Essays and Treatises on Several Subjects: In Two VolumesT. Cadell in the Strand; A. Donaldson in St. Paul's Church-yard; and W. Creech, at Edinburgh, 1804 - 572 sider |
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actions agreeable allowed appear approbation argument arises ascribe ATHENIANS authority beauty benevolence blame cause cerning character CICERO circumstances common concerning conclusion conduct conjoined connection consequences consider contrary course of nature degree Deity derived discover distinction divine effect endeavour entirely EPICURUS esteem event evident excite existence experience farther feel force former friendship give happiness HESIOD human nature idea imagination immediately infer influence inquiry instance ject justice kind laws mankind manner matter of fact ment merit metaphysics mind miracle moral natural philosophy necessity neral never object observe operation opinion opposite origin ourselves particular passions person philosophers PHOCION pleasure PLUTARCH POLYBIUS polytheism possessed praise present principles produce qualities racter reason reflection regard relation relations of ideas religion rence render rience rules scepticism seems self-love sense sensible sentiment social virtues society species stancy supposed TACITUS testimony theism thing tion tural ture utility vanity
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Side 138 - So that, upon the whole, we may conclude, that the Christian Religion not only was at first attended with miracles, but even at this day cannot be believed by any reasonable person without one. Mere reason is insufficient to convince us of its veracity: and whoever is moved by Faith to assent to it, is conscious of a continued miracle in his own person, which subverts all the principles of his understanding, and gives him a determination to believe what is most contrary to custom and experience.
Side 120 - A miracle is a violation of the laws of nature ; and as a firm and unalterable experience has established these laws, the proof against a miracle, from the very nature of the fact, is as entire as any argument from experience can possibly be imagined.
Side 26 - The contrary of every matter of fact is still possible; because it can never imply a contradiction, and is conceived by the mind with the same facility and distinctness, as if ever so conformable to reality. That the sun will not rise to-morrow is no less intelligible a proposition, and implies no more contradiction than the affirmation, that it will rise.
Side 160 - But this universal and primary opinion of all men is soon destroyed by the slightest philosophy which teaches us that nothing can ever be present to the mind but an image or perception, and that the senses are only the inlets through which these images are conveyed, without being able to produce any immediate intercourse between the mind and the object.
Side 401 - The whole frame of nature bespeaks an intelligent author; and no rational enquirer can, after serious reflection, suspend his belief a moment with regard to the primary principles of genuine Theism and Religion.
Side 122 - ... When any one tells me, that he saw a dead man restored to life, I immediately consider with myself, whether it be more probable that this person should either deceive or be deceived, or that the fact which he relates should really have happened. I weigh the one miracle against the other; and according to the superiority which I discover, I pronounce my decision, and always reject the greater miracle. If the falsehood of his testimony would be more miraculous than the event which he relates; then,...
Side 94 - A prisoner who has neither money nor interest, discovers the impossibility of his escape, as well when he considers the obstinacy of the gaoler, as the walls and bars with which he is surrounded; and, in all attempts for his freedom, chooses rather to work upon the stone and iron of the one, than upon the inflexible nature of the other.
Side 80 - Suitably to this experience, therefore, we may define a cause to be an object followed by another, and where all the objects, similar to the first, are followed by objects similar to the second.
Side 18 - Here, therefore, we may divide all the perceptions of the mind into two classes or species which are distinguished by their different degrees of force and vivacity. The less forcible and lively are commonly denominated thoughts or ideas. The other species want a name in our language and in most others, I suppose, because it was not requisite for any but philosophical purposes to rank them under a general term or appellation. Let us, therefore, use a little freedom and call them impressions, employing...
Side 121 - Why is it more than probable that all men must die; that lead cannot, of itself, remain suspended in the air; that fire consumes wood, and is extinguished by water; unless it be that these events are found agreeable to the laws of nature, and there is required a violation of these laws, or in other words a miracle, to prevent them?