his Attributes, and without which the Divine Nature cannot fubfift, include no less Difficulties than the Doctrine of the Trini. ty. I will inftance only in Two, his independent Existence, and his Omniprefence.

For the first, nothing can exift without a Caufe; and fince there can be no external Caufe to God, the Caufe of his Existence must be sought for in himself; and that is the Infinity of his Nature. Now although all Men firmly believe that God never received his Existence from any external Cause, nor needed to do it; fince the Infinity of his own Nature was a neceffary Cause of independent Existence: Yet can VOL. II.

D

not

not the Soul of Man conceive how any Thing fhould be the Cause of it felf, without being involved in inextricable Darknefs.

Again, no Man can deny God to be Omniprefent, who grants his Existence; yet can we not conceive the Prefence of God in all Places, without conceiving at the fame Time an Extenfion of Parts; although we be affured that God is an immaterial Being, and as fuch can have no Extention of Parts.

Further, not only the Infinity of the Subject may exceed our Apprehenfion, but the Spirituality of it, altho' Finite, may confound us in this Life, wherein we are fo much inured to judge by the Report of our Senfes, that few or none can form a diftinct Conception of an immaterial Being. All allow the Soul of Man to be fuch; yet the greatest Part of Mankind are not able to form any Conception of an immaterial Being; and even those who can, yet have no other than a very confused Idea of it; which confifts rather in a Negative Conception of it, to wit, that it is not Material, than in any pofitive Notion of its Immateriality. If then Things which are on all Sides allowed, continue to be incon ́ceiveable, if we cannot folve the Difficul ties arifing from many Attributes in God, which yet we cannot deny to be in him, without denying his Existence at the fame

Time; if we be fo much at a Lofs in the Conception of any immaterial Being; we ought not to be aftonished or fcandalized, that the Doctrine of the Trinity cannot be fully conceived by us.

So then, fince human Reason cannot by its own Conceptions alone find out and determine all which may relate to the Nature of God; the Second Confideration propofed will take Place, namely, That in judging the Truth of thefe Matters, we must not confider their internal Probability, fo much as their external Motives of Credibility. For fince we cannot perfectly comprehend the Nature of God, many Properties may be in it, which we could never difcover by the Light of Reason, nor yet when difcovered to us, fully conceive them. But what we cannot conceive, we cannot judge of from internal Arguments, which are to be drawn from the Nature and Effence of the Subject; the perfect Knowledge of which being denied to us, we cannot form any Arguments from thence. It remains therefore that we refpect only the external Arguments of its Truth; and thofe can be no other than external Revelation. We cannot doubt, that God fully knoweth his own Nature; and that as he is most wife, he is most veratious; that as he cannot be 'deceived himfelf, fo he cannot deceive us, If then we be fufficiently affured that God hath revealed this, all-Scruples ought to cease,

D 2

ceafe, which is the Apostle's Argument in this Cafe.

It must be indeed acknowledged, that we may be deceived in our Belief of a Divine Revelation; and that fince God cannot affirm any Thing which is falfe, it is an invincible Argument against any pretended Revelation: This Matter is falfe, therefore it cannot be revealed by God. We must have therefore fome Rule, whereby to direct our Afsent and Judgment in this Cafe; and that is very obvious. For the Underftanding neceffarily (at least reasonably) inclining to that Part which carrieth the greatest Evidence along with it; if the Evidence of the Revelation of any Propofition be greater than the Evidence of its Falfity,

we must in Obedience to the Laws of Reafon embrace and believe it. But if the Evidence of its Falfity exceeds the Evidence of its Revelation, we may fafely reject it. Let us therefore compare the Evidence of both Sides.

Matters of Revelation may concern either finite or infinite Nature. Examples of the firft Sort in the Chriftian Religion are all fuch Propofitions, as relate to the natural Body of Chrift: Of the fecond, all fuch as refpect the Divine Nature. In the first Cafe, which exceedeth not the natural Capacity of our Understandings, nothing can be true, which may not be fully conceived by us. For although many Properties and

Qua

Qualities of finite Beings, may lie for ever undiscovered to the natural Light of Reafon, yet when discovered to us, they may be easily conceived by us, if they carry any Truth with them. So that whatsoever in finite Natures is inconceivable to us, can be no Part of Divine Revelation. For we cannot imagine any Revelation to be made without an intended Obligation of Affent; now fince God hath required us to judge according to the greater Evidence, he could never require us to believe a Propofition, the Evidence of whofe Falfity exceeds the Evidence of its Revelation. And fince we are proper Judges of the Nature of finite Beings, when discovered to us; not to be able to conceive any Propofition relating to them, is an unanfwerable Argument of the Falfity of it; fince if it were true, we fhould be easily able to conceive it, and reconcile it to all other Truths, and the received Laws of Reafon. And upon this Account the Doctrine of Tranfubftantiation can never be any part of a revealed Religion. But in Matters relating to infinite Beings it is far otherwife. In those it is no Objection against the Truth of them, that we are not able to conceive them; as we before fhewed.

The only internal Argument which can be used in this Cafe against the Truth of any Revelation, must be founded upon a Contradiction included in it; to wit, if the