thoughts others have had before them, concerning the fame things that fo thofe may not be thought their own inventions which are common to themselves and others. If a man fhould try all the magnetical experiments himself, and publifh them as his own thoughts, he might take himself to be the inventor of them: but he that examines and compares with them what Gilbert, and others have done before him, will not diminish the praife of his diligence, but may wifh he had compared his thoughts with other men's by which the world would receive greater advantage, although he had loft the honour of being an original.

To alleviate my fault herein, I agree with your lordship, that many things may feemNEW,to one that converfes only withhis own thoughts, which really are not fo; but I muft crave leave to fuggeft to your lordship, that if in the fpinning them out of his own thoughts, they feem new to him, he is certainly the inventor of them; and they may as juftly be thought his own invention,as any one's; and he is as certainly the inventor of them, as any one who thought on them before him: the distinction of invention, or not invention, lying not in thinking firft, or not first, but in borrowing, or not borrowing, our thoughts from another: and he to whom, fpinning them out of his own thoughts, they seem new, could not certainly borrow them from another. So he truly invented printing in Europe, who, without any communication with the Chinese, fpun it out of his own thoughts; though it were ever fo true, that the Chihefe had the ufe of printing, nay, of printing in the very fame way, among them, many ages before him. So that he that fpins any thing out of his own thoughts, that feems new to him, cannot ceafe to think it his own invention, fhould he examine ever fo far, what thoughts others have had before him, concerning the fame thing, and fhould find by examining, that they had the fame thoughts too."

But what great obligation this would be to the world, or weighty cause of turning over and looking into books, I confefs I do not fee. The great end to me, in converfing with my own or other men's thoughts, in matters of fpecu-lation, is to find truth, without being much concerned whether my own spinning of it out of mine, or their spinning of it out of their own thoughts, helps me to it. And how little I affect the honour of an original, may be feen at that place of my book, where, if any where, that itch of vain. glory was likelieft to have hewn itfelf, had I been fo over sun with it, as to need a cure. It is where Ifpeak of cer

tainty, in these following words, taken notice of by yours lordship, in another place: “ I think I have fhewn wherein "it is that certainty, real certainty confifts, which whatever "it was to others, was, I confefs, to me, heretofore, one of "thofe defiderata, which I found great want of."

Here, my lord, however new this feemed to me, and the more so because poffibly I had in vain hunted for it in the books of others; yet I fpoke of it as new, only to myself : leaving others in the undisturbed poffeffion of what either by invention, or reading, was theirs before ; without affuming to myself any other honour, but that of my own ignorance, till that time, if others before had shown wherein certainty lay. And yet, my lord, if I had, upon this occafion, been forward to affume to myself the bonour of an original, I think I had been pretty fafe in it; fince I should have had your lordship for my guarantee and vindicator in that point, who are pleased to call it new; and, as fuch, to write against it.

And truly, my lord, in this refpect, my book has had very unlucky ftars, fince it hath had the misfortune to displease your lordship, with many things in it, for their novelty; as new way of reafoning; new hypothefis about reafon ; new fort of certainty; new terms; new way of ideas; new method of certainty, &c; and yet in other places, your lordship feems to think it worthy in me of your lordship's reflection, for faying, but what others have faid before; as where I fay, " In "the different make of men's tempers, and application of "their thoughts, fome arguments prevail more on one, and "fome on another, for the confirmation of the fame truth.” Your lordship afks, What is this different from what all men of understanding have faid? Again, I take it, your lordship meant not these words for a commendation of my book, where you say, But if no more be meant by "The fimple ideas "that come in by fenfation, or reflection, and their being "the foundation of our knowledge," but that our notions of things come in, either from our fenfes or the exercije of our minds: as there is nothing extraordinary in the difcovery, fo your lordfhip is far enough from oppofing that, wherein you think all mankind are agreed.

And again, But what need all this great noise about ideas and eertainty, true and real certainty by ideas; if, after all, it comes only to this, that our ideas only reprefent to us fuch things, from whence we bring arguments to prove the truth of things ?! But, the world hath been ftrangely amufed with ideas of late;

and we have been told, that firange things might be done by the help of ideas; and yet thefe ideas, at last, come to be only common notions of things, which we must make use of in our reasoning." And to the like purpose in other places.

Whether, therefore, at laft, your lordship will refolve, that it is new or no; or more faulty by its being new, must be left to your lordship. This I find by it, that my book cannot avoid being condemned on the one fide or the other, nor do I fee a poffibility to help it. If there be readers that like only new thoughts; or, on the other fide, others that can bear nothing but what can be juftified by received authorities in print; I must defire them to make themselves amends in that part which they like, for the displeasure they receive in the other: but if any should be fo exact, as to find fault with both, truly, I know not well what to say to them. The cafe is a plain cafe, the book is all over naught, and there is not a sentence in it, that is not, either for its antiquity or novelty, to be condemned, and fo there is a fhort end of it. From your lordship, indeed, in particular, I can hope for fomething better; for your lordship thinks the general defign of it fo good, that that, I flatter myfelf, would prevail on your lordship to preferve it from the fire.

But as to the way, your lordship thinks, I fhould have taken to prevent the having it thought my invention, when it was common to me with others, it unluckily fo fell out, in the fubject of my Effay of Human Understanding, that I could not look into the thoughts of other men to inform myself. For my defign being, as well as I could, to copy nature, and to give an account of the operations of the mind in thinking; I could look into no body's understanding but my own, to fee how it wrought; nor have a profpect into other men's minds, to view their thoughts there; and obferve what steps and motions they took, and by what gradations they proceeded in their acquainting themselves with truth, and their advance in knowledge: what we find of their thoughts in books, is but the result of this, and not the progrefs and working of their minds, in coming to the opinions or conclufions they fet down and publifhed.

All therefore, that I can fay of my book, ia, that it is a copy of my own mind, in its feveral ways of operation. And all that I can fay for the publishing of it is, that I think the intellectual faculties are made, and operate alike in most mens and that fome, that I thewed it to before 1 published it, liked

it fo well, that I was confirmed in that opinion. And therefore, if it should happen, that it fhould not be fo, but that fome men should have ways of thinking, reafoning, or arriv ing at certainty, different from others, and above those that I find my mind to use and acquiefce in, I do not fee of what ufe my book can be to them. I can only make it my humble request, in my own name, and in the name of those that are of my fize, who find their minds work, reafon,and know in the fame low way that mine does, that thofe men of a more happy genius would fhow us the way of their nobler flights; and particularly would discover to us their fhorter or furer way to certainty, than by ideas, and the obferving their a greement or disagreement.

Your lordship adds, But now, it seems, nothing is intelligible but what suits with the new way of ideas. My lord, The new way of ideas, and the old way of speaking intelligibly* was always and ever will be the fame and if I may take the liberty to declare my fenfe of it, herein it confifts: 1. That a man ufe no words, but fuch as he makes the figns of certain determined objects of his mind in thinking, which he can make known to another. 2 Next, that he use the fame word fteadily for the fign of the fame immediate object of his mind in thinking. 3. That he join thofe words together in prop ofitions, according to the grammatical rules of that language he fpeaks in. 4. That he unites thofe fentences in a coherent difcourfe. Thus, and thus only, I humbly conceive, any one may preserve himself from the confines and fufpicion of jargon, whether he pleases to call thofe immediate objects of his mind, which his words do, or should stand for, ideas or no. This dispute about ideas affiears to mis to turn whom this: The Bishop objects to ew Locke's doctrines of ideas eur Lock takes up this objections as applied to the Mr. Locke's Third Letter to the Bishop of Worcester. use of the term and is this argumer a poms to which the Bishop's remarks have no referemes. If this be the case it lays etv Locks opens to the imputations of elve great want want of discernment or of candid reply. If a however the Bishop's objection does refers to the of the terms it must be ednutted he is marked by great sensclipnes. 1825. July 21.04

me

CHAP. II.

NO INNATE PRINCIPLES IN THE MIND.

1. The way shown how we come by any Knowledge, fufficient to prove it not Innate.

T is an established opinion amongst fome men, that there are in the understanding certain innate principles, fome primary notions, Kova, characters as it were, ftamped upon the mind of man, which the foul receives in its very first being, and brings into the world with it. It would be fufficient to convince unprejudiced readers of the falfenefs of this fuppofition, if Ifhould only fhow (as I hope I fhall in the following parts of this difcourfe) how men, barely by the use of their natural faculties, may attain to all the knowledge they have, without the help of any innate impreffions; and may arrive at certainty, without any fuch original notions or principles. For I imagine any one will eafily grant, that it would be impertinent to fuppofe the ideas of colours innate in a creature, to whom God hath given fight and a power to receive them by the eyes, from external objects: and no lefs unreasonable would it be to attribute feveral truths to the impreffions of nature, and innate characters, when we may obferve in ourfelves faculties fit to attain as easy and certain knowledge of them, as if they were originally imprinted on the mind.

But because a man is not permitted, without cenfure, to follow his own thoughts in the fearch of truth, when they lead him ever fo little out of the common road, I fhall fet down the reasons that made me doubt of the truth of that opinion, as an excufe for my mistake, if I be in one; which I leave to be confidered by thofe, who, with me, difpofe themfelves to embrace truth wherever they find it.

2. General Affent, the great Argument.

THERE is nothing more commonly taken for granted, than that there are certain principles, both fpeculative